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ABSTRACT
FALLIBILITY AND EPISTEMIC NORMATIVITY
SEPTEMBER 2016
JOSHUA DIPAOLO, B.A., CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY
NORHTRIDGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON
Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Hilary Kornblith
We are fallible, and knowledge of our fallibility has normative implications. But these
normative implications appear to conflict with other compelling epistemic norms.
We therefore appear to face a choice: reject fallibility-based norms or reject these
other epistemic norms. I argue that there is a plausible third option: reconcile these
two sets of norms. Once we properly understand the nature of each of these norms,
we aren’t forced to reject either.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“To err is human.”
-- John Milton

1.1 Introduction
We are fallible – we make all sorts of mistakes when managing our beliefs – and we
know it. In order to minimize the damage our fallibility does to our intellectual lives,
not to mention our practical lives, we ought to account for our fallibility while
managing our beliefs. Beginning from what I consider to be plausible assumptions
regarding what accounting for our fallibility requires, this dissertation attempts to
defend this “Fallibility Norm.” Let me start with an example of what I think
accounting for our fallibility requires, then I’ll explain why the Fallibility Norm
requires defense, as I don’t take this to be obvious.
I was once arguing with a man about the proper probability assignments of
some dice rolls. I have great respect for this man’s general intellectual powers.
Regarding any subject about which we had equal training, I’m confident that he
would generally outreason me. But, unsurprisingly, there are some topics on which I
have more training than he does, and probability is one of them. Although he knows
a bit about probability, his formal training ended in elementary school. I don’t know
much about probability, but I know a bit more than he does. The question we were
arguing about was, “What is the probability of rolling the same number on two
dice?” I should have immediately disambiguated the question, but it was late, I was
tired, and I didn’t. I took the question to be “what’s the probability of rolling two
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sixes (for example)?” Easy: 1/36. This man’s answer: 1/6. We tried to convince each
other, but we failed. On what felt like the 100th iteration of the argument, the man
concluded that the probability experts, and all of probability theory, must be
mistaken. He reached this conclusion by granting that I was correct about what
probability theory implied the answer to the question was, while remaining confident
that his answer was correct, in spite of his admission of his relative lack of training in
probability and his admission that humans who lack training in probability often
have trouble reasoning about probability. “All of the experts are wrong, and you,
who have basically no formal training, are right?” I asked. “Yes, I guess so!” he
answered. This astonished me. How could someone so rational manifest such a lack
of intellectual humility? This was certainly a failure to account for his own fallibility.
That being said, he was right! Not about probability theory and the experts
being mistaken. He was right that the answer to the question he was addressing was
1/6. (“What is the probability of rolling two 1s, or two 2s, … or two 6s?” Easy: 1/6.)
It took us a long time to realize that we were addressing two different questions.
Surely, another failure to account for our fallibility.
Now, I certainly don’t endorse an absolute prohibition against disagreeing
with experts. But when you do disagree with experts – or, more generally, with those
who you recognize to be better suited to answering the question you’re addressing –
you need a good reason to think you’re right, and they’re wrong. And the fact that
you seem to have arrived at the correct answer and that answer isn’t the one they
endorse isn’t a good reason. You have some information they don’t; they’re blind to
or biased against the case in favor of your view for such-and-such reason; they
reached their conclusions while sleep-deprived, intoxicated, or on drugs, etc. Coming
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up with reasons like these, even when one has correctly assessed the relevant
considerations, seems to me to be what accounting for our fallibility at least
sometimes requires in these kinds of cases.
But this can be puzzling. What happens if you can’t come up with these sorts
of reasons? Even when we’ve correctly assessed the relevant considerations, does
respecting our fallibility really require us to give up beliefs that are best supported by
those considerations? It’s my aim, in this dissertation, to defend an affirmative
answer to this question against two thoughts that are, by my lights, mistaken.
The first thought is that there’s no puzzle here at all. Everyone should always
believe what their evidence supports. If at first you correctly assess your evidence
and then you gain reason to think you actually assessed your evidence incorrectly,
you may or you may not need to give up your belief. It just depends on whether your
evidence still supports your belief. The second thought is that, while there is indeed a
puzzle here, respecting our fallibility doesn’t require us to give up our beliefs when
we’ve correctly assessed our evidence. If at first you correctly assess your evidence
and then you gain reason to think you actually assessed your evidence incorrectly,
you need not – and, on some versions of this view, must not – give up your belief.
You don’t need special reasons to think you’re correct; your original evidence is
enough.
The first thought gives us plenty to complain about. One concern is that
evidence that one has incorrectly assessed their evidence behaves differently than
other kinds of evidence, and these differences cast doubt on the idea that it is “just
more evidence” to be added to all the rest. Another concern is that there is good
reason to suppose that even after you gain reason to think you’ve incorrectly
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assessed your evidence, it will still support your original belief. If that’s right, then
this option will recommend that you maintain your belief when it seems that
respecting your fallibility will require you to abandon it. A third concern is that this
strategy may not be sufficiently general. There are compelling epistemic norms that
clearly imply that you should believe in certain ways even if you have reason to think
otherwise. If these norms are norms of evidential support, this concern collapses
into the second concern. But if they are distinctive norms, then responding to the
puzzle by telling us to simply believe what our evidence supports doesn’t address the
full extent of the puzzle.
But if it’s true that your evidence sometimes still supports your belief even
after you have reason to think it’s mistaken, or if it’s true that these other norms
recommend maintaining your belief in this circumstance, why shouldn’t we stick with
the second thought? The main reason has its source in my reaction to the probability
argument example, and other examples like it. I simply don’t think the second
thought accurately captures what respecting our fallibility requires of us. Who really
cares what happens in the probability argument example? Since the man isn’t a
gambler, next to nothing practical hangs on his beliefs about the probability of dice
rolls. But the beliefs of doctors, judges, pilots, political leaders and others can have
major practical consequences. And simply relying on their beliefs when they face
strong reasons to doubt the epistemic standing of those beliefs, even if they’ve
accurately assessed their evidence, isn’t an appropriate way for fallible beings to
behave, especially those whose practically engaged beliefs will have major
consequences for their own lives and the lives of others.

4

More than this, though, I think the background normative picture is more
complicated than either the second thought or the first thought suggests. Simple
versions of both thoughts imply that we ought to always believe what our evidence
supports. Proponents of the first thought allow that evidence that you’ve incorrectly
assessed your evidence changes what your evidence supports, while proponents of
the second thought deny this, and these proponents recommend revising or
maintaining your beliefs, accordingly. But the claim that we ought to always believe
what our evidence supports receives no defense. Of course, that claim seems to be a
truism, and so it may appear to need no defense. Indeed, it can appear to be the only
game in town.
The major positive contribution of this dissertation, to my mind, is that it
shows that this last claim is a mistake. There are alternative theories of epistemic
normativity that, I contend, better capture the rational contribution made by our
recognition of our fallibility. At best, one of the theories canvassed in this
dissertation is true. At the very least, this dissertation encourages those working on
these issues to consider questions that are not usually considered in this field, and to
defend answers to those and other questions that are not usually defended.
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation
David Lewis once remarked, “I should have liked to be a piecemeal, unsystematic
philosopher, offering independent proposals on a variety of topics. It was not to
be.” 1 Well, regarding this dissertation, I should have liked to be a systematic
philosopher, offering a single coherent proposal. I’m afraid that in this respect, as in
so many others, I am much unlike Lewis. I have written the chapters of this
1

Lewis (1983: ix).
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dissertation as stand alone papers; there is next to no cross-reference between them,
and there is a bit of overlap and redundancy partly due to the fact that they all
address the same set of issues. What’s worse, how and whether they all fit together
may not be totally obvious. In the previous section, I provided a broad-brush
overview of the problem and aim of the dissertation. In this section, I’ll explain in a
little more detail what goes on in each chapter and how the chapters fit together.
A lot of the dissertation concerns higher-order evidence and higher-order
defeat. Higher-order evidence is evidence about the relation between one’s beliefs
and one’s evidence. Higher-order defeat occurs when one loses justification for one’s
beliefs as a result of acquiring higher-order evidence that beliefs resulted from some
cognitive malfunction, flaw in reasoning, or some other flawed process rather than
from a proper assessment of the evidence. A few central examples of higher-order
defeat are discussed throughout the dissertation. If you agree that the man in the
probability argument example loses justification for his belief when he comes to
believe that all of the probability experts disagree with him, then you can consider
that an example of higher-order defeat.
In chapter 2, “Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent” I show how
higher-order defeat differs from other types of defeat, by reviewing what others have
said in this regard and by arguing for a new identifying feature of higher-order defeat.
I argue that it is object-independent in the sense that whether one should revise
one’s belief in response to receiving higher-order evidence is independent of the
object of that belief. All of this is meant to go some way toward showing that
perhaps there is something noteworthy about higher-order evidence and higherorder defeat. One of the features that has been identified as a distinguishing feature
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of higher-order evidence is that it can defeat a subject’s justification for a belief
without changing whether her evidence supports that belief. If higher-order evidence
has this feature, and higher-order defeat occurs, then the “just more evidence” view
can’t be right. This is a negative conclusion. I also propose a positive account of how
higher-order defeat works, assuming that the distinction between what metaethicists
call “object-given reasons” and “state-given reasons” is exhaustive. On this account,
higher-order evidence defeats by providing agents with state-given reasons against
their beliefs.
In chapter 3, “Evidence and Fallibility” I consider whether an Evidentialist
account of higher-order defeat is sustainable. On Evidentialism, a belief is
epistemically justified or epistemically rational for an agent just in case it’s supported
by the agent’s total evidence. An Evidentialist account of higher-order defeat says
that higher-order evidence defeats by undermining the support provided by an
agent’s evidence for the defeated belief. In chapter 2, some reasons for doubting
such an account were offered. In this chapter, I consider some of those reasons in
more detail. Many proponents of Evidentialism don’t commit to particular principles
of evidential support. It can therefore be difficult to assess the claim that
Evidentialists can capture higher-order defeat, since it’s therefore difficult to assess
the claim that higher-order evidence defeats without changing evidential support. So,
in this chapter, I propose to consider these questions in light of what I take to be a
plausible principle of evidential support, namely that if a body of evidence entails a
proposition, it supports that proposition. Since entailment is a monotonic relation, if
you only add evidence to a body of evidence that entails a proposition, the resulting
body of evidence will still entail that proposition. Granting this principle of evidential
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support, if a body of evidence entails a proposition, then the only way belief in that
proposition can be defeated on an Evidentialist account is for the agent to lose some
of the entailing evidence when she acquires the defeating evidence. So, I consider the
prospects for an “evidence-loss” account of higher-order defeat in this chapter. No
one has discussed such a view in the literature, but both opponents and proponents
of Evidentialism have something to gain by considering its merits. However,
although there are initially compelling arguments in its favor, I think we, and those
committed to Evidentialism, should not adopt such an account. I conclude that there
is indeed good reason to think a non-Evidentialist account of higher-order defeat is
required.
In chapter 4, “Disagreement, Weight, and Exclusion,” I drop the assumption
from chapter 2, that the distinction between object-given and state-given reasons is
exhaustive, and I develop an account of higher-order defeat in terms of so-called
“exclusionary reasons.” Exclusionary reasons are not reasons for or against having
particular attitudes; rather, they are reasons against having particular attitudes on
particular bases. My wife might make me promise not to send our daughter to public
school; she also might make me promise not to send our daughter to public school
for financial reasons. The first promise provides me with a reason against sending
our daughter to public school. The second promise, however, provides me with a
reason against doing this for particular reasons without necessarily providing me with
a reason against sending her to public school. Exclusionary reasons don’t affect the
weight of reasons for or against particular options. Rather, they exclude certain
reasons from counting as reasons in a particular situation. Some have argued that
properly responding to higher-order defeat requires agents to bracket some of their
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evidence. I argue that there’s a good case to be made in favor of understanding this
bracketing requirement in terms of exclusionary reasons. This allows proponents of
bracketing requirements to answer an objection that is commonly advanced against
their view, namely, that it implausibly requires agents to ignore evidence. If the
bracketing requirement is based in exclusionary reasons, then agents can have
reasons to ignore evidence. If that’s right, then there needn’t be anything inherently
irrational in ignoring evidence.
Finally, in chapter 5, I take a step back. What is going on when we say that
agents ought to proportion their beliefs to their evidence, or when we say that agents
ought to account for their fallibility when managing their beliefs? Do these ought
claims conflict with each other? If they do, is one of them false? To address these
questions, I distinguish two kinds of norms, norms of perfection and norms of
compensation. Roughly, norms of perfection tell us how agents ought to behave if
they’re to be perfect; norms of compensation tell us how agents ought to behave in
order to compensate for their imperfections. This distinction is needed in any
normative discipline, I contend, and, therefore, provides a firm foundation for the
epistemological study of fallibility. I argue that the Fallibility Norm is a norm of
compensation, and that the norm that we ought to proportion our beliefs to our
evidence, and several other norms that apparently conflict with the Fallibility norm
are norms of perfection. So, it may be true that perfectly rational agents will always
believe what their evidence supports and never believe in accord with state-given
reasons or exclusionary reasons. But agents like us who know that they’re fallible
need to compensate for that fallibility by doing things that perfect agents would
never do (like, perhaps, believing in accord with state-given or exclusionary reasons).
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The conclusion is that there is something special about higher-order
evidence; it can’t just be accounted for in standard Evidentialist terms. And we don’t
have to reject, as totally misguided, the thought that agents ought to proportion their
beliefs to their evidence. But we do need to locate its significance in the right place,
and we shouldn’t necessarily criticize those whose beliefs aren’t properly
proportioned to their evidence if the reason their beliefs are this way is that they are
attempting to cope with their fallibility. This may be the best way of compensating
for their rational imperfection.
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CHAPTER 2
HIGHER-ORDER DEFEAT IS OBJECT-INDEPENDENT
“What is out of common is usually a guide rather than a hindrance.”
--Sherlock Holmes, A Study in Scarlet
2.1 Introduction
Higher-order evidence is evidence about the relation between one’s evidence and
one’s beliefs. Higher-order defeat occurs when one loses justification for one’s
beliefs as a result of acquiring higher-order evidence that these beliefs resulted from
some cognitive malfunction, flaw in reasoning, or other flawed process rather than
from a proper assessment of the evidence.
Several philosophers have identified features of higher-order defeat that
arguably distinguish it from more familiar types of defeat.2 David Christensen rightly
contends that, “[A]ny satisfactory epistemology will need to address the apparent
peculiarities with which [higher-order evidence] presents us. We will not fully
understand rational belief until we understand higher-order evidence.”3 Higher-order
evidence and higher-order defeat are, indeed, peculiar,4 and these peculiarities are
best seen as a guide to helping us understand the normative underpinnings of
rational belief. This paper identifies a new distinguishing feature of higher-order
defeat, and thereby describes a new observation that theories of rational belief must
capture.

See, for instance, Feldman (2005), Christensen (2010a), Schechter (2013), and Lasonen-Aarnio
(2014).
3 Christensen (2010a: 213).
4 Or, “out of common” as Holmes says.
2

11

It is too early to develop a complete theory of higher-order defeat because, I
think, we are still in the data-gathering phase on this issue. Nevertheless, in the
penultimate section, I tentatively suggest that the feature I identify favors a nonevidentialist account of higher-order defeat over an evidentialist one (i.e., a theory of
higher-order defeat may need to appeal to more than variation in evidential support
to explain this feature), and that this non-evidentialist account may also explain other
peculiar features of higher-order defeat.
In §2.2, I (i) describe the two most familiar types of defeat, (ii) provide
examples of higher-order defeat (HOD, hereafter), (iii) explain what others have
thought distinguishes HOD from these familiar types of defeat, and (iv) motivate the
project of studying distinctive features of defeat. In §2.3, I argue that HOD is
“object-independent.” To preview, this means that whether one should revise one’s
belief in response to receiving HOE is independent of the object of that belief. In
§2.4, I argue that the object-independence of HOD favors a hybrid account of the
normative underpinnings of rational belief in terms of both evidential, “objectgiven,” reasons and non-evidential, “state-given,” reasons. In §2.5, I conclude.

2.2 Background and Motivation
When acquiring new information results in a subject losing rationality or justification
for one of her beliefs, that new information defeats the rationality or justification of
that belief. I take this new information to be evidence, and I will use ‘justification’
and ‘rationality’ (and their cognates) interchangeably.5 Although defeat is a relation

It is plausible that one’s views on the nature of evidence and evidence possession may influence
one’s views on defeat, and vice versa. Thanks to an anonymous referee.

5
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between evidence and justification on my usage, I will sometimes speak of beliefs
themselves being defeated.
Beliefs and defeat are both of two sorts, categorical and graded. I discuss
both sorts of belief. If acquiring evidence makes a previously justified belief
unjustified, the defeat is categorical. If the belief ends up being less, though still,
justified, the defeat is graded. I focus on categorical defeat.
There are two familiar sorts of defeat: rebutting and undercutting. A standard
example of rebutting defeat involves a subject believing a universally quantified
proposition on the basis of a strong inductive generalization, and then encountering
a counterexample to the universal proposition:
Rebutting: Bob observes a large number of swans, noticing that they are all
white. Let E1 be his relevant evidence. On the basis of E1, Bob believes that
all swans are white. Then Bob learns E2, that there is a black swan.
There are two central features of cases of rebutting defeat. First, the original
evidence, E1, supports belief or high confidence in some proposition. Second, the
defeating evidence, E2, supports the negation of this proposition. By hypothesis,
Bob’s original evidence supports his belief that all swans are white. Then he acquires
evidence that there is a black swan. Bob’s belief is no longer rational because, in this
case, not only does his evidence no longer support this belief, it in fact supports its
negation.
Undercutting defeat differs from rebutting defeat over the second feature. As
John Pollock explains, undercutting defeat “attacks the connection between the
evidence and the conclusion, rather than attacking the conclusion itself.”6 Here is a
common example of undercutting defeat:
6

Pollock (1986: 39).
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Undercutting: Coco sees a wall that appears red to her. Let E1 be her relevant
evidence. On the basis of E1, Coco believes that the wall is red. Then she
learns E2, that there is a red light shining on the wall.
E2 is not evidence that the wall is not red. Intuitively, however, it does defeat Coco’s
justification for believing that the wall is red. Roughly, E2 is evidence that, in this
context, E1 is not evidence for the proposition that the wall is red.7 Like Rebutting,
in Undercutting the subject’s original evidence supports belief in some proposition.
Unlike Rebutting, in Undercutting the defeating evidence is not evidence that this
proposition is false.
Although undercutting defeaters are not, qua undercutters, evidence that the
defeated belief is false, this doesn’t mean that they cannot rebut this belief. With the
proper background evidence in place, evidence that a wall is being illuminated by a
red light can be evidence that the wall is not red. If Coco knows for certain that the
wall is red only if it’s not being illuminated by a red light, then learning E2 will not
only undercut but also rebut her justification. When identifying the unique
contributions made by one type of defeater in order to distinguish it from other
types of defeaters, we need to ignore cases with this kind of rich background
evidence.
Several philosophers argue that HOD is distinct from both rebutting defeat
and undercutting defeat. Call this the defeat distinctness hypothesis. These
philosophers have identified differences between HOD and these other types of
defeat. Before reviewing these claims, we should consider examples of HOD. Here is
a common case:

7

Alternatively, E2 is evidence that makes E1 less weighty. See Schroeder (2011) for a proposal like this.
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Hypoxia: Andy is piloting an airplane and after doing some calculations, she
becomes highly confident that she has enough fuel to fly to Hawaii on the
basis of the following evidence, E1:
• A full tank contains 20,000 miles worth of fuel.
• The tank is ¾ full.
• Hawaii was 16,000 miles from Andy’s point of departure.
• Andy has flown 5,000 miles toward Hawaii.
Then air traffic control provides her with a credible warning that as a result
of a drop in her oxygen supply any reasoning she’s done in the last five
minutes has probably been distorted without her knowing it. 8 Call this
information HOE1.
Andy’s reasoning is perfectly reasonable, we can suppose, as E1 entails that she has
enough fuel. 9 Intuitively, though, learning HOE1 makes maintaining her high
confidence irrational.10
Consider another case:
Disagreement: Dale and Donna reasonably consider each other to be
epistemic peers on meteorological issues, and they share the same (somewhat
complicated) evidence, E2, concerning whether it’s going to rain tomorrow.
After Dale becomes confident that it will not rain, he learns, HOE2, that
Donna believes that it will. Independent of their disagreement, Dale has no
reason to think that Donna is not assessing her evidence properly.
We can suppose that, in fact, Dale responded reasonably to his evidence.
Nevertheless, intuitively, learning HOE2 makes maintaining his confidence
irrational.11
These are standard cases of HOD. On the basis of relatively complex
reasoning, a subject adopts a reasonable belief. Then she acquires strong evidence
that her belief is due to some sort of cognitive malfunction or flaw in reasoning. This
This can actually happen. The condition is called hypoxia.
I assume that if she has more fuel than she needs, then she has enough. The first two propositions
entail that she has 15,000 miles worth of fuel and the second two propositions entail that she needs
11,000 miles worth of fuel to make it to Hawaii. So, this evidence entails that she has more fuel than
she needs, so it entails that she has enough.
10 For the same verdict, see Elga (2013), Christensen (2010b), and Schechter (2013). This example is
originally due to Elga.
11 Few philosophers working on disagreement dispute this claim, but see Kelly (2005) and Titelbaum
(2015).
8
9
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HOE is also typically evidence that, from the subject’s perspective, if this cognitive
malfunction did influence her beliefs, she would not know it. In other words, in
typical cases of HOD, the subject acquires evidence both that she is in the bad case
and that she cannot tell from her perspective whether she is in the bad case.
Acquiring this evidence makes maintaining her belief irrational. So, acquiring the
HOE defeats the belief’s rationality.
I’ll now list three features of HOD identified by others in support of the
defeat distinctness hypothesis. All three features distinguish HOD from rebutting
defeat, and all but the first feature distinguish it from undercutting defeat.
First, unlike rebutting defeat, HOD does not typically provide subjects with
evidence that the defeated proposition is false. This claim isn’t that HOD never
provides evidence of this, just as the corresponding claim isn’t that undercutting
defeat never does either. Like undercutting defeat, HOD typically defeats without
rebutting.
Second, HOD has a retrospective aspect: it provides subjects with evidence
that their beliefs were originally irrational.12 This is not how rebutting or undercutting
defeat work. When Bob learns that there is a black swan or when Coco learns that a
red light is shining on the wall, this new evidence doesn’t cast doubt on the
rationality of their original beliefs. However, the HOE that the subjects in Hypoxia
and Disagreement acquire (misleadingly) indicates that their original beliefs were
irrational.

See Christensen (2010: 185) and Lasonen-Aarnio (2014: 317). The phrase “retrospective aspect” is
Lasonen-Aarnio’s. Here is an alternative (rough) characterization of this retrospective aspect, covering
cases in which the subject has not yet formed the relevant belief: HOD provides subjects with
evidence that if they had formed beliefs of a certain kind, in a certain way, then those beliefs would
have been irrational. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting that I address this kind of case.
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The third point can be separated into two claims. Depending on one’s view
of evidential support, however, it may turn out that the claims are equivalent. Joshua
Schechter notes that conditional probabilities differ between undercutting cases and
(some) HOD cases. Compare the conditional probabilities in Undercutting and
Hypoxia. The probability that a wall that looks red is red is presumably greater than
the probability that a wall that looks red is red given that the wall is illuminated by
red lights. Whereas the probability that Andy has enough fuel given her original
evidence is no greater than the probability that she has enough fuel conditional on
her original evidence and that she is suffering from hypoxia.13 After all, her evidence
entails that she has enough fuel.
Christensen, going a step further, argues that HOE defeats the rationality of
one’s attitudes without changing whether one’s evidence supports those attitudes.14
This is true, he argues, both in cases (like Andy’s) where the evidence entails the
believed proposition and also in cases in which the evidence merely supports,
without entailing, the believed proposition.15 The claim that HOD leaves evidential
support intact when the subject’s evidence entails the defeated proposition is most
plausible in a framework that measures evidential support probabilistically. In this
framework, anything entailed by one’s evidence will be assigned probability 1
Schechter (2013: fn. 41).
In conversation, I’ve met with resistance to this interpretation. Some claim that although
Christensen thinks that the first-order evidential support remains intact, he wouldn’t say that the
subject’s total evidence still supports the defeated belief as strongly as it did before. This resistance is
misguided; this is exactly what he says (2010a: 195): In entailment cases of misleading HOE, “it is not
obvious why my total evidence, after I [acquire the HOE], does not support my original conclusion
just as strongly as it did beforehand. … there is a clear sense in which the facts which are not in
doubt—the parameters of the puzzle—leave no room for anything other than my original answer. Or,
to put it another way, the undoubted facts support my answer in the strongest possible way—they
entail my answer—, and this kind of connection cannot be affected by adding more evidence”
[emphasis added]. Hedging aside, in this passage Christensen clearly argues for the view I’m
attributing to him in the text. Lasonen-Aarnio (2014: 318) also attributes this view to him.
15 Christensen (2010a: 197).
13
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because one’s evidence is typically assigned probability 1, and a proposition that has
probability 1 conditional on one’s evidence has full evidential support. Moreover, it
will continue to receive full support, no matter how much evidence one acquires, as
long as one possesses the entailing evidence. Since Andy’s evidence entails that she
has enough fuel, unless she loses evidence, after she acquires the HOE it will still
entail and, hence, fully support this proposition.16 Even if Andy’s evidence only
provides strong, but non-conclusive support for her belief, her evidence might still
support this belief after she gets the hypoxia warning. Since the evidential relation
between Andy’s evidence and whether she has enough fuel doesn’t depend on any
claims about her physiology, adding evidence of hypoxia doesn’t change whether her
evidence supports the claim that she has enough fuel.
These are the main differences between HOD and other types of defeat that
have so far been identified.17 I do not mean to endorse these claims. Rather than
assessing their merits, however, I will argue for a new distinguishing feature, and this
argument will not presuppose these claims. But I will return to them in §4 to show
that they lend additional, independent support to the suggestion I make in that
section. Before I turn to my main argument, it’s worth motivating this project.
Most philosophers accept that theories of justification must account for
defeat. Often, however, philosophers address defeat simply by adding “No-

Kelly (2013: 47) also notes this probabilistic interpretation of Christensen’s argument.
This list is not exhaustive, but other alleged differences are not as compelling. Feldman (2005), for
instance, argues that whereas undercutting defeat attacks the connection between the evidence and
the conclusion in a particular case while leaving the general connection between that evidence and
conclusion intact, HOE attacks the general connection. Christensen (2010a: 194) convincingly
counters this suggestion. Kelly (2005: 187-8) argues that HOE is agent-relative in the sense that its
epistemic effects depend on who you are. On reflection, though, it’s not obvious that this feature
distinguishes it from other types of defeating evidence. The features discussed in the text, on the other
hand, are prima facie plausible as distinguishing features of HOD. Thanks to an anonymous referee
for motivating me to reconsider agent-relativity.
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Defeaters” clauses to their principles. As Schechter explains, “One of the lessons of
contemporary epistemology is that epistemic principles should generally include such
clauses.”18 If they do make specific proposals about how their principles interact with
defeat, these proposals typically suffer from one of two problems: either they fail to
account for all and only cases of defeat, or they conflict with the theory’s motivation.
For instance, Alvin Goldman admirably ends his seminal defense of process
reliabilism by attempting to account for defeat in his reliabilist framework.19 Three
such attempts, Goldman realizes, either betray the motivations for reliabilism (by not
being sufficiently reductive or by being “too internalist”—my phrase not his), or get
the wrong results (by implying justification where there should be defeat).20 And the
principle Goldman ends up endorsing is terribly vague.21 If theories of justification
ought to account for defeat, and it turned out that process reliabilism could not do
so, this would be a major cost of the view. Whether or not reliabilism can in fact
handle defeat, my point is that without considering the details, we would never know
whether it can.
Philosophers working on HOD have carefully attended to the normative
implications of defeat. Let’s consider three examples. 22 First, recall, Christensen

Schechter (2013: 437).
Goldman (1979/1992).
20 See Goldman (1979/1992: 122) for these three attempts (numbered 7-9). The first version contains
the term ‘justified,’ so will not work as a base clause for his recursive account of justification. The
second version, Goldman admits, gets the intuitively wrong result. The third version appeals to
“meta-beliefs,” which has problematic implications regarding unreflective creatures.
21 Goldman’s final principle: “If S’s belief in p at t results from a reliable cognitive process, and there
is no reliable or conditionally reliable process available to S which, had it been used by S in addition to
the process actually used, would have resulted in S’s not believing p at t, then S’s belief in p at t is
justified.” Goldman (1979/1992: 123) recognizes that it’s vague, but defends its vagueness by
appealing to the vagueness of our concept of justification. I find this move unsuccessful, but I cannot
argue for this here. See Beddor (forthcoming) on process reliabilism’s trouble with defeat.
22 These examples do not exhaust the interesting (potential) implications of HOE. For instance,
Schoenfield (forthcoming a) suggests that higher-order considerations may be relevant to the
evaluation of transitions of thought, rather than the evaluation of belief states. Relatedly, in her
18
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argues that HOE defeats while leaving evidential support intact; that is, acquiring
HOE can change whether one’s beliefs are justified without changing whether one’s
total evidence supports those beliefs. This directly contradicts evidentialism, the view
that justification supervenes on evidential support. Thus, if Christensen’s arguments
are sound, capturing HOD requires abandoning evidentialism.
Second, Christensen also argues that HOE is rationally toxic: once one has it
one is often forced into epistemic imperfection because one is bound to violate some
epistemic ideal. He argues for this conclusion on a number of grounds,23 but just
suppose that his claim that HOD leaves evidential support intact is true. Sometimes,
then, agents will have HOE that recommends believing something other than what
their evidence supports. Christensen argues that, in spite of this, believing what your
evidence supports is an epistemic ideal. But so is respecting one’s fallibility by
accounting for HOE in one’s beliefs. Thus, in a case of HOD, a person who
continues to believe what her evidence supports violates the “respect your fallibility”
ideal; but, if she believes what her HOE indicates, then she violates the “believe what
your evidence supports” ideal. Either way, she violates an ideal. And, Christensen
argues, violating these epistemic ideals forces her into epistemic imperfection.
Whether this argument is sound depends on whether HOD has the features
Christensen attributes to it. Thus, a theory of HOD may have implications
concerning whether all epistemic norms are always jointly satisfiable.

(forthcoming b) she argues that considering HOE reveals that there are distinct notions of rationality,
corresponding to third-person evaluation and to first-person deliberation.
23 See his (2010a, 2013). At (2013: 92), he makes a logically weaker case for this view.
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Finally, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio argues for several metaepistemological
conclusions regarding HOD.24 Those who take HOD seriously, she thinks, work
from two assumptions. First, that for any epistemic rule one can acquire evidence
that an attitude that is the output of that rule is actually flawed. And, second, that
one should revise one’s attitude when one acquires such evidence. She concludes
that “there is no non-paradoxical notion of justification or epistemic rationality that
can accommodate these ideas.”25 She endorses the rationality of epistemic akrasia:
one can rationally believe some proposition, while rationally believing that one
epistemically should not believe that proposition. This is a surprising conclusion that
many are likely to find unacceptable.26 Again, simply appealing to a No-Defeaters
clause would conceal the challenges Lasonen-Aarnio raises.
To determine whether standard theories of justification can accommodate
defeat in general, and HOD in particular, we need to examine the features of defeat.
Although Christensen’s and Lasonen-Aarnio’s assessments of HOE’s implications
differ, they converge on the conclusion that an investigation of HOE leads to
revisionary results. As I mentioned at the outset, I believe that reaching conclusions
about the implications of HOE would be premature. However, the fact that
conflicting, prima facie cases have been made in favor of this revisionary verdict
should make it clear that we need to examine HOD carefully. In the next section, I
continue that examination.

Lasonen-Aarnio (2014).
Lasonen-Aarnio (2014: 342). Cf. Schoenfield (forthcoming b).
26 For relatively early discussions of the problems associated with epistemic akrasia see Elga (2005)
and Feldman (2005). For recent, more detailed articulations of its problems see Greco (2014) and
Horowitz (2014).
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2.3 Object-Independence
In this section, I identify a feature of HOD – what I call object-independence – that
distinguishes HOD from rebutting and undercutting defeat. From the outset I want
to be clear that if it turned out that some cases of HOD don’t have this feature, I
wouldn’t take my argument to be undermined. I intend to argue that the standard
cases of HOD have this feature. In some cases undercutters attack the conclusion,
rather than merely attacking the connection between the evidence and the
conclusion, but these cases are non-standard, and they don’t show that undercutters
should not be distinguished from rebutters in the usual way. Likewise, even if there
are cases of object-dependent HOD, this wouldn’t show that HOD should not be
distinguished from undercutters and rebutters in this way. These cases, I suspect,
would be non-standard. Anyway, I will argue that the cases of HOD discussed in this
paper have this feature, and that the cases of rebutting and undercutting defeat do
not. I believe this argument can be generalized.
To begin to see the object-independence of HOD, consider the following
example:
Protective Pessimism: Ron is a Republican, and Don is a Democrat. By
Ron’s estimate, it’s likely, but not terribly likely that a Republican will win the
next presidential election. By Don’s estimate, it’s likely, but not terribly likely
that a Democrat will win.27 When it comes to politics, they both suffer from
protective pessimism: they tend to have lower confidence than their evidence
supports in political outcomes they find attractive. However, both Ron and
Don are completely unaware that they suffer from this affliction.28
Suppose Ron and Don were to learn of their protective pessimism. They would
thereby learn that their respective political beliefs likely resulted from a cognitive
malfunction or flaw in reasoning, and this would make maintaining their attitudes
27
28

For the sake of concreteness, imagine that each has only a 60% credence that his candidate will win.
This case is inspired by Christensen’s (2010b) Ava/Brayden cases.
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irrational. If we assume that both of their beliefs were originally justified—perhaps
this time they both overcame their pessimism—as I will,29 then this is a case of
HOD.30
Intuitively, in response to learning that they are protectively pessimistic, Ron
and Don should each become more confident that their preferred candidate will win.
Yet, the contents of their beliefs are clearly different: Ron believes that a Republican
will win, and Don believes that a Democrat will win. Thus, whether someone should
revise his belief in response to learning that he is protectively pessimistic appears to
be independent of the content of that belief. I submit that this is a general feature of
HOD: whether a subject should revise a belief in response to acquiring some HOE
that indicates that that belief resulted from some cognitive malfunction or flaw in
reasoning is independent of the object of that belief. In this sense, HOD is objectindependent.
To say that HOD is object-independent is just to say that whether a subject
should revise her belief in response to HOE is independent of the content of that
belief. If we judge that someone should revise her belief in response to some HOE,
then we will make this judgment regardless of whether she believes P or not-P. This
does not imply anything about what the resulting revision should be. It’s worth
emphasizing two points. First, we need to distinguish two questions: (1) Should I
revise my belief? (2) What should I (now) believe? Second, in cases of HOD, I claim,
the answer to the first question is independent of the content of the subject’s belief,
whereas the answer to the second question may not be. In Protective Pessimism,
This assumption is inessential. I’ll discuss this below in the text.
Don’t let the fact that the resulting attitude should be greater confidence rather than less confidence
throw you. Maintaining their previously rational beliefs is irrational as a result of acquiring HOE, so
this is a case of HOD.

29
30
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Ron and Don should both revise. In particular, they should both become more
confident. More confident in what? The answer to that question depends on how
their confidence is distributed; it depends on the objects of their beliefs. Ron should
become more confident that a Republican will win, and Don should become more
confident that a Democrat will win. How much more confident? That depends on
lots of things. For instance, when discussing disagreement, Thomas Kelly argues that
although both parties to the disagreement should reduce their confidence, the person
who originally responded correctly to her evidence need only reduce a little
compared to the person who originally bungled the evidence.31 Likewise, how much
more confident Ron and Don should become may depend on what their original
evidence supports. Or it may not. Saying that HOD is object-independent doesn’t
bear directly on this issue.
Juxtaposing cases like Ron’s and Don’s helps bring out the objectindependence of HOD. To see that this isn’t unique to this case, compare two
versions of Hypoxia:
Hypoxia (Original): …Andy is highly confident that she has enough
fuel…Then she acquires HOE1.
Hypoxia (New): …Andy is highly confident that she doesn’t have enough
fuel… Then she acquires HOE1.
The difference between these cases is the content of Andy’s beliefs. In Original, she
believes that she has enough fuel; in New, she believes the opposite. Acquiring
HOE1 seems to call for revision in both cases, in spite of Andy’s being confident in
one proposition in one case and confident in the negation of that proposition in the
other case. It’s not that she should revise because of what she believes. Rather, she

31

Kelly (2010).

24

should revise because, whatever she believes, that belief probably resulted from a
cognitive malfunction.
If it helps, imagine the following conversation between Andy and Sandy, the air
traffic controller who gave Andy the hypoxia warning, and who happens to be an
epistemologist.
Sandy: Andy, given our readings, you’re probably suffering from hypoxia!
Andy: Well, even if I am, I don’t think it matters. I managed to arrive at the
belief my evidence supports. I believe…
Sandy: [Cuts Andy off.] Look, I don’t care what you believe. You’re probably
suffering from hypoxia, which means you think you’re reasoning as well as
usual, but you’re not! Whatever you believe about your fuel, you need to
reduce your confidence, breathe in some oxygen, and we’ll go from there.
If, like Sandy, all we knew about Andy’s belief was that she arrived at high
confidence about whether she has enough fuel, without knowing which proposition
earned her confidence, we would still claim that she should revise that belief. The
object of her belief plays no role in the judgment that she should revise, and the
contribution of HOE1 is the same in both cases.32
Neither rebutting defeat, nor undercutting defeat is object-independent. If all
we knew about Bob and Coco was that they learned, respectively, that there is a
black swan and that there is a red light shining on the wall, we would not know
whether they should revise their respective beliefs. To know this we would have to
know what they already believe. I’ll focus on Undercutting, but the same points
apply to Rebutting:
Undercutting (Original): …Coco believes that the wall is red…Then Coco
learns that the wall is being illuminated by red lights.

We see basically the same thing in Disagreement, except because it’s an impure case of HOD, to
factor out the rebutting effect and to keep the HOE the same across both cases, we have to specify
the HOE as saying something like, “my peer believes the opposite of what I believe.”

32

25

Undercutting (New): …Coco doesn’t believe that the wall is red
[alternatively: Coco believes that the wall is not red]…Then Coco learns that
the wall is being illuminated by red lights.
Learning that the wall is being illuminated by red lights seems to call for revision in
Undercutting (Original), but not Undercutting (New). In the latter case, the new
information may not bear at all on her beliefs or it may provide some confirmation.
Either way, acquiring this information calls for revision in Undercutting (Original),
but not in Undercutting (New). And the only relevant difference between the cases is
the content of Coco’s beliefs.
Again, if it helps, imagine a conversation between Coco and her
epistemologist friend Dodo.
Coco: Dodo, I was previously confident about whether the wall is red. I’m
wondering, since I just learned that it’s being illuminated by red lights, should
I revise my belief?
Dodo: Well, that depends. If you were pretty confident that the wall is red,
then you should definitely revise your belief. If you were already confident
that the wall is not red, then there’s no need to revise.
Dodo’s response seems reasonable. We cannot know whether Coco should revise
her confidence without knowing what she already believes.
It is unsurprising that rebutting and undercutting defeat are object-dependent
when we consider their standard characterizations. Rebutting defeaters “attack the
conclusion,” while undercutting defeaters “attack the connection between the
evidence and the conclusion.” A rebutting defeater for a proposition is evidence that
this proposition is false; typically, the same piece of evidence will not indicate (for
people with similar evidence) that P and not-P are both false. And, regarding
undercutters, there is no reason to suppose that a single piece of evidence will attack
both the connection between evidence and a conclusion and the connection between
evidence and the negation of that conclusion.
26

When we reflect on examples of HOD, the object-independence of HOD, if
not unsurprising, at least makes sense. When Ron and Don learn that they are
protectively pessimistic, they learn that they tend to be underconfident on certain
matters. When Dale discovers that Donna disagrees with him, from his perspective,
he learns that “my peer believes the opposite of me.” When Andy learns that her
belief probably resulted from hypoxia, she learns that her belief probably resulted
from a distorting influence. At bottom, each of these subjects learns the same thing:
whatever I believe regarding some issue, that belief is flawed. The defeating evidence
is not tied to the content of any particular belief.
Someone may object by presenting the following dilemma. Horn 1: the pairs
of cases don’t both involve defeat. Horn 2: the evidence differs between the cases.
The dilemma can be motivated by two thoughts. First, defeat requires defeated
beliefs to be justified initially. Second, a single body of evidence can justify only one
of a pair of inconsistent beliefs. Given these two thoughts, either the evidence is the
same in both cases and both beliefs are not initially justified, or both are justified and
the evidence differs. If Horn 1 is true, then we can’t compare the cases to learn
lessons about HOD (because they are not both cases of defeat). If Horn 2 is true,
then there’s another difference between the cases besides the object of the subjects’
beliefs. Either way, the argument doesn’t show that HOD is object-independent.
This objection appeals to the denial of permissivism. According to
permissivism, two people with the same evidence can have justified beliefs in
opposing propositions. But this denial is controversial, and if my view relied on
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permissivism, that wouldn’t be a huge cost. 33 However, the dilemma doesn’t
essentially rely on this denial. The dilemma could be run by pointing to particular
cases, claiming that those cases are impermissive. This will be more or less plausible
depending on the case. Protective Pessimism is a paradigmatic permissive case
(according to permissivists), but Hypoxia is not plausibly permissive as Andy’s
evidence entails her belief.
Nevertheless, this objection misses the point for two reasons.34 First, the
argument for the object-independence of HOD doesn’t depend on there being no
differences between the pairs of cases aside from the content of the subjects’ beliefs.
Admittedly, the case for object-independence is stronger if that is the only
difference. But even if there are other differences, if they don’t explain why HOE
appears to be object-independent, then these differences are irrelevant in this
context.
Second, and more importantly, my argument identifies a difference between
the defeating effect of HOE, on the one hand, and that of rebutting and
undercutting evidence, on the other. Regardless of whether Horn 1 or Horn 2 is true,
the argument appealing to the pairs of cases does this. In both cases, acquiring the
hypoxia warning provides Andy with a reason to revise her belief. The corresponding
claim is not true of Rebutting and Undercutting. That is the observation driving my
argument, and it remains regardless of how we fill out the cases.

One of the seminal (recent) works on this issue is White (2005). For critical discussion of that
paper, see Meacham (2014). See, also, Schoenfield (2014) for a defense of permissivism.
34 I mention it because I anticipate that those working on the issues discussed in this paper might be
inclined to think in these terms.
33
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This point can also be made by “counting mistakes.” 35 Suppose that in
Hypoxia (New) Andy’s original evidence is the same as her evidence in Hypoxia
(Original). In both cases, then, Andy’s evidence supports high confidence in the
proposition that she has enough fuel. Now consider only Hypoxia (New). Suppose
that after she gets the hypoxia warning, she remains highly confident in her belief. In
this scenario, Andy has made two mistakes. She didn’t believe what her original
evidence supported, and now she fails to respond appropriately to the HOE. The
latter mistake is the same mistake Andy would make by failing to revise in Hypoxia
(Original). In the analogous setup, in Undercutting (New) Coco makes only one
mistake. Even if she believes that the wall is not red when her original evidence
supports the proposition that the wall is red, maintaining her belief after learning that
the wall is being illuminated does not constitute an additional mistake.

2.4 Upshot
In this section, I speculate on what implications the object-independence of HOD
has for a theory of rational belief. I argue that both on its own, and in conjunction
with the other distinguishing features described in §2, the object-independence of
HOD favors an account of HOD grounded in non-evidential, “state-given” reasons
for belief. If this is correct, then an account that grounds HOD in state-given
reasons has the potential to explain its peculiarities. This explanatory payoff is what
makes this account significant.36

See Schechter (2013: 433) for a similar argumentative strategy.
The following argument provides only a sketch, and along the way, I flag claims that need additional
investigation.

35
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Metaethicists distinguish between two sorts of reasons: state-given reasons
and object-given reasons.37 Using this distinction (to be explained presently), we can
state two hypotheses about HOD:
SG-Hypothesis: HOD defeats by providing subjects with state-given
epistemic reasons against their beliefs.
OG-Hypothesis: HOD defeats by providing subjects with object-given
epistemic reasons against their beliefs.
I will suggest that the object-independence of HOD favors the SG-Hypothesis over
the OG-Hypothesis.
Consider the proposition that God exists; call it G. The Teleological
argument provides one reason to believe G: roughly, God’s existence is the best
explanation of the apparent design we observe. This argument (suppose) gives us
reason – evidence – to believe that G is true. Another reason to believe G is
provided by Pascal’s Wager: roughly, there is extreme disvalue associated with not
believing G. Pascal’s Wager doesn’t purport to provide evidence that G is true, but it
is meant to provide reason to believe G. These are different kinds of reasons for
belief. We can refer to the first kind of reason as an object-given reason and the
second kind as a state-given reason. 38 This distinction, I will assume, is jointly
exhaustive: if a reason isn’t object-given, then it is state-given (and vice versa).
Although my main focus in this section is metaepistemological, it’s worth
briefly mentioning some metaethical implications of the SG-Hypothesis. Derek
Parfit is skeptical of the significance of state-given reasons because, he contends,
state-given reasons are redundant given object-given reasons; since we of course

See, e.g., Parfit (2011) and Schroeder (2012).
It may be that some state-given reasons are also object-given reasons. For the value/disvalue
associated with the state that grounds a particular state-given reason may be located in the object of
that state. In what follows, I focus on mere state-given reasons. I will leave the “mere” implicit.
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need to appeal to object-given reasons, it’s not worth discussing state-given
reasons.39 Mark Schroeder defends the significance of state-given reasons against the
prevailing orthodoxy that these reasons are the “wrong kind of reason,” by arguing,
inter alia, that we have state-given epistemic reasons against believing and
disbelieving, in favor of withholding judgment – an attitude that has no object, and
hence, that we cannot have object-given reasons to adopt.40 Schroeder’s argument
for epistemic state-given reasons, however, is limited to reasons to withhold. If
capturing the object-independence of HOD does indeed require state-given reasons,
as I argue, then that is reason to reject Parfit’s skepticism and to extend our
judgment of the significance of state-given reasons beyond the limits of Schroeder’s
argument. It also provides independent reason to reject the prevailing orthodoxy that
state-given reasons are the wrong kind of reasons for belief, since the reasons
provided by HOD are clearly of the right kind. Thus, if the SG-Hypothesis is true, it
has several metaethical ramifications in addition to its epistemological implications.
Return now to the epistemological domain. As our focus here is on defeat,
we are interested in reasons to revise one’s beliefs. Reasons to revise a belief must be
grounded in (apparent) facts about the disvalue of maintaining that belief; if there
were nothing wrong with holding that belief, there would be no reason to revise it.
Object-given reasons to revise a belief locate the disvalue of that state in its content.
In the case of object-given epistemic reasons, that disvalue is linked to the (probable)
falsity of the belief’s content.41 State-given reasons to revise a belief do not locate the

Parfit (2011: 51). See also Appendix A in that volume. The “it’s not worth” claiming or discussing
locution applied to state-given reasons is Parfit’s.
40 Schroeder (2012).
41 In particular, the reason to revise may be that the object of the belief is false or that it is less likely
to be true, and hence, more likely to be false than previously thought.
39
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disvalue of that state in its content; there may be something about holding that
belief, independent of its content, that makes maintaining it bad, and this badness
gives rise to a state-given reason against maintaining it. Thus, whereas object-given
reasons to revise a belief do depend on the belief’s content, state-given reasons to
revise do not.
Object-given epistemic reasons, then, are the same as evidence, and the OGHypothesis is a standard evidentialist picture of HOD. State-given reasons, on the
other hand, are not evidence, and hence, the SG-Hypothesis is an anti-evidentialist
picture. Several prominent philosophers take HOE to be “just more evidence,” and,
accordingly take HOD to be amenable to an evidentialist picture like the OGHypothesis. 42 An argument for the SG-Hypothesis, therefore, is an argument against
this prominent approach to HOD.
Here is my main argument. Higher-order defeaters provide subjects with
reasons to revise their beliefs. Since HOD is object-independent, it provides subjects
with reasons to revise their beliefs that do not depend on the content of those
beliefs. This is why the object-independence of HOD favors the SG-Hypothesis
over the OG-Hypothesis: the reasons provided by HOD cannot be object-given
reasons if HOD is object-independent, so they must be state-given reasons.
This argument raises at least three questions:
1. The reasons provided by HOD are clearly epistemic, but Pascal’s Wager
provides a pragmatic reason. If this is the paradigmatic case of a stategiven reason, does this mean there is no precedent for epistemic stategiven reasons, making the SG-Hypothesis is a non-starter?

See, for instance, Feldman (2009) and Kelly (2010). In addition, Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) admits that
she is “very sympathetic to the thought that higher-order evidence should be treated as just more
evidence,” though she disagrees with Feldman and Kelly about the implications this thought has for
an account of HOD.
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2. If the SG-Hypothesis is a “non-evidentialist” picture of HOD, what role
does higher-order evidence play?
3. If state-given reasons depend on content-independent disvalue, what is
the disvalue that gives rise to the state-given reasons that ground HOD?
In what follows, I address each question in turn. Then I conclude the section by
replying to a more general worry, arguing that the other distinguishing features of
HOD described in §2.2 also favor the SG-Hypothesis.
Regarding Question 1, the first thing to note is that there may be examples of
state-given epistemic reasons unrelated to HOD. Consider: while you’re waiting for a
medical test result, your expectation that you’ll soon receive further evidence
provides you with an epistemic reason to suspend judgment, even though this fact is
not evidence either way regarding the result.43 Or another: the fact that P entails Q is
an epistemic reason to avoid the state of believing P and disbelieving Q, but this sort
of reason isn’t clearly evidence either.44 Or finally: the fact that two hypotheses are
on a par with respect to all theoretical virtues except that one is simpler than the
other provides a reason to believe the simpler one. But, again, this is not obviously
evidence since simplicity is non-truth-conducive. Moreover, the (epistemic) value of
adopting belief in a simpler hypothesis is, one might argue, that it increases
coherence of one’s total belief state. So, this reason is arguably state-given rather
than object-given because the value associated with adopting such a belief derives
not from the object of the belief itself, but from a feature of the total belief state. 45
These seem to be examples of state-given epistemic reasons for/against certain
This example is from Schroeder (2012).
This example is from Sosa & Sylvan (forthcoming).
45 I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for reminding me of this potential precedent. Lycan (1988),
for instance, defends a version of coherentism according to which what justifies a new belief is that it
increases explanatory coherence among one’s set of beliefs, and whether one hypothesis is a better
explanation than another depends on its possession of theoretical virtues. Lycan admits that some of
these virtues are not truth-conducive.
43
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mental states.46 If that is correct, then there is a precedent for admitting state-given
epistemic reasons into one’s normative framework.
Setting this precedent would certainly bolster the case for the SGHypothesis, and if it turns out to be a contender, this would be a step to take in
future research. However, even if no precedent could be set, this wouldn’t doom the
SG-Hypothesis. HOD differs from other kinds of defeat. Depending on how
different HOD is, it may be completely unsurprising that there is no precedent.
Recall the revisionary results suggested by Christensen’s and Lasonen-Aarnio’s
arguments, that HOE is rationally toxic and that there is no non-paradoxical notion
of justification that can accommodate HOD. No one thinks rebutting or
undercutting defeat have implications like this. It may turn out that the name of the
HOD game is “unprecedented.”
Question 2: What is the relationship between HOE and HOD on the SGHypothesis, a “non-evidentialist” picture? Answer: HOE provides evidence of the
epistemic disvalue of maintaining a belief, and having evidence of this disvalue gives
rise to a state-given epistemic reason against maintaining this belief. In general, when
a subject has evidence that there is some value or disvalue associated with being in
some state S – besides having a true/false object – this gives her a state-given reason
to adopt or give up S. For instance, suppose Ethel is suffering from cancer, and her
doctor informs her of studies showing that patients who believe they will recover
tend to recover more frequently than those who don’t. Ethel has evidence (provided
Whether these examples succeed may depend on complex issues about the nature of belief and
suspension of judgment, issues that I cannot address here. For instance, if suspension of judgment has
an object, then perhaps the first example is an example of an object-given reason; or, if believing P
and disbelieving Q is just to believe the conjunction P&~Q, then perhaps the second example is too.
As I argue in the next paragraph in the text, if they don’t happen to be examples of state-given
reasons, the main argument of this section would only be slightly weakened. Thanks to an anonymous
referee for urging me to address this issue.
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by the doctor’s testimony) that there is value associated with believing that she will
survive. And this gives rise to a (pragmatic) state-given reason to believe she will
survive. On the SG-Hypothesis, the same applies to HOE. When Andy gets the
hypoxia warning, she acquires HOE that there is some epistemic disvalue associated
with her belief. This gives rise to a state-given reason against holding this belief.
Thus, although HOD, like all defeat, can ultimately be traced to evidence, what
explains HOD is not that the subject’s evidence no longer supports the relevant
belief—the evidence may still support this belief. Rather, it’s that the evidence
indicates that there is content-independent disvalue associated with maintaining the
belief.
Question 3: What is the alleged, object-independent epistemic disvalue to
which HOE points that gives rise to the state-given reasons that ground HOD? I
don’t have a full account to offer here, but there are at least three prima facie
plausible answers that come to mind: When Andy gets the hypoxia warning, she
simultaneously gains evidence (i) that her belief is not supported by her evidence, (ii)
that her belief is epistemically irrational, and (iii) that it does not constitute
knowledge. And there is epistemic disvalue associated with each of (i)-(iii), disvalue
that needn’t depend on the belief’s object, and that may be enough to warrant
revision.47
The SG-Hypothesis differs in important respects from other accounts of
HOD. Its appeal to non-evidential, state-given epistemic reasons makes it anti-

That HOE provides evidence of (i) is a central premise in the debate over the rationality of
epistemic akrasia (see fn. 26 above for references). Christensen (2010b) also makes this suggestion.
See the references in fn. 12 for (ii). Since (i) and (ii) are plausibly necessary conditions for (iii), the
arguments favoring (i) and (ii) favor (iii).
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evidentialist, unlike Richard Feldman’s and Thomas Kelly’s accounts.48 It also has an
advantage over level-bridging accounts of HOD. On these accounts, the rationality
of a subject’s lower-order belief gets defeated solely as a result of the subject having a
higher-order belief that something is epistemically wrong with the lower-order belief.
In Andy’s case, for example, HOD requires two steps: first, after acquiring the
hypoxia warning, she should become confident that something is wrong with her
first-order belief; second, as a result of adopting this confidence, and only as a result
of this, she should revise her first-order belief. If the HOE fails to make her
confident that something is wrong with her first-order belief, then it does not affect
the rationality of that belief.49 This, however, strikes me as the wrong result. The
intuition that Andy should revise her first-order belief once she receives the HOE is
present without knowing whether she changes her higher-order beliefs. Even if Andy
thinks nothing is wrong with her first-order belief, maintaining this first-order belief
is irrational because her evidence indicates that something is epistemically wrong
with this belief. 50 The SG-Hypothesis gets the right result here. As explained in
response to Question 2, HOD occurs when a subject has a (sufficiently strong) stategiven reason against her belief, and such a reason arises when she has (sufficiently
strong) HOE that there is something epistemically wrong with that belief. So, on the
SG-Hypothesis once Andy acquires the HOE, the rationality of her first-order belief
is defeated regardless of whether she changes her mind about the rationality of that
belief.
Feldman (2009) and Kelly (2010).
Three notes. First, this obviously does not imply that level-bridging accounts cannot criticize the
resulting belief-state. Second, Christensen (2013: 91) seems to endorse a level-bridging account. Third,
in articulating this account, I’m echoing David Lewis’s (1986a: 85) discussion of the relation between
evidence and beliefs about chance and outcomes.
50 Cf. Schechter (2013: fn. 35).
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The SG-Hypothesis also avoids the potentially problematic implications
associated with the views of Lasonen-Aarnio and Christensen (§2). In providing an
account of HOD, it avoids the claim, made by Lasonen-Aarnio and others51, that
accommodating HOE leads to rational epistemic akrasia. It can also avoid claiming,
as Christensen does, that accommodating HOE forces one into epistemic
imperfection. Recall, Christensen argues for this claim by showing that once one has
HOE one is often bound to violate an epistemic ideal.52 But, from the perspective of
the SG-Hypothesis – a perspective that takes epistemic reasons seriously – the step
from violating ideals to epistemic imperfection is questionable. In the case of action,
for instance, not lying may be an ideal and avoiding causing harm may be another
ideal, but when these ideals conflict, no imperfection must result. This is because the
ideals should not be seen as exceptionless rules, but as being or grounding different
contributory reasons, which should be weighed against each other to yield an overall
recommendation.53 Likewise, on the SG-Hypothesis, it may be true that there are
conflicting epistemic ideals (e.g., “respect your evidence” and “respect your
fallibility”), but violating one in favor of the other needn’t lead to any epistemic
imperfection because each ideal provides a different reason that should be weighed
against the other to yield an overall recommendation. Just as we needn’t accuse an
agent of being morally imperfect for lying to avoid harm in spite of his violating an
ideal against lying, we shouldn’t accuse an epistemic agent of being epistemically
imperfect for violating a “respect your evidence” ideal in favor of a “respect your
fallibility ideal,” in the right circumstances. And those circumstances will be ones in

See Horowitz’s (2014) excellent overview of the work that recommends epistemic akrasia.
See Christensen (2010: 192-3, 204) and (2013: 95).
53 See Dancy (2004: 3-12).
51
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which the agent’s state-given epistemic reasons against her belief outweigh her
object-given epistemic reasons for that belief.54
Finally, one might insist that a standard evidentialist/object-given framework
can account for object-independence. Both Ron and Don have strong evidence that
their belief resulted from a cognitive malfunction. Since this evidence isn’t tied to any
particular content, it is not object-dependent, and when a person has strong evidence
of this sort, her evidence no longer supports that belief. What’s the problem?
How plausible this line is partly depends on whether HOD has the other
features described in §2 that allegedly distinguish it from undercutting defeat. This is
because the SG-Hypothesis appears to have the explanatory advantage over the OGHypothesis with respect to those features. While the OG-Hypothesis is consistent
with the retrospective aspect of HOD, the SG-Hypothesis actually makes predictions
that cohere with it, and the OG-Hypothesis makes no such predictions. On the SGHypothesis, it’s not surprising that HOE provides evidence that the defeated belief
was epistemically irrational, as believers in the retrospective aspect claim. This
hypothesis predicts that HOE provides subjects with evidence that there is some
object-independent epistemic disvalue associated with the defeated belief. And
evidence that this belief is epistemically irrational is arguably disvalue of that kind.
On the OG-Hypothesis, the retrospective aspect is surprising, as no other defeating
evidence works like this.
Things are worse for the OG-Hypothesis regarding the features identified by
Christensen and Schechter because those features recommend an anti-evidentialist
Admittedly, this relies on an account of weighing object-given and state-given reasons together, and
I have no such account to offer here. But insofar as the distinction between these kinds of reasons is
one we already needed, my appeal to this weighing relation brings with it no new commitment.
However, this is definitely an element of the account that requires further development.
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account of HOD. Thus, as an evidentialist account, the OG-Hypothesis is not even
consistent with HOD’s having these features. Moreover, it’s worth noting that my
arguments that HOD is object-independent and that this favors the SG-Hypothesis
do not rely on claiming that HOD has the features identified by Christensen and
Schechter. Yet, our arguments converge on an anti-evidentialist approach. This
independent convergence provides additional support to the SG-Hypothesis over the
OG-Hypothesis. More than this, though, the SG-Hypothesis is not only a negative
picture of HOD. Rather, it provides a positive proposal that explains why
evidentialist accounts of HOD fail: capturing HOD requires state-given epistemic
reasons – reasons an evidentialist will not countenance.
If HOD does not leave evidential support intact, or if it does not have a
retrospective aspect, and if a plausible story explaining the object-independence of
HOD on the OG-Hypothesis can be told, object-independence may not favor the
SG-Hypothesis over the OG-Hypothesis. If, on the other hand, HOD has either of
these other features, or if the OG-Hypothesis cannot explain object-independence,
then the object-independence of HOD may indeed favor the SG-Hypothesis. This is
partly why it is too early to tell what an account of HOD will look like. Whether
certain alleged facts are data an account of HOD must capture is still unclear. Once
we settle which data must be captured, as I have urged that we need to do and have
started to do in this paper, we will be in a better position to provide a comprehensive
account of HOD.
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2.5 Conclusion
The defeat distinctness hypothesis is true: higher-order defeat is distinct from
rebutting defeat and undercutting defeat. What an adequate theory of epistemic
norms looks like depends on what distinguishing features higher-order defeat has.
These features, therefore, must be studied and assessed.
I have identified a feature of higher-order defeat that distinguishes it from
other kinds of defeat, namely, object-independence: whether a person should revise a
belief in response to acquiring higher-order defeaters is independent of the object of
that belief. Comparison of cases and reflection on the different types of defeat both
suggest that higher-order defeat, but not these other types, has this feature.
Finally, I have gestured toward what a theory of rational belief that captures
the object-independence of higher-order defeat might look like: a hybrid theory,
essentially appealing to both object-given and state-given epistemic reasons. If
everything I’ve argued here is correct, much more still needs to be known about
higher-order defeat to adequately defend this theory. Even if object-independence
does not distinguish higher-order defeat from other types of defeat, if any defeat is
object-independent, the proposal that capturing object-independence requires stategiven reasons may still be correct, and a hybrid theory may still be needed. In any
case, a closer look at these details will advance our understanding of higher-order
defeat and, thereby, advance our understanding of rational belief.
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CHAPTER 3
EVIDENCE AND FALLIBILITY

A wise man…proportions his belief to the evidence.
–Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
In general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds
of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner.
–Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding55

3.1 Introduction
Consider two plausible thoughts. The first thought – the Evidentialist Dictum – is
that we must believe what our evidence supports. The second thought – the
Fallibility Norm – is that we must account for our fallibility when managing our
beliefs. Both thoughts are incredibly plausible.
Nevertheless, there is a tension between applications of these two thoughts.56
Consider the debate surrounding peer disagreement. Those who give priority to the
Fallibility Norm insist that when confronted with a disagreeing peer, you should
often reduce your confidence on the disputed issue.57 Those who give priority to the
Evidentialist Dictum accuse these theorists of recommending that agents
inappropriately ignore evidence. 58 And even among conciliationists – those who
think peer disagreement often requires a reduction of confidence – there are those
Hume (1999: 170, 208).
Work addressing this tension includes: Christensen (2007b, 2010, 2011, 2013), Elga (2007), Feldman
(2005, 2009), Horowitz (2014), Kelly (2005, 2010), Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), Schechter (2013),
Titelbaum (2015), Schoenfield (forthcoming a), Sliwa & Horowitz (2015), Weatherson (2013, ms.).
57 See, e.g., Christensen (2007a), Elga (2007), Feldman (2007), and Kornblith (2010).
58 Kelly (2010, 2013), Lord (2014), Weatherson (2013, ms.), and Schoenfield (2015).
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who believe such epistemic modesty has its limits: although awareness of our
fallibility should make us reduce our confidence on other disputed matters, no
information about our fallibility can make it reasonable to reduce confidence in
conciliationism itself.

59

In other words, the evidence will always favor

conciliationism, and no amount of disagreement can make it reasonable to ignore
that evidence.
Is the tension between the Evidentialist Dictum and the Fallibility Norm real
or merely apparent? The answer is: it’s complicated. I begin by investigating this
apparent tension from the perspective of the proponent of the Evidentialist Dictum.
In particular, I will articulate a puzzle based on considerations of fallibility that a
proponent of the Evidentialist Dictum must address. 60 I will then consider the
prospects of a response to this puzzle – an “evidence-loss” response – that has the
potential to dispel the tension. This sort of response has not been discussed in the
literature, but the case against the Evidentialist Dictum depends on it being
untenable. So both friends and foes of the Dictum have something to gain by
considering it.
The tension between the Evidentialist Dictum and the Fallibility Norm –
hereafter, simply, the tension – may appear easily dissolvable: that we are fallible is
itself just more evidence to be balanced against all the rest.61 Although this position
was a compelling pretheoretical stance, several theorists have recently argued that

Drawing on work by Lewis (1971) and Field (2000), Elga (2010) argues for this claim. Christensen
(2013) defends limitless epistemic modesty, and Schechter (2013) argues that reasoning favoring
limitations to epistemic modesty has implausible consequences.
60 The puzzle is inspired by Christensen (2010a). See also Christensen (2011: 19-20).
61 Lasonen-Aarnio (2014: 317-8) nicely articulates this response, to which she is sympathetic. Feldman
(2009) and Kelly (2010) are the main proponents of the “just more evidence” view of evidence of
error.
59
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evidence of fallibility differs importantly from more mundane evidence,62 and the
puzzle described in the next section bolsters this claim. In the end, maybe these
theorists are wrong, and maybe the puzzle can be easily solved. But the “just more
evidence” view can no longer be taken for granted.
After articulating the puzzle in §3.2, and explaining and motivating the
evidence-loss account in §3.3, I will argue in §3.4 that the evidence-loss account
provides the wrong sort of response to the puzzle and has an implausible
consequence, viz. that it makes evidence possession “purpose-relative,” in a sense I
will explain. 63 In §3.5, I briefly address other responses to the puzzle. Then I
conclude in §3.6.

3.2 The Puzzle
We make all sorts of errors: we misremember, we think we see something we didn’t,
we make fallacious inferences, we misapply good rules of inference, etc. These are
epistemic errors because they often lead to inaccurate beliefs. Throughout, my
reference to our fallibility signifies our proclivity toward epistemic error.
To begin to see the puzzle our fallibility gives rise to, let’s start with an
example:
Hypoxia: After doing some calculations while piloting an airplane, Andy
becomes highly confident that she has enough fuel to fly to Hawaii on the
basis of the following evidence, E:
• A full tank contains 20,000 miles worth of fuel.
• The tank is ¾ full.
• Hawaii was 16,000 miles from Andy’s point of departure.
See, for instance, Christensen (2010a), Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), Schechter (2013), and Schoenfield
(forthcoming b).
63 This is not the same as saying that evidence is “interest-relative,” as Stanley (2005: ch. 9) argues. I
discuss this view in §3.4.
62
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• Andy has flown 5,000 miles toward Hawaii.
Then air traffic control warns her that, as a result of a drop in her oxygen
supply, any reasoning she’s done in the last five minutes has probably been
distorted without her knowing it.64
In this example, Andy receives evidence that she has likely made an error in her
calculations. Call this kind of evidence – evidence that one has made an epistemic
error – higher-order evidence. The intuition that Andy should reduce her confidence
is widespread,65 and it is typically encoded in the judgment that maintaining her
confidence after she receives the higher-order evidence would be epistemically
irrational. I will suppose that this judgment is correct, and that it represents the fact
that Andy, like the rest of us, must account for her fallibility in her doxastic practice.
To make the puzzle more precise, I will replace talk of the Evidentialist
Dictum with talk of Evidentialism. ‘Evidentialism’ can be used to refer to several
views. On my usage, Evidentialism is the view that believing a proposition is
epistemically rational for someone just in case her evidence supports that
proposition. Rational belief supervenes on evidential support, rather than evidence
alone: any two people for whom the same propositions are supported (to the same
degree) by their respective evidence are justified in believing the exact same things.66
Evidentialism is a broad view that includes both objective and subjective
Bayesianisms, for instance.67

This case is widely discussed in the literature. It’s originally due to Elga (ms). I’ve added details
about Andy’s evidence.
65 For discussion of this or similar cases, see, e.g., Christensen (2010, 2010a 2013), Elga (ms),
Schechter (2013), Schoenfield (2015).
66 This leaves open whether permissivism is true. Notable papers containing arguments against
permissivism include White (2005, 2010), Feldman (2007), Christensen (2007a). Notable papers that
defend permissivism include Titelbaum (2010), Meacham (2014), Schoenfield (2014), and Titelbaum
& Kopec (ms.).
67 See Ballantyne & Coffman (2011) for discussion of different evidentialisms. As stated,
Evidentialism is something that might be accepted by self-proclaimed evidentialists like Conee and
Feldman. However, anyone sympathetic with their (2008) developments of Evidentialism may not
64
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One additional claim is needed to generate the puzzle. It links evidential
support to entailment, so I’ll call it the Entailment-Support principle: If a body of
evidence entails some empirical (contingent a posteriori) proposition, that body of
evidence supports that proposition.68 This is the most controversial claim of the
puzzle. Some will view it as downright implausible, while others will think
(something like) this principle is the only objective evidential support principle.69 I’m
not sure that it’s the only objective evidential support principle, but I’m confident
that it’s not downright implausible. Indeed, I think it’s difficult to reject, given a
plausible conception of Evidentialism. In any case, I will offer reasons for endorsing
it in §5. For now, I’ll make two notes: First, the principle does not say that if your
body of evidence entails any proposition, your body of evidence supports it. In
particular, it does not entail that every necessary truth is justified for everyone.
Second, the puzzle can arguably be generated without appeal to this principle.70
The gist of the puzzle is that Evidentialism cannot accommodate the
judgment that Andy should revise her belief. This is because, by the EntailmentSupport principle, Andy’s evidence supports the belief that she has enough fuel,
since her evidence entails this proposition.
More carefully: Andy is in an Entailment Case of higher-order defeat—an
Entailment Case for short. In an Entailment Case, at t1, the subject’s evidence entails
some proposition, P, and she believes P on the basis of this evidence. Then, at later

find the puzzle described in this section troubling. At the end of §3.5, I make remarks that must be
addressed even by someone sympathetic to a Conee-Feldman-style evidentialism.
68 This principle is best seen as a corollary of Evidentialism, since Evidentialists owe us an account of
evidential support, and this principle provides a sufficient condition for that notion.
69 Titelbaum (2010) explicitly takes the latter stance.
70 I discuss a version of the puzzle that does not require the Entailment-Support principle at the end
of §3.5.
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t2, she acquires higher-order evidence that renders her belief in P irrational.71 By
Evidentialism and the Entailment-Support principle, Andy’s belief is rational at t1,
and by Evidentialism, Andy’s belief is not supported by Andy’s evidence at t2. If it’s
not supported by her evidence at t2, then, by the Entailment-Support principle, it’s
not entailed by her evidence at t2. But entailment is monotonic: adding evidence to a
body of evidence without removing any evidence leaves the entailment intact. Hence,
her belief is entailed by her evidence at t2, hence it is supported, hence it is rational.
Thus, the judgment that Andy should revise her belief appears to be inconsistent
with Evidentialism and the Entailment-Support principle. Since the latter principle is
just a corollary of Evidentialism, this appears to be an instance of the tension: one
cannot always simultaneously respect one’s evidence and respect one’s fallibility.72
Without a solution to this puzzle, Evidentialism will be unable to account for our
judgments about how evidence of fallibility bears on rational belief.

3.3 Evidence-Loss
Abandoning Evidentialism at this point would be too hasty. There is a lacuna in the
argument based on the puzzle, namely that Andy does not lose evidence between t1
and t2. Indeed, there is an argument from the puzzle to an evidence-loss account.
Call it the Evidence-Loss Argument.
1. Evidentialism: Believing P is rational for S at t just in case S’s evidence
supports P at t.

This is a case of higher-order defeat because receiving higher-order evidence that a belief likely
resulted from a misevaluation of the evidence renders that belief unjustified.
72 Notice this consequence isn’t an artifact of the Entailment-Support principle. The judgment that
there is defeat in Andy’s case is crucial, and this judgment depends on the type of evidence she
receives. If she had received only ordinary (non-higher-order evidence), we wouldn’t judge that defeat
occurred.
71
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2. Entailment-Support principle: If S’s evidence entails (empirical) P at t, then
S’s evidence supports P at t.
3. Entailment Case: At t1, S’s evidence entails P, and S believes P on the basis
of this evidence. At t2, S acquires higher-order evidence that renders S’s
belief irrational.
4. Entailment-Loss principle: S’s evidence entails P at t1 and not at t2 only if S
loses evidence between t1 and t2.
5. S’s evidence doesn’t support P at t2. (By (1) and (3))
6. S’s evidence doesn’t entail P at t2. (By (2) and (5))
7. Therefore, S loses evidence between t1 and t2. (By (3), (4), and (6))
The Entailment-Loss principle is the only premise not discussed so far, but it follows
from the monotonicity of entailment and a plausible understanding of evidence.
Entailment relations between sets of propositions cannot change, but which set of
propositions constitutes one’s evidence can change. And, according to this argument,
sometimes when one acquires higher-order evidence, one’s body of evidence not
only gains propositions, it loses propositions as well.
Philosophers have discussed versions of this puzzle before, and some do
make reference to the claim that Andy (for instance) does not lose evidence when
she receives her higher-order evidence. For instance, Thomas Kelly (2013: 46) writes,
“If one’s original evidence entails that p, then it seems like one’s total evidence will
always support the belief that p, no matter how much misleading testimonial
evidence one subsequently acquires, so long as the original evidence remains part of
the total set.”73 What Kelly says here is, of course, true. But he does not argue for the
claim that, in these cases, the subject does not lose evidence. While this claim may

Christensen (2010a: 195) briefly addresses this step as well. I should note that in the context in
which this quote from Kelly appears, Kelly is addressing an issue arising from peer disagreement,
whereas I’m focusing on fallibility more generally. However, Kelly only bolsters the point in the text
that there seems to a tension between Evidentialism and fallibility, when he says (2013: 47): “Of
course, it is difficult to make sense of the idea that someone who possesses entailing evidence should
invest less than maximal credence in the entailed proposition; indeed, orthodox theories of evidential
probability would seem to rule this out (at least in cases in which the person is certain of the entailing
evidence itself).”
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appear to require no defense, in the face of the Evidence-Loss Argument more
needs to be said to rule out such a response.
Indeed, I think something can be said to rule out this response, but before
offering objections, it’s worth seeing what can be said in favor of this response.
The idea suggested by the Evidence-Loss Argument is that acquiring higherorder evidence that one has improperly assessed one’s evidence sometimes causes
one to lose some of that evidence. Call this the Evidence-Loss Account. To avoid
confusion arising from the ambiguity of “having more/less evidence,” we need to
distinguish between evidence possession and support strength. If Bob has weaker
evidence for a claim than Coco does, it’s natural to describe Bob as having less
evidence than Coco. But Bob does not necessarily possess less evidence in the sense
relevant to the Evidence-Loss account; in that sense, Bob may possess more
evidence than Coco. If Bob and Coco both see someone who looks like Don
standing on the corner, but Bob knows, and Coco doesn’t, that Don is out of the
country, then Bob has weaker evidence than Coco does that Don is standing on the
corner. But Bob possesses more evidence than Coco. The sense of “having
evidence” relevant to the Evidence-Loss Account has implications regarding support
strength, but it is the stronger, literal notion of possessing evidence that is at issue.
On the conception I find most plausible (and will briefly defend in §5), evidence is
propositional and the evidence a person possesses is a set of propositions. According
to the Evidence-Loss Account, when someone acquires higher-order defeating
evidence, a proposition that was previously in her evidence set no longer is.
Why should anyone believe the Evidence-Loss Account? There are at least
four reasons, and we’ve already seen one: it solves the puzzle faced by the
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Evidentialist. As this Evidence-Loss Argument appeals to Evidentialism, it’s an
Evidentialist-based reason to believe the account.
There is another Evidentialist-based reason that appears to favor the
Evidence-Loss Account. A prior question to whether Evidentialism can explain
higher-order defeat is what resources are available to Evidentialism to do so. The
elements of Evidentialism – its basic resources – are nicely captured in the standard
characterization of the distinction between undercutting and rebutting defeat:
undercutting defeat “attacks the connection between the evidence and the
conclusion, rather than attacking the conclusion itself [as rebutting defeat does].”74
This characterization appeals to three elements, and these plausibly exhaust the
Evidentialist’s basic resources: evidence, conclusions, and the connection between
the two. Several philosophers have argued that higher-order defeat is distinct from
rebutting and undercutting defeat.75 If this is right, then given that the each of the
latter two elements is already associated with a specific kind of defeat it is a
reasonable hypothesis that higher-order defeat is associated with the final element.
That is, it seems reasonable to suppose that higher-order defeat attacks the evidence.
And this is one way of articulating what the Evidence-Loss Account says. Call this
the “elements of Evidentialism” argument.
The third reason in favor of the Evidence-Loss Account is it has a precedent
in the literature. Timothy Williamson (2000: 219) describes an example of evidence
loss occasioned by acquiring evidence that one misassessed one’s original evidence:
I see one red and one black ball put into an otherwise empty bag, and am
asked the probability that on the first ten thousand draws with replacement a
Pollock (1986: 39).
See, for instance, Feldman (2005), Christensen (2010a), Schechter (2013), Rotondo (2013), and
Lasonen-Aarnio (2014).
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red ball is drawn each time. I reply ‘1/210,000’. Part of my evidence is the
proposition e that a black ball was put into the bag; my calculation relies on
it. Now suppose that on the first ten thousand draws a red ball is drawn each
time, a contingency which my evidence does not rule out in advance, since its
evidential probability is non-zero. But when I have seen it happen, I will
rationally come to doubt e …
Williamson concludes, “Thus e will no longer form part of my evidence.” In this
case, something very improbable occurs, given the subject’s assessment of what he
takes to be his evidence. When he observes this, he loses evidence as a result of
becoming reasonably worried that he misassessed his evidence. Thus, at least
sometimes acquiring evidence that one misassessed one’s evidence can result in
evidence loss.
Finally, there is a parallel between a sort of dogmatic response to higherorder evidence and the reasoning involved in the so-called Dogmatism Paradox for
knowledge, and an explanation of the illegitimacy of the former reasoning that
appeals to evidence loss parallels the standard explanation of the illegitimacy of the
latter reasoning. 76 Moreover, the two main hypotheses that compete with the
Evidence-Loss Account on this score are unacceptable by the Evidentialist’s lights.
Several philosophers have cautioned against dogmatic responses to higherorder evidence. 77 Suppose Andy were to reason as follows: “If I were suffering from
hypoxia, I would likely have made the wrong inference. But, in fact, I made the right
inference: after all, I concluded that I have enough fuel to fly to Hawaii and that is
just what my evidence supports—indeed, entails! So, I’m probably not suffering
from hypoxia.” Andy’s higher-order evidence calls into question her evidence

See Harman (1973) and Kripke (1971/2011) on the Dogmatism Paradox for knowledge.
For seminal discussions of this concern, see Christensen (2007a, 2011), Elga (2007), Kornblith
(2010).
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assessment, so appealing to that assessment to conclude that she’s not suffering from
hypoxia would be illegitimate (question-begging or dogmatic).
One may be tempted toward a similar form of illegitimate reasoning in
response to evidence against one’s knowledge. Consider Gilbert Harman’s (1973:
148) statement of this reasoning:
If I know that h is true, I know that any evidence against h is evidence
against something that is true; so I know that such evidence is misleading.
But I should disregard evidence that I know is misleading. So, once I know
that h is true, I am in a position to disregard any future evidence that seems
to tell against h.
Both sorts of reasoning – regarding knowledge and one’s original evidence
assessment – are illegitimate. What explains why these sorts of reasoning are
illegitimate?
The standard explanation of what’s wrong with the dogmatic reasoning
about knowledge is that it incorrectly presupposes that once one has knowledge, one
may always thereafter use it in one’s reasoning. It’s true that when one knows a
proposition, one also knows that evidence against that proposition is misleading. But
acquiring such misleading evidence can cause one to lose the knowledge that one
would have used to dismiss that evidence.78
The Evidence-Loss Account’s explanation of why Andy’s reasoning is
illegitimate appeals to the fact that acquiring new evidence can, likewise, cause one to
lose evidence. Although Andy’s evidence previously entailed that she had enough
fuel, this does not warrant her in disregarding further evidence, since getting that
further evidence may change what her evidence entails. But it can only do this by
causing her to lose evidence. And this is just what the Evidence-Loss Account
78

Harman (1973: 148-9)
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implies: it is illegitimate for Andy to appeal to her original evidence because once she
acquires the higher-order evidence, she no longer possesses that evidence.
There are two alternative explanations of the problem with Andy’s reasoning
in the literature, but the Evidentialist cannot accept either of them. First, there is
David Christensen’s Bracketing Explanation.79 In accounting for her higher-order
evidence, Andy must bracket her original reasons; she is barred from giving a certain
part of her evidence its due. This is a sort of “virtual” rather than “genuine”
evidence-loss account: Andy does not actually lose evidence, but what she is justified
in believing after she acquires the higher-order evidence depends only on a proper
subset of her evidence, the evidence remaining after she brackets her original
evidence. The second explanation – what I’ll call the Non-Monotonic Explanation –
is due to Thomas Kelly. Focusing on peer disagreement, Kelly explicitly discusses the
parallel between the Dogmatism Paradox and the dogmatic reasoning involving
higher-order evidence. Explaining why this reasoning is illegitimate, Kelly (2013: 45)
writes:
[A]fter I add the fact that you believe as you do to my stock of evidence, it
will no longer be reasonable for me to believe that p, given what is my total
evidence. And if it’s no longer reasonable for me to believe that p, then I lack
any rational basis for inferring that your sincere testimony is misleading
evidence.
The idea is that the support enjoyed by a subject’s belief before she was aware of the
disagreement will simply be lost, in the standard way, once she learns of the
disagreement. As a result, subsequently appealing to that belief to dismiss her peer’s
belief will be irrational.

79

Christensen (2010a: 195; 2011). See also Elga (2007).
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All three explanations imply that the dogmatic reasoning is unreasonable
because (some of) the premises of the dogmatic reasoning are unjustified. However,
the Evidentialist can accept neither the Bracketing Explanation nor the NonMonotonic Explanation. The problem cases are Entailment Cases: the original
evidence entails the relevant beliefs, hence the Evidentialist must say that the original
evidence supports the beliefs. No matter how much evidence one brackets, and no
matter how much additional evidence gets added to one’s body of evidence, if one
does not lose any evidence, then by the Evidentialist’s lights the premises of the
problematic reasoning remain justified. Indeed, Christensen would say that Andy’s
evidence does still support her beliefs because, on his view, higher-order evidence
defeats while leaving evidential support relations intact; his account is nonEvidentialist.80 And while Kelly wants to provide an Evidentialist account, he admits
that Entailment Cases give rise to a genuine puzzle.81 The Evidence-Loss Account is
an Evidentialist account that can solve that puzzle.
To summarize: There appears to be a tension between respecting one’s
evidence and respecting one’s fallibility. In particular, Evidentialism faces a puzzle in
accommodating higher-order defeat in Entailment Cases. The Evidence-Loss
Account can solve this puzzle. And there seem to be three additional points in its
favor. First, it coheres with the standard characterizations of defeat. Second, there is
a precedent for it in the form of examples of evidence-loss occasioned by acquiring
reason to believe one misassessed one’s evidence. Finally, it explains, in terms
acceptable to the Evidentialist, what is wrong with dogmatically dismissing higher-
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Christensen (2010a: 195, 197).
Kelly (2013: 46).
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order evidence, and this explanation mirrors the standard explanation of what’s
wrong with the dogmatic reasoning found in the Dogmatism Paradox.82 Thus, the
Evidence-Loss Account should strike Evidentialists and non-Evidentialists alike as a
serious hypothesis.

3.4 Against the Evidence-Loss Account
In spite of its attractions, the Evidence-Loss Account is problematic. In this section,
I raise three objections to this account. The first should not worry the Evidentialist
much, I will argue. The second and third may not be decisive, but they strike me as
strong objections.
The first objection can be put in terms of a question pertaining to the
Hypoxia example. According to the Evidence-Loss Account, when Andy acquires
the higher-order evidence she thereby loses some of her evidence. Which evidence
does Andy lose? Given the description of the case, there are four main options. But
picking one rather than the other seems arbitrary. Without a principled answer, the
account seems to be in trouble.
This question should be addressed if the Evidence-Loss Account is to be
defended further. However, not having a precise, general answer is not a major
embarrassment for the proponent of the Evidence-Loss Account, since the main
alternative to this account faces a similar question, and also lacks a precise, general
answer. This alternative is Christensen’s Bracketing Account, according to which,
accommodating higher-order evidence requires bracketing some of one’s original

The fact that the two explanations mirror each other is noteworthy because it allows what appear to
be similar phenomena to be given a similar explanation.
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evidence.83 This account needs to address the question: Which evidence, or how
much of it, must Andy bracket?84 It’s unlikely that any precise, general answer will be
forthcoming. Thus, the Evidence-Loss Account can address this objection by
adopting a companions-in-guilt strategy. This is not to say it’s off the hook, but only
that this concern should be seen as a challenge rather than a strong objection.
According to the second objection, the Evidence-Loss Account gives the
wrong sort of response to the puzzle. On the Evidence-Loss Account, Andy’s belief
turns out to be irrational because she loses evidence. But a common concern that
arises when we consider our fallibility is that we make “performance” errors while
attempting to properly form beliefs. Hume (1978: 180), for instance, insists that
although deductive rules of inference are certain and infallible, our application of
them is not.85 Likewise, when Andy gets the hypoxia warning, this is worrisome
because it makes it likely that she made a faulty inference. And, it seems, this sort of
worry leaves an agent’s evidence untouched.
Compare Williamson’s ball example (§3.3) with the Hypoxia example. In
Williamson’s case, it does seem that the subject should give up belief in his evidence
because what he observes is incredibly unlikely if his evidence is true. Since
incredibly unlikely things are probably false, what he took to be his evidence is
probably false, too. This is why claiming that he loses evidence is plausible. But
nothing like this occurs in Hypoxia. Andy takes her evidence to support a
proposition, while having strong evidence that her take on the evidence is flawed.
Unlike the subject in Williamson’s case, what Andy observes is not incredibly
This account underlies Christensen’s Bracketing Explanation. See §3.3.
Christensen (2010a: 213; 2011).
85 Schechter (2013: 448) makes a similar point.
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unlikely if her evidence is true. Putting the comparison slightly differently: the subject
in Williamson’s example acquires reason to think he has misassessed what his
evidence is, whereas Andy only acquires reason to think she has misassessed what
her evidence supports. Whereas continuing to accept what she took her evidence to
support when she gets the hypoxia warning is unreasonable, it seems unproblematic
for her to rely on her judgments about what evidence she possesses. Thus, while it’s
true that Williamson’s example sets a precedent for the Evidence-Loss Account, this
account doesn’t properly explain all problematic Entailment Cases.86
According to the third objection, the Evidence-Loss Account requires an
implausible “purpose-relative” conception of evidence possession. Consider a case
of peer disagreement. If you and your friend discover, while out to dinner, that you
disagree about your shares of the bill, even if, in some sense, you thereby lose
evidence, you can still legitimately appeal to this evidence for some purposes.
Suppose it’s part of your original evidence that your bill, before tip, is $60. You can
reasonably reject your friend’s claim that your share is $400, since the bill itself is
only $60. 87 But, to avoid condoning dogmatism, the Evidence-Loss Account
prohibits appealing to this evidence to dismiss a more plausible position (that, with
tip, your shares are $35, rather than $36, say). Now suppose you’re out to dinner
with two people (suppose that the third person is paying separately): one claims that
your shares are $400 and the other claims that your shares are $35. Arguably, you can
dismiss the $400 verdict, but not the $35 verdict. What explains this? The natural
This is also a reason not to accept the Evidence-Loss Account on the basis of the “elements of
Evidentialism” argument. Evidentialism has an open slot for higher-order defeat, but without a
compelling explanation of why higher-order defeat should fill that slot, that fact is only a very weak
reason to accept the Evidence-Loss Account.
87 Cf. Christensen (2007a). Also, nearly all of the papers in Feldman & Warfield (2010) make a point
like this.
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answer is that for the purposes of ruling out the ridiculous response you can
reasonably appeal to your original evidence, but for the purposes of ruling out the
sensible response you cannot.88 The Evidence-Loss Account explains the former fact
by positing evidential support, hence evidence possession, and it explains the latter
fact by positing evidence-loss. Thus, the Evidence-Loss Account is committed to a
purpose-relative account of evidence possession: you possess the evidence about the
bill for the purpose of dismissing the ridiculous response, but not for the purpose of
answering the sensible one.
While the claim that evidence possession is purpose-relative is not obviously
incoherent, it does seem highly implausible. It’s not as if considerations available to
you for the purpose of answering one question vanish when you attend to another
question. But on the Evidence-Loss Account, they do, at least, lose their status as
evidence depending on the question you’re answering or the purpose for which
you’re using them. Things end up looking very strange from your perspective,
though, if you’re aware of the Evidence-Loss Account’s truth. You might think: “I
previously possessed evidence E, which supported belief in P and in Q; now that I
have this higher-order evidence, I still possess evidence E for the purpose of
Although Christensen (2007a: 200-1) seems to implicitly endorse appealing to the original evidence
in a case like this as part of the explanation of why rejecting the ridiculous response can be rational,
some of his theoretical commitments – e.g., his commitment to Independence – may prohibit this
appeal. (Lord (2014) and Kelly (2013) argue that the verdicts Christensen wants might require
appealing to the original evidence in the way I’m suggesting.) Things are more complicated in
Christensen (2011) because although he doesn’t straightforwardly endorse this appeal in his discussion
of similar cases, he admits that there are unresolved issues about the scope of Independence (see
Christensen (2011: 18)). In any case, those who share Christensen’s commitments may find my
argument objectionable. But, the argument from the Evidence-Loss Account to purpose-relativity
doesn’t depend on this example. It only requires (i) that there is some purpose for which the agent
who’s suffered higher-order defeat can use her original evidence, but (ii) that she could not use it for
that purpose if she did not possess it. For instance, after providing her with the hypoxia warning, air
traffic control might ask Andy how much fuel she has. It seems perfectly legitimate for her to appeal
to her evidence that the tank is ¾ full. (Fill in the details however you like to focus on another piece
of her evidence.) If that’s right, then in order to capture this point, the Evidence-Loss Account
requires a purpose-relative conception of evidence possession.
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answering whether P, E still bears on the question whether Q, but I do not possess
evidence E for the purpose of answering whether Q.” This doesn’t seem right. The
Evidence-Loss Account introduces relativity into evidence possession where there
appears not to be any.
Of course, the proponent of the Evidence-Loss Account can insist that I’ve
mischaracterized which evidence has been lost, and that, properly characterized, any
trace of purpose-relativity will vanish. However, while this response may only
depend on particular judgments about which evidence one loses in response to
higher-order evidence, the more heavily the account relies on such judgments, the
more urgent the need to answer the first objection begins to look. In other words,
this response invites the question: Why does the subject lose that evidence rather
than this evidence? It wouldn’t be wise to place too much theoretical weight here.
There is what might seem to be a precedent for the purpose-relativity of
evidence possession. Several philosophers have argued that knowledge and/or
justification are ‘interest-relative,’ in the sense that whether a subject knows or is
justified in believing something depends in part on her interests or what is at stake
for her.89 If this view is correct, then at least some epistemic notions are interestrelative. And Jason Stanley suggests that all epistemic notions are interest-relative,
including evidence.90 According to Stanley, this implies that one’s practical situation
will affect the “evidential standing one has with respect to one’s belief that p.”91
Inspired by Stanley’s position –Strong Interest-Relativism – a proponent of the

See Hawthorne (2005), Stanley (2005), and Fantl & McGrath (2009).
Stanley (2005: 182).
91 Ibid. 180.
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Evidence-Loss Account may dig in his heels and defend the purpose-relativity of
evidence possession.
No doubt that by some people’s lights we need not take the Evidence-Loss
Account seriously if it relies on Strong Interest-Relativism. But it’s important to note
that even if Strong Interest-Relativism could be defended, the claim that evidence
possession is purpose-relative is even more radical. First, recall that in §3.3 we
distinguished between evidence possession and support strength, noting that the
Evidence-Loss Account is primarily concerned with the former. Some of Stanley’s
remarks seem to suggest that what is relative to one’s interests is support strength,
not evidence possession. But that sort of view will not justify the purpose-relativity
of evidence possession. Stanley also sympathetically discusses Williamson’s E=K
account of evidence – according to which, one’s evidence is just what one knows. If
that view is true and whether one knows something depends on one’s interests, then
whether one possesses it as part of one’s evidence will also depend on one’s
interests. Yet, this still doesn’t guarantee purpose-relativity. For the proponent of the
Evidence-Loss Account must still claim that evidence-possession can vary while
one’s interests are held fixed. There may be a lot or a little at stake for you in figuring
out what your share of the bill is, but once we hold fixed your stakes, Strong
Interest-Relativism will have fixed what evidence you possess, whereas the EvidenceLoss Account will still leave this purpose-relative. So, in this respect, the EvidenceLoss Account is more radical than Strong Interest-Relativism.
Thus, although the Evidence-Loss Account may have an elegant explanation
of what’s wrong with dismissing evidence of one’s fallibility, it purchases that
elegance with an implausible purpose-relative conception of evidence possession.
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Given this, and given the second objection, I think we have good reason to reject the
account.

3.5 Defending the Puzzle92
Evidentialism implies that higher-order evidence defeats justification by changing
evidential support. Given the Entailment-Support principle, the Evidence-Loss
Account seemed to be the Evidentialist’s only option for accommodating higherorder defeat. With reason to reject that account, we are apparently left with two
options: reject Evidentialism or reject Entailment-Support. In this section, I briefly
argue that if these are indeed our only options, then we should reject Evidentialism
because on the most plausible version of Evidentialism, Entailment-Support will be
true. The argument will be brief because it mostly depends on claims that others
have already defended.93 At the end of the section, however, I suggest that even if
this argument fails, Evidentialism may still have trouble accommodating higher-order
defeat.
The argument goes as follows: Evidential support should be understood
probabilistically, and evidence is propositional. Given these two claims, we should
accept Entailment-Support.
Evidentialism analyzes justified belief in terms of evidential support. This is
plausible because typically the greater epistemic justification one has for a belief, the
more likely it is to be true and, likewise, typically the greater evidential support one

A reader who is convinced that Evidentialists cannot accommodate higher-order defeat may want
to skip this section.
93 This section draws heavily from Williamson (2000: chs. 9, 10).
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has for a belief, the more likely it is to be true.94 When we ask about the strength of
the evidence, i.e., how much the evidence tells for or against a hypothesis, we are
asking how probable that hypothesis is given that evidence. This suggests that
evidential support should be understood probabilistically.
There

are

several

reasons

why

evidence

should

be

understood

propositionally. First, evidence is what inferences to the best explanations explain,
and only propositions are the proper objects of explanation. Second, evidential
support is a logical relation between something and hypotheses. Logical relations
include entailment, perhaps the logical connectives, and relations of probability. As a
logical relation, then, that something must be a proposition. Third, thinking of
evidential support probabilistically, two main types of quantities will interest us, the
conditional probability of a hypothesis on evidence and the likelihood of the
hypothesis—P(h|e) and P(e|h), respectively.95 Both rely on evidence being the sort
of thing that can have a probability, and the sort of thing that can have a probability
is a proposition. (It makes no sense, e.g., to discuss the probability of appearingredly-to-me or the appearance of red, etc.) Finally, our evidence can rule out
hypotheses by being inconsistent with them, but only propositions can be
inconsistent with hypotheses.96
Now suppose that, indeed, evidential support should be understood
probabilistically, and evidence is propositional. And suppose that E is S’s evidence
and that E entails some contingent proposition H. Does E support H? It’s hard to
see how it could not. For one thing, the conditional probability of P(H|E)=1. But
See Goldman (1979) and Williamson (2000: 202).
For a nice introduction to likelihoods see section 1.2 of Sober (2008).
96 See Williamson (2000: 196) for an articulation of the relevant sense in which evidence is
inconsistent with hypotheses.
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suppose entailment doesn’t suffice for support. The following seems plausible: if
P(H1|E)>P(H2|E), then E provides more support for H1 than for H2. Now suppose
that E entails H1. If entailment doesn’t suffice for support, then we must endorse the
following implausible triad: (1) E provides as much support for H1 as it can for any
hypothesis – indeed, H1 can enjoy no greater support from any evidence; (2) E
provides more support than it could for any hypothesis it doesn’t entail; (3) but it
doesn’t necessarily support that hypothesis. And if evidential support doesn’t require
the supported hypothesis to have probability 1 on the evidence, as it plausibly
doesn’t, we’re forced to say that there are two hypotheses H1 and H2 such that (1) E
supports H2, but H2 is not certain on E, yet (2) H1 is certain on E and E does not
support it. This just seems implausible. Greater support of some hypothesis given
some evidence seems tied to greater probability of that hypothesis given that
evidence.97
One might grant the Entailment-Support principle, but express a lingering
worry as follows: the Evidentialist need not worry about cases like Hypoxia because
although evidence can entail and thereby support propositions, the specification of
Andy’s evidence is too broad. While it’s true that appearances and the like are not
evidence, evidence is not directly about the external world. In Hypoxia, Andy’s
evidence includes propositions like that the tank is ¾ full, but her evidence should
be specified more narrowly, i.e., internally – e.g., as that the fuel gauge seems to read
¾ full. Otherwise, our evidence provides us with certainty about the external world,
which is unobtainable, as Descartes taught us.

Fitelson (2007) argues for the claim that if E provides conclusive evidence (i.e., entailing evidence)
for H1, but non-conclusive evidence for H2 (when these are all contingent claims), then E favors H1
over H2. His arguments, therefore, support an analogous, contrastive entailment-support principle.
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This is a concern about evidence’s extent. Although this is a legitimate worry,
it doesn’t undermine the puzzle. Insofar as this puzzle depends on the EntailmentSupport principle, it depends on evidence being propositional. It doesn’t, however,
depend on a particular account of evidence’s extent. Change the specification of
Andy’s evidence however you think appropriate. That evidence will entail some
proposition, and she can acquire evidence that she bungled her reasoning about that
proposition. Given the judgment that maintaining her belief is irrational,
Evidentialists will still face the same puzzle.
Finally, for those who remain unmoved by this defense of the EntailmentSupport principle, it’s worth noting that Evidentialists may face a version of the
puzzle even if that principle is false.98 Recall, several philosophers argue that higherorder defeat differs from both rebutting defeat and undercutting defeat. Higherorder defeat does not defeat by providing evidence that the defeated belief is false
(like rebutting defeat does), by “attacking the connection” between one’s evidence
and one’s belief (like undercutting defeat does), or by attacking the evidence (as in
Williamson’s example). If higher-order defeat differs in these ways from these other
sorts of defeat, how else can it undermine justification? This question points to the
grain of truth in the “elements of Evidentialism” argument: Evidentialists can only
accommodate defeat that attacks conclusions, evidence, or the connection between
these, and higher-order defeat doesn’t necessarily do any of these.99 It’s tempting,

As Conee & Feldman (2008) express their evidentialist commitments, they are likely to remain
unconvinced. This final argumentative maneuver may, therefore, be of special interest to those who
find an evidentialist view like theirs compelling.
99 Another “element” in some versions of Evidentialism (for instance, Bayesianism) is the agent’s
standards for evaluating evidence or her priors, but appealing to this element won’t solve the puzzle.
For one thing, Bayesians should already be on board with the conclusion that Evidentialism cannot
accommodate defeat in Entailment Cases because they are committed to the Entailment-Support
98
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then, to conclude that higher-order evidence defeats while leaving evidential support
intact even in non-Entailment Cases. And this is just what Christensen (2010: 197)
argues. Suppose my evidence strongly supports, but does not entail, some
conclusion, and I adopt belief in that conclusion on the basis of an inference to the
best explanation, only to discover that I was slipped a reason-distorting drug before I
made the inference. Christensen argues that, in this sort of case, I cannot rationally
maintain my belief even though my evidence still supports it. Why does the evidence
still support the belief? Because the evidence itself is not in question (as in
Williamson’s case). And the connection between that evidence and my belief remain
incredibly strong, since these connections do not depend on any claims about me or
my current reasoning abilities and the higher-order evidence does not break those
connections. Thus, if the proper moral of the “elements of Evidentialism” argument
is that higher-order defeat cannot undermine justification on Evidentailism, or if
Christensen is right that higher-order defeat leaves evidential support relations –
even inductive ones – intact, then Evidentialists will face a version of the puzzle
from §3.2, even if the Entailment-Support principle is false.
If our only options are to reject Evidentialism or the Entailment-Support
principle, I think that, one way or another, we must reject Evidentialism because the
most plausible version of Evidentialism includes the Entailment-Support principle.
But even if Evidentialism doesn’t include the Entailment-Support principle, there’s
reason to think that Evidentialism should still be rejected.
Principle. But, in any case, insofar as I have a handle on the notion of one’s evidential standards being
“attacked,” for the same reasons it seems wrong to say that higher-order evidence always defeats by
attacking the evidence, it seems wrong to say it always defeats by attacking an agent’s standards. (It’s
not as if Andy must adopt some wholly new take on the import of evidence in response to learning
that she’s not properly assessing her evidence. She simply can’t fully trust her take on the evidence,
regardless of how she tends to evaluate it.)

64

3.6 Conclusion
We began with an apparent tension between the Evidentialist Dictum and the
Fallibility Norm. Evidentialism was one plausible elaboration of the Dictum, and
higher-order defeat was taken to represent the Norm. If what I’ve argued is correct,
Evidentialism cannot accommodate higher-order defeat. The tension looks to be
genuine. However, I don’t think we should reject the Evidentialist Dictum or the
Fallibility Norm. Since both clearly represent important standards of epistemic
evaluation, our theorizing must make room for both. In the final chapter of this
dissertation, I explain how we can do that. First, however, in the next chapter, I
provide a new explanation of how higher-order defeat works, one that doesn’t
require higher-order evidence to provide agents with state-given reasons.
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CHAPTER 4
DISAGREEMENT, WEIGHT, AND EXCLUSION
4.1 Introduction
Consider this response to peer disagreement: “Although we were equally likely to get
things right before I discovered our disagreement, now that I know my peer
disagrees with me, I know I’m right and she’s wrong. After all, she believes ~H, but
our evidence supports H, and that’s what I believe.” Conciliationists think dismissing
disagreement like this is illegitimate because doing so relies on the very evidence
assessment the disagreement calls into question. To prohibit this kind of reasoning,
Conciliationists endorse Independence:
Independence: In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another’s expressed
belief that p, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own
belief about p, I should do so in a way that doesn’t rely on my initial belief
that p, nor on the reasoning behind that belief.100
Independence blocks the illegitimate inference by prohibiting agents from relying on
their original reasoning when responding to disagreement.
Insofar as agents’ original reasoning included their original evidence,
Independence apparently requires them to modify their beliefs without relying on
that evidence. Critics of Conciliationism argue that, therefore, this prohibition is
absurd, as it permits – even requires – agents to ignore evidence.101
While Conciliationists typically accept that this would be absurd, they deny
Conciliationism has this consequence. David Christensen (2011: 4) claims that it
would be “very damaging to Conciliationist views if their insistence on Independence

Christensen (2007a, 2010, 2011), Cohen (2013), Elga (2007), Kornblith (2010), and Vavova (2015)
endorse Independence.
101 Critics include Kelly (2010, 2013), Lord (2014), and Weatherson (2013, ms.). Sliwa and Horowitz
(2015) and Schoenfield (2015) discuss this objection somewhat ambivalently.
100

66

amounted to insisting that one’s original evidence was irrelevant to the rationality” of
post-disagreement beliefs; however, Christensen argues, “the Conciliationist position
does not have this consequence.” Also, Stewart Cohen (2013: 100) argues that one of
Conciliationism’s rivals implies “either that my peer’s disagreement is no evidence
whatsoever against my credence, or that it is permissible, in some instances, to ignore
evidence. Neither position is defensible.” Since Cohen defends Conciliationism, he
clearly thinks it doesn’t – and shouldn’t – permit agents to ignore evidence.
I will argue that Conciliationists should, instead, accept that Conciliationism
recommends ignoring evidence and deny that this is objectionable.102
Most discussions of disagreement concern the question, “How should we
respond to disagreement?” Conciliationism answers that sometimes we should revise
our beliefs since disagreement sometimes undermines rational belief. This raises
another, much less discussed question, the Undermining Question: “How does
disagreement undermine rational belief?”
Following a prominent approach, I assume that reasons are the basis of
normativity.103 As I understand it, the Undermining Question asks for a theory of
reasons. On one theory, Weightism, all undermining results from adjusting the
weight of reasons. Among epistemologists, this is the standard theory. On another
theory, Exclusionism, some undermining is, instead, a matter of excluding reasons
from being the basis of belief.104 Conciliationists have independent reason to adopt

Van Wietmarschen (2013: 421) endorses a related strategy. I briefly discuss his view in §4.4.
See, e.g., Dancy (2004), Parfit (2011), Raz (1990), Scanlon (1998), Schroeder (2007), and Smith
(1994).
104 Raz (1990) champions this view. See, also, Horty (2012).
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Exclusionisn, and adopting it allows them to answer the Ignoring Evidence
objection.105
The paper proceeds as follows. In §2, I provide background. In §3, I explain
Exclusionism. In §4, I explain why Conciliationists should adopt Exclusionism. In
§5, I show how Conciliationism-plus-Exclusionism answers the Ignoring Evidence
objection. In §6, I conclude.

4.2 Defeat
Evidence of disagreement is a species of higher-order evidence, evidence about the
relation between one’s evidence and beliefs. Higher-order evidence often calls into
question one’s evidence assessments. Suppose Andy is Piloting an airplane. After
doing some calculations, she becomes confident that she has enough fuel to fly to
Hawaii. Then air traffic control warns her that she’s probably suffering from
hypoxia, and any mathematical reasoning she’s done in the last five minutes has
probably been distorted with her knowing it. The sort of reasoning that was
illegitimate in the disagreement case also appears illegitimate here: “If I were
suffering from hypoxia, I probably would have made a faulty inference. But my
evidence supports the conclusion that I have enough fuel, and that’s what I believe.
So I’m probably not suffering from hypoxia.” To prohibit this kind of reasoning,
those who endorse Independence should endorse:

Whiting (2015) argues against the existence of exclusionary reasons. To demonstrate his
argument’s significance, Whiting briefly argues that some of Christensen’s positions imply something
like Exclusionism and they are, therefore, false. The argument of this paper, which was arrived at
independently, shows that Conciliationists in general have reason to adopt Exclusionism and that
doing so allows them to answer the Ignoring Evidence objection. Due to space limitations, I address
Whiting’s arguments elsewhere.
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General Independence: In responding to evidence that I’ve misassessed my
evidence, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my belief based
on that assessment, I should do so in a way that doesn’t rely on that belief, or
the reasoning on which it was based.
General Independence blocks Andy’s reasoning by prohibiting her from relying on
her original reasoning when responding to the hypoxia warning.
Conciliationists think that higher-order evidence can undermine or defeat
rationality. The fact that higher-order evidence calls into question evidence
assessments distinguishes it from familiar types of defeating evidence.106 Seeing a
black swan defeats Bob’s belief that all swans are white, and learning that a red light
is shining on a wall defeats Coco’s belief that the wall is red. Neither of these
defeaters – rebutters and undercutters, respectively – calls into question the agent’s
evidence assessment. Accordingly, several philosophers argue that higher-order
defeat is distinct from rebutting and undercutting defeat.107 This doesn’t imply that
higher-order evidence never rebuts or undercuts. It only implies that it needn’t do
these things to have its defeating effect. I’ll assume that this is correct.108
Just as Independence can be generalized to account for the fact that evidence
of disagreement is a species of higher-order evidence, the Undermining Question can
also be generalized to account for this fact:
General Undermining Question: How does higher-order evidence defeat?
As the Ignoring Evidence objection actually targets Conciliationism, it will be
convenient to focus on disagreement. But in the background there’s a more general
Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) calls this its “retrospective-aspect.” Also, see Christensen (2010a).
See, for instance, Feldman (2005), Christensen (2010a), Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), Rotondo (2013),
and Schechter (2013).
108 It’s worth noting that cases of higher-order evidence typically include an undercutter. In Andy’s
case, part of the hypoxia warning is that she’s probably suffering from hypoxia without knowing it.
The hypoxia warning, thus, breaks the connection between feels like I’m reasoning well and I’m
reasoning well. What matters, though, is that higher-order evidence needn’t defeat by undercutting.
106
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dialectic. General Independence apparently permits agents to ignore evidence. This
seems objectionable. Exclusionism provides a response.

4.3 Weight vs. Exclusion
In this section, I contrast two conceptions of reasons, Weightism and Exclusionism.
Each view is a conjunction of two claims: one about defeat and one about, all things
considered, epistemically rational belief. These views are usually discussed in terms of
practical reasons, rather than reasons for belief. I discuss both types of reasons, while
ultimately focusing on the theory of epistemic reasons for belief.109
Pro tanto reasons have ‘strength’ or ‘weight.’110 As John Broome (2004: 36)
points out, these terms signal a mechanical analogy that explains why a pair of scales
tip to the left, when they do, namely, “the objects in the left-hand pan of the scales
have a total weight greater than the total weight of the objects in the right hand pan.”
Applying this analogy to reasons, Broome (2004: 37) writes:
Each reason is associated with a metaphorical weight. This weight need not
be anything so precise as a number; it may be an entity of some vaguer sort.
The reasons for you to ϕ and those for you not to ϕ are aggregated or
weighed together in some way. The aggregate is some function of the weights
of the individual reasons. The function may not be simply additive … It may
be a complicated function, and the specific nature of the reasons may
influence it. Finally, the aggregate comes out in favor of your ϕing, and that is
why you ought to ϕ.
This, I submit, is the standard account of how epistemic reasons work. Some pieces
of evidence are stronger or weightier than others, and when we have conflicting

Metaethicists sometimes allow that facts beyond agents’ ken are reasons for belief. My discussion
of epistemic reasons is, rather, restricted to reasons agents possess.
110 Schroeder (2007) assigns weight to sets of reasons, rather than reasons. Nothing hangs on this
difference here.
109
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evidence, we should believe the proposition most strongly supported by our
evidence.
Call an epistemic defeater weight-affecting just in case it defeats the epistemic
rationality of believing a proposition by affecting the aggregate weight of epistemic
reasons to believe that proposition. Epistemic defeaters can be weight-affecting in
three ways. They can (1) provide reason to believe the negation of the proposition;
(2) reduce the weight of reasons to believe the proposition; or (3) eliminate a reason
to believe the proposition altogether. To illustrate, consider the mechanical analogy.
Suppose the scale is tipped far to the left, representing rational belief in some
proposition. When the reasons provided by a weight-affecting defeater are added to
the reasons to believe and disbelieve the relevant propositions, the scale tips to the
right.111 Again, there are three ways this can happen: place enough weight in the right
pan; change the weight of the things already in the pans; or remove something with
enough weight from the left pan.112 On Weightism, all defeaters are weight-affecting
in one of these ways, and what it’s epistemically rational for a subject to believe is
just what the aggregate weight of her epistemic reasons favors believing.
First-order epistemic reasons are epistemic reasons that directly affect the
aggregate weight of epistemic reasons. An equivalent statement of Weightism, then,
says that all defeaters are first-order epistemic reasons, and what it’s epistemically

Defeat can be merely graded, reducing justification or rationality for believing some proposition
while leaving “enough” justification in place to still rationally believe the proposition. Or it can be
categorical: when the rationality of a belief is defeated, it is no longer rational to believe that
proposition. I focus on categorical defeat.
112 It may seem that “removing” is just the limiting case of “changing weights” by reducing the weight
to nothing. While this may be one way of removing, there may be others. A defeater may cause the
agent to lose the epistemic reason, for instance, which seems distinct from complete reduction. In
Dancy’s terms (2004), disabling needn’t be attenuating.
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rational for a subject to believe is just what the aggregate weight of her first-order
epistemic reasons supports.
Joseph Raz posits “second-order reasons.”113 Second-order epistemic reasons
are not first-order reasons; they don’t affect the aggregate weight of reasons. Rather,
a second-order reason is a reason for or against ϕing for certain first-order reasons.
Negative second-order reasons are exclusionary reasons. These are reasons to
exclude certain reasons from being the bases of action or belief. To illustrate,
consider a practical case.114 Colin promises his wife not to send their son to public
school for financial reasons. Colin’s promise, Raz claims, provides him with an
exclusionary reason. This is not a reason against sending him to public school; rather,
it’s a reason against doing this for a particular reason.115
Exclusionary reasons conflict with first-order reasons, but this conflict differs
in kind from first-order conflicts. William Edmundson (1993: 330) explains:
In a conflict between competing first-order reasons, the reasoner weighs up
the balance of reasons and acts thereon. In a conflict between a first-order
reason and an exclusionary reason, however, the reasoner may very well be
acting against the balance of first-order reasons, and the action of the
exclusionary reason is better described not as outweighing the first-order
reason, but as taking it out of the balance of first-order reasons altogether,
yet without diminishing its weight as a reason.
Simply adding an exclusionary reason to a set of reasons doesn’t affect those reasons’
aggregate weight, but it does make ϕing for the excluded reasons impermissible.116
This doesn’t guarantee that ϕing will be irrational. Sometimes all first-order reasons

Raz (1990).
See Raz (1990: 39).
115 In terms of motivating reasons, exclusionary reasons are reasons against doing things for particular
motivating reasons.
116 As Raz (1990: 184) explains, “Exclusionary reasons are reasons for not acting for certain valid
reasons. They do not nullify or cancel those reasons…” I mostly focus on undefeated exclusionary
reasons. I discuss defeated ones in §4.5.
113
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and all unexcluded first-order reasons will both favor ϕing. Suppose, for instance,
that an agent’s first-order reasons, R1 and R2, individually and jointly favor ϕing.
Now suppose that she acquires an exclusionary reason that excludes her from ϕing
for R2. On this view, she can ϕ only if R1 favors ϕing. Since it does, she can.
On Exclusionism, not all defeaters are weight-affecting, or first-order
reasons. Some defeaters are or provide exclusionary reasons. And what it’s
epistemically rational for a subject to believe is just what the aggregate weight of her
unexcluded first-order epistemic reasons favors believing.
In the next section, I argue that Conciliationists have reason to claim that
higher-order evidence defeats by providing exclusionary reasons. One might dismiss
this as trivial: after all, isn’t ‘second-order epistemic reason’ just another term for
higher-order evidence?117 Far from being trivial, this thesis is implicitly rejected by
nearly everyone in this debate. Weightism – the standard view – implies that both
higher-order and first-order evidence defeat by providing subjects with first-order
reasons. Given my terminology, it’s a substantive question whether higher-order
evidence defeats by providing first-order or second-order reasons because some
second-order reasons are exclusionary reasons. That being said, since an exclusionary
reason is not a kind of evidence, Conciliationists should not identify higher-order
evidence with exclusionary reasons. Rather, the idea is that when a subject acquires
higher-order defeating evidence, she thereby acquires an exclusionary reason. This
reason “piggy-backs” on the higher-order evidence.

Feldman (2005), e.g., uses ‘second-order evidence’ to refer to what others call ‘higher-order
evidence.’
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I will assume that first-order epistemic reasons and evidence or evidential
reasons are the same. Weightism, then, is a version of Evidentialism – the view that
what it is epistemically rational for someone to believe is what her evidence supports
– and Exclusionism is incompatible with Evidentialism.118
Given this incompatibility, some will view Exclusionism as being dead on
arrival, rather than trivial, since Conciliationists and anti-Conciliationists alike take
Conciliationism to be consistent with the “Requirement of Total Evidence.” While
arguing against Conciliationism, Thomas Kelly (2013: 51) explains that he’s “certainly
not accusing [Conciliationists] of having to deny the Requirement of Total
Evidence.” And, while defending Conciliationism, Cohen (2013: 104) appeals to the
“uncontroversial” principle that “whether and to what extent one should revise one’s
credence depends only on what one’s evidence supports.” Cohen (2013: 109) later
claims that, “It is a truism that one must always take into account one’s total
evidence.”
With Exclusionism in mind, it should be clear that the Requirement of Total
Evidence is not a truism. What may be a truism is the Requirement of Total
Epistemic Reasons: one must always take into account one’s total epistemic reasons.
However, it’s a further, substantive question whether evidence exhausts epistemic
reasons. 119 Although Exclusionism cannot respect the Requirement of Total
Evidence, this fact alone doesn’t constitute an objection against it. For it can respect
the Requirement of Total Epistemic Reasons. Without arguing that evidence

Evidentialism, as I understand it, implies that rational belief supervenes on evidential support,
rather than evidence alone. Therefore, it is compatible with permissivism and anti-permissivism. See
Ballantyne & Coffman (2011) for a discussion of evidentialisms. See, e.g., White (2005), Titelbaum
(2010), and Schoenfield (2014) on permissivism.
119 For a similar point, see Schroeder (2015).
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exhausts epistemic reasons, appealing to the Requirement of Total Evidence to rule
out Exclusionism simply begs the question.
Finally, one might wonder, why go in for all the bells and whistles of
Exclusionism? One might be inclined to follow Katia Vavova (2015: 312) who
argues, “there is nothing more perplexing about the mechanics” of defeat by
evidence of disagreement “than there is about the mechanics of defeat more
generally.” After citing a standard example of undercutting defeat, Vavova writes,
“Most of us happily accept defeating evidence like this into our epistemology. We
can understand Conciliationism as the claim that disagreement sometimes constitutes
defeating evidence.” Vavova doesn’t claim that evidence of disagreement undercuts.
Still, since higher-order defeat and undercutting defeat are distinct, the fact that
there’s nothing particularly perplexing about undercutting defeat doesn’t imply that
there’s nothing perplexing about higher-order defeat. The bells and whistles may be
warranted.

4.4 Conciliationism and Exclusion
In this section, I’ll argue that Conciliationists have independent reason to adopt
Exclusionism. Conciliationism may not be incoherent without Exclusionism, but
Exclusionism better captures the motivations behind Conciliationism than
Weightism does.
Conciliationism views disagreement as evidence of a manifestation of our
fallibility.120 How should we take this evidence into account? Suppose Cory and Indy
know each other to be disagreeing epistemic peers. Cory is correct about what their
120

For a statement of Conciliationism’s motivation, see Christensen (2013: 77).
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shared evidence supports; Indy is incorrect. When Cory discovers the disagreement,
she needs to judge how likely it is that she’s correct. By Independence, she cannot
rely on her belief on the disputed matter or the reasoning that led her to that belief.
She must bracket those, and perhaps other, considerations. According to some
Conciliationists, she needs to bracket all relevant information about which she and
Indy disagree. 121 Suppose that’s right. Some information will usually remain,
including information about the circumstances of the disagreement (how much
coffee each of them has had; whether they did their reasoning in their heads, etc.)
and personal information (information she has about herself, but may not have
about Indy, e.g., how distracted she was when she went through her reasoning;
whether she was on drugs, etc.).122 Once she’s bracketed everything Independence
tells her to bracket, she works with what’s left over—the Remainder. There are two
ways of applying Independence to the Remainder. First, Independence might say
that insofar as the Remainder fails to give Cory good evidence for being confident
that she’s more likely to be correct, she must revise her belief in the direction of
Indy’s. This is not what Conciliationism recommends. Rather, it says that insofar as
the Remainder gives Cory good evidence for being confident that she and Indy are
equally likely to be correct, she should revise her belief.123 Cory’s revision should be
proportionate to the strength of the Remainder’s indication that this is the case.
Excellent evidence for this should lead to near agnosticism; weak evidence should
lead to minimal reduction.
See Christensen (2011) and Vavova (2015).
On circumstances of disagreement, see Elga (2007: 490). On personal information, see Christensen
(2011: 9-10).
123 Cf. Christensen (2011: 15). Vavova (2015: 316-7) calls these, respectively, the No Independent
Reason Principle (NIRP) and the Good Independent Reason Principle (GIRP). Christensen and
Vavova argue that NIRP leads to total skepticism.
121
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What is bracketing? On Conciliationism-plus-Weightism (CW), bracketing is
simply outweighing. When Bob encounters a black swan after observing only white
swans, he cannot rationally believe that all swans are white, even though a proper
subset of his evidence, considered on its own, strongly supports this conclusion.
Properly responding to the black swan evidence requires bracketing the white swan
evidence. Likewise, evidence of disagreement shifts the weight of Cory’s evidence so
it no longer supports her first-order belief, requiring her to bracket the evidence that
favored it. On Conciliationism-plus-Exclusionisn (CE), bracketing is exclusion.
Evidence of disagreement provides Cory with an exclusionary reason against
believing what her evidence supports on the basis of her original reasoning. It may
exclude her original belief and reasoning, the shared evidence, and whatever else she
and Indy disagree about. What her evidence supports has not changed, but now she
must believe what her unexcluded evidence – her Remainder – supports.124
Why think Conciliationists should prefer Exclusionism to Weightism?
First, it’s worth noting, it’s doubtful that CW is the view that epistemologists
of disagreement think Conciliationists are actually committed to. Christensen, the
leading proponent of Conciliationism, claims that what distinguishes Conciliationism
from its rivals is its commitment to Independence. And Conciliationism’s opponents
reject Independence precisely because it calls for bracketing.125 But if Conciliationists
were committed to CW and Independence-style bracketing were unexceptional – as
the “bracketing” in Bob’s case surely is – then it would be mysterious what is
distinctive about Conciliationism, and why anyone would reject it on this basis. On

I assume that, on CE, the only epistemic exclusionary reasons agents have are provided by higherorder evidence.
125 Christensen (2011: 1), Kelly (2013), and Lord (2014).
124
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the other hand, this dialectic makes more sense if Conciliationists are committed to
CE.
Some Conciliationists might respond: That’s the point! It is mysterious why
anyone rejects Independence because the bracketing it calls for is unexceptional.
Recall, Vavova insists that defeat by evidence of disagreement is no more perplexing
than ordinary undercutting defeat, and Cohen relies on the Requirement of Total
Evidence in his defense of Conciliationism. So, perhaps anti-Conciliationist
dissenters have mistakenly attributed too substantive a position to Conciliationists.
I don’t think this interpretation of the dialectic is correct. Even if actual
Conciliationists accept it, they shouldn’t. On Weightism, all conflicts are conflicts in
weight. When defeat occurs, the aggregate weight of reasons shifts from favoring
one attitude to favoring another. Conflict between exclusionary reasons and firstorder reasons leaves the aggregate weight of reasons untouched. This means
exclusionary reasons can defeat while leaving evidential support intact. Therefore, if
it can be shown that evidence of disagreement can defeat while leaving evidential
support intact, this would mean that Weightism cannot capture higher-order defeat
and that the bracketing Conciliationism calls for is distinct from the bracketing
ordinary evidence calls for.
There are several ways to see this.
First, consider one of Conciliationism’s competitors. On Right Reasons,
since Cory drew the correct conclusion before discovering the disagreement,
abandoning her belief upon discovering it would be irrational. 126 There are two
versions of this view. On the Bottom-Up version, after discovering the disagreement,
Kelly (2005), Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), Titelbaum (2015), and Weatherson (ms.) all endorse Right
Reasons.
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Cory should (i) believe what her original evidence supports and (ii) believe that this is
what she ought to believe. This view is objectionable to those who take higher-order
evidence seriously because it lets higher-order evidence drop out of the picture. The
Mismatch version of Right Reasons gives higher-order evidence a rational role. It
implies that (i) Cory should maintain her first-order belief and (iii) in order to respect
the higher-order evidence, she should believe that this isn’t what she ought to
believe. The Mismatch view therefore licenses epistemic akrasia.127
Right Reasons follows from these two claims:
1. When Cory discovers the disagreement, her evidence still supports her
first-order belief.
2. Cory should believe what her total evidence supports.
Of course, 1 is the claim I want to establish, so it helps to see how Right Reasons
theorists might defend it. Consider one of Conciliationists’ favorite examples, The
Restaurant Case. In this example, Cory and Indy are out to dinner and their evidence
consists of the bill total and that they will split the bill including tip. Yet, they
disagree about their shares. Suppose Cory believes that their shares are $45 because
the evidence in fact entails that their shares are $45. Thus, unless Cory loses
evidence, no matter how much evidence she gains, her evidence will continue to
support this proposition. And since learning of the disagreement needn’t cause Cory
to lose evidence, it needn’t change what her evidence supports.
Consider again Weightism’s mechanical analogy: the right pan represents the
proposition that their shares are $45, and the left pan represents this proposition’s
negation. Since Cory’s evidence entails that their shares are $45, the right pan is
completely weighed down. Adding weight to the left pan doesn’t shift the scale. It’s
127

Greco (2014) and Horowitz (2014) provide arguments against licensing epistemic akrasia.
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difficult to see how Weightism can capture higher-order defeat in Entailment Cases
like this, but Conciliationists think higher-order defeat can occur in these cases.
Therefore, they have reason to reject Weightism.
Perhaps entailment of contingent propositions doesn’t suffice for evidential
support. While it’s hard to imagine how evidential support could ever be better than
entailment – some even argue that entailment is the only objective evidential support
relation128 – my argument doesn’t require this principle.129 The same result follows
from a different conception of evidential support. Consider:
(ES): A body of evidence E supports the belief that P for subject S if and
only if S would believe that P on ideal reflection on whether P, given access
to E. 130
As Han van Wietmarschen (2013: 403) suggests, when we imagine a process of ideal
reflection, we abstract away from those aspects of our fallibility that lead to the
errors indicated by higher-order evidence. On ideal reflection, it seems that Cory
would believe that their shares are $45. What about the evidence of disagreement?
Van Wietmarschen (2013: 403) is correct, I think, when he claims that, “from the
vantage point of ideal reflection on all the evidence,” the fact that Indy thought, after
a quick mental calculation, that their shares were not $45, “would not lead [Cory] to
change [her] mind.” Rather, she would conclude that Indy must have made a
calculation error that explains the disagreement. On ES, this means evidence of
disagreement leaves evidential support intact.

See Titelbaum (2010).
Alternatively, you might think evidence cannot entail because it’s not propositional. But many of
Conciliationists’ opponents accept that evidence can entail, so, they will not object to this. And there’s
good reason to accept that evidence is propositional, as Williamson (2000) argues.
130 Inspired by Foley (1993), Van Wietmarschen (2013) appeals to ES.
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There is a third way to see why higher-order evidence can leave evidential
support intact. Since higher-order defeat is distinct from rebutting and undercutting
defeat, there appears to be no way higher-order evidence can defeat on Weightism.
Recall the three ways defeat occurs on this view. The defeater: (a) provides reason to
believe the negation of the proposition, (b) reduces the weight of reasons to believe
the proposition, or (c) altogether eliminates a reason to believe the proposition. The
first sort of defeat is rebutting defeat; the second is undercutting. And eliminating a
reason for belief amounts to causing evidence-loss, which higher-order defeat does
not require.131 Since these are Weightism’s only options, it doesn’t look like higherorder evidence can change evidential support when, by Conciliationists’ lights,
higher-order defeat occurs.132
Conciliationism sees defeat where Weightism doesn’t. Conciliationists,
therefore, have good reason to reject Weightism.
Since Weightism and Exclusionism aren’t exhaustive, it doesn’t follow that
Conciliationists must adopt Exclusionism. However, they do have reason to adopt
Exclusionism. Conciliationists, I’ve argued, are committed to claiming that higherorder defeat can leave evidential support intact, and this is just what we should
expect if higher-order evidence defeats by providing agents with exclusionary
reasons, as these reasons defeat without affecting the weight of first-order reasons. If
evidential reasons exhaust first-order epistemic reasons, it follows that epistemic

I argue for this elsewhere.
It’s worth remembering that evidence of disagreement can have a rebutting effect. But (i) this
cannot account for all cases of defeat by disagreement – as evidenced by the Restaurant Case – and
(ii) it doesn’t account for all higher-order defeat, which is my ultimate concern (§4.2).
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defeat by exclusion leaves evidential support intact. 133 Moreover, Independence
prohibits agents from arriving at conclusions on the basis of certain considerations,
without implying anything about which conclusions agents can rationally accept. This
is why Conciliationists can issue many of the same verdicts their competitors issue
about the rational response to particular disagreements.134 CE predicts these facts.
Epistemic exclusionary reasons are reasons against basing one’s beliefs on certain
considerations, but acquiring an epistemic exclusionary reason doesn’t necessarily
change which conclusions are rational.
Before moving on, I want to provide CE with additional support by
mentioning some of its advantages. First, as a version of Conciliationism it has the
standard advantages over Right Reasons views: it captures higher-order defeat and
doesn’t license epistemic akrasia. Unlike other versions of Conciliationism, however,
CE concedes to Right Reasons that evidence of disagreement leaves evidential
support intact. This is crucial because the other step in the argument for Right
Reasons – that Cory should believe what her total evidence supports – is rarely
defended. Although Cohen labels this a truism, it’s a substantive thesis. So, a
proponent of CE can point out that this argument for Right Reasons relies on an
unsupported, false premise (since higher-order defeat requires (non-evidential)
exclusionary reasons). And CE can diagnose the argument’s flaw: the Requirement of
Total Evidence is a reasonable, but false generalization of the ideas that many
epistemic reasons are evidential reasons and that you should believe what your
epistemic reasons support. These moves aren’t available to CW.

CE also captures Christensen’s (2011: 19) remarks about the relationship between mathematical
reasons and bracketing/combining and his (2010) remarks about rational toxicity.
134 See Christensen (2011) and Kelly (2013) on this point.
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Some Conciliationists defend views on which bracketing isn’t simply
outweighing. CE has advantages over these views, as well. Christensen argues for a
“Conflicting Ideals” view, on which there are multiple, sometimes jointly
unsatisfiable, epistemic ideals.135 In contrast, van Wietmarschen thinks Evidentialists
are right about propositional rationality, but, since Independence prohibits Cory
from basing her beliefs on her original reasoning, higher-order evidence defeats
doxastic rationality.136 Christensen’s view opens the door to (ubiquitous) epistemic
dilemmas, and van Wietmarschen abandons a natural picture of the relationship
between propositional and doxastic rationality.137 While I won’t argue against these
positions, 138 I want to note that CE needn’t revise this natural picture –
Exclusionism, as I understand it, is about propositional rationality – and it isn’t
committed to the existence of epistemic dilemmas. In these respects, CE stands with
Conciliationism’s competitors.

4.5 Ignoring Evidence
A major objection to Conciliationism is that it recommends ignoring evidence.139
There are two versions of this objection. One version accuses Conciliationists of
treating evidential asymmetries as symmetries. The other presents Conciliationists
with a dilemma: permit agents to ignore evidence, or adopt an objectionable
explanation of why Independence merely appears to permit this.
See Christensen (2010, 2013).
See van Wietmarschen (2013).
137 Roughly, your belief is doxastically rational just in case (i) you hold your belief on the basis of
reasons, R, and (ii) R makes that belief propositionally rational.
138 Broome (2007) denies the existence of rational dilemmas. Many endorse the natural picture of the
relationship between propositional and doxastic rationality. See Turri (2010), who opposes this
picture, for references.
139 See fn. 107 for references.
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If Conciliationists adopt CE, they’re committed to claiming that sometimes
ignoring evidence is permissible. In what follows, I identify instances in which CE is
committed to saying it’s permissible and those in which it isn’t. In the former cases, I
argue that this commitment needn’t embarrass Conciliationists.
Since most Conciliationists who tackle this objection accept that ignoring
evidence is impermissible, I’m addressing anti-Conciliationists and Conciliationists.
Even if anti-Conciliationists remain unconvinced, I hope to show committed
Conciliationists that it’s worth rethinking whether ignoring evidence is always
impermissible.

4.5.1 Asymmetries
The major concern the Ignoring Evidence objection raises is that Conciliationism
overlooks important evidential asymmetries. There are several versions of this
objection. Kelly’s (2010: 122) seminal version begins with this case:
Despite having access to the same substantial body of evidence E, you and I
arrive at very different opinions about some hypothesis H: while I am quite
confident that H is true, you are quite confident that it is false. Indeed, at
time t0, immediately before encountering one another, my credence for H
stands at 0.8 while your credence stands at 0.2. At time t1, you and I meet and
compare notes.
Suppose that, according to CE, the evidence of disagreement provides you with an
exclusionary reason that prohibits you from relying on your original evidence. CE
implies that what you should believe at t1 depends on your unexcluded reasons –
your Remainder – at that time. Let’s stipulate that your Remainder strongly indicates
that you and your peer are equally likely to be correct. Given this stipulation,
Conciliationism will issue a verdict about what you should believe at t1.
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Regardless of which verdict it issues, Kelly (2010: 122) thinks Conciliationism
must be missing part of the story because it overlooks potential evidential
asymmetries:140
Notice that, in the case as it has been described thus far, nothing whatsoever
has been said … about the extent to which E supports or fails to support H.
But it is implausible that how confident you and I should be that H is true at
time t1 is wholly independent of this fact. … After all, what it is reasonable
for us to believe after we have met at time t1 presumably depends upon the
total evidence that we possess at that point.
According to CE, the last claim is false: rational belief depends on unexcluded
reasons, and in this case, some of your evidence is excluded. Hence, what it’s rational
for you to believe may differ from what your total evidence supports. In
presupposing the Requirement of Total Evidence, Kelly presupposes that CE is
false. Without an argument for that principle, he hasn’t presented a non-questionbegging argument against CE.
Kelly presents another version of this worry. It’s a weakness of
Conciliationism, Kelly claims (2010: 124), “that it assimilates cases in which one does
have access to the original evidence to cases in which one does not.” Unfortunately,
this oversimplifies things. Distinguish three cases (let E be the original first-order
evidence):
(A) You have access to E & you lack reason to think you’ve reasoned poorly
about E.
(B) You have access to E & you have reason to think you’ve reasoned poorly
about E.
(C) You do not have access to E.

To say Conciliationism overlooks potential/actual evidential asymmetries is to say that its
implications are independent of what might be/are important evidential asymmetries. Metaphorically,
these objections claim that Conciliationism issues verdicts either without knowing whether certain
asymmetries obtain (potential) or while knowing certain asymmetries do obtain (actual).
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Kelly objects that Conciliationism assimilates cases in which you have access to the
original evidence to (C).
Although some Conciliatory views assimilate every case in which you have
access to the original evidence to (C), CE doesn’t. Consider the Purity Constraint:
when an agent’s evidence contains no higher-order evidence – when it’s “pure” – she
must believe what her first-order evidence supports.141 Any theory that violates the
Purity Constraint recommends ignoring evidence, and any theory that assimilates (A)
to (C) violates this constraint. According to Guess Calibration, if I draw the
conclusion that H on the basis of any evidence E, my credence in H should equal my
prior expected reliability with respect to H.142 Paulina Sliwa and Sophie Horowitz
(2015: 2841) argue that Guess Calibration violates this Constraint since it doesn’t
care whether your evidence supports your conclusion, even when you altogether lack
higher-order evidence. But on CE, when you lack reason for higher-order doubt, you
lack epistemic exclusionary reasons, and the sets of your unexcluded epistemic
reasons and all your epistemic reasons support the same beliefs. Thus, CE doesn’t
assimilate (A) to (C), since in (A), but not (C), it implies that you should believe what
E supports. Of course, CE does assimilate (B) to (C), in the sense that rational belief,
in both cases, doesn’t depend on E. But this shouldn’t embarrass Conciliationists. If
rational belief in The Restaurant Case depended on the original evidence, Cory could
reject Indy’s opinion outright—their original evidence entails that Indy’s opinion is
wrong. Prohibiting this kind of reasoning requires taking the original evidence out of
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Kelly (2010: 124) and Sliwa & Horowitz (2015: 2841) endorse this constraint.
White (2009) motivates but doesn’t endorse a view like this.
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the picture.143 So, CE satisfies the Purity Constraint and doesn’t, by Conciliationists’
lights, problematically assimilate cases in which you have access to first-order
evidence to ones in which you don’t.
Conciliationists are also charged with failing to capture actual evidential
asymmetries.

144

Reconsider Cory and Indy. Suppose that, according to

Conciliationism, after they discover their disagreement they should each be .5
confident in H. This may seem counterintuitive, since Cory correctly assessed her
evidence and Indy didn’t. Why is someone who correctly assessed her evidence
required to adopt the same belief as someone who incorrectly assessed her evidence?
Whether this is objectionable depends on the story Conciliationists tell. CE
doesn’t imply that Cory and Indy’s original credences completely fix which credences
they should adopt; it’s not a Split the Difference view. Rather, it says Cory and Indy
should be .5 confident in H because their unexcluded reasons support this credence.
Treating them symmetrically at this stage for this reason, however, is
unobjectionable. Two agents with the same evidence at t1 and t2 can both end up
with rational beliefs at t2 even if only one responded correctly to their evidence at t1.
The fact that their terminal epistemic position is symmetrical doesn’t imply that their
epistemic positions were always symmetrical. The one who initially responded
incorrectly is, for that reason, criticizable. The other isn’t. This sort of transition
from asymmetry to symmetry is mundane.

Without offering a solution, Kelly (2013: 46-7) admits that cases in which one’s evidence entails
some proposition provide Evidentialists with a puzzle about how to explain the undermining effect of
disagreement. As we’ve seen, other considerations may lead to the same puzzle.
144 Kelly (2010, 2013), Lord (2014), Christensen (2011), and Sliwa & Horowitz (2015) discuss this
version of the objection.
143
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Errol Lord (2014) advances another version of the actual evidential
asymmetry concern.145 Independence implies that relying on one’s original reasoning
when confronted with disagreement is impermissible, but, Lord insists, sometimes
this is permissible:
Mail Woman: You have recently moved into a new apartment at 10 Maple St.
You keep getting Adams’s mail because he used to live there, but never told
the post office that he moved. You know full well that Adams doesn’t live
there, despite the evidence you get from the fact that Adams constantly gets
mail at that address. Priscilla is a sorter at the post office. She believes that
Adams lives there. You encounter Priscilla and realize you two disagree.146
Lord doesn’t question whether Conciliationists can deliver the correct verdict: that
remaining confident that Adam doesn’t live in your apartment is rational. Rather,
Lord (2014: 370) insists that although Independence says otherwise, you can rely on
your original reasoning: “it is perfectly fine for you to negatively assess the
credentials of Priscilla’s belief because of the reasons for which you initially came to
hold the belief.”
A natural initial Conciliationist response is that although you can’t appeal to
your original reasons, you can discount Priscilla’s belief by appealing to the fact that
you have more evidence than she does. Lord (2014: 370) finds this response
problematic: “It is completely bizarre to hold that it is permissible for you to cite the
fact that you have more evidence than she does but impermissible to actually cite
that evidence.” Similarly, Kelly (2013: 41) argues that if you must bracket your
assessment of your evidence, you may no longer judge that lacking this evidence is a
handicap. Thus, either Independence requires you to bracket the fact that you have
more evidence or, even if it doesn’t, it renders this fact rationally impotent.

145
146

Lord thinks this objection is decisive. Kelly (2013) is more ambivalent.
Abridged from Lord (2014).
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I can’t decide whether this objection is strong or weak. While Lord insists
that it’s “perfectly fine” for you to rely on your original reasoning, Conciliationists
might be satisfied responding: no, it isn’t. After all, they defend Independence as an
explanation of what’s wrong with an illegitimate inference. If you think these
inferences are illegitimate and you don’t like Independence, you need to tell a
different story. Otherwise, the options are: condone the inference or accept
Independence. Since Conciliationists are committed to banning these inferences,
they can rest content in their commitment to Independence.147
But suppose the objection is good. Suppose that if Conciliationism prohibits
you from relying on your original reasons in this case, that is a problem. CE doesn’t
necessarily issue this prohibition.148 To see this, we can consider two questions CE
must eventually answer. On CE, higher-order evidence provides agents with
exclusionary reasons, reasons to avoid believing for certain reasons. First, in any
given case, what is the scope of an exclusionary reason, i.e., which class of reasons
cannot be the basis of belief?149 And, second, under what conditions are exclusionary
reasons defeated?
The first question essentially asks: what goes into the Remainder? One
popular answer is that anything about which disagreeing parties disagree must be

Kelly (2013) argues that prohibiting the illegitimate reasoning doesn’t require Independence. But,
again, he doesn’t account for Entailment Cases. (See fn. 149.) Lord (2014: 376) seems to condone the
inferences.
148 Lord’s target is Independence, not (what he calls) Conciliationism, but I’m taking these to go
together.
149 On the scope issue, Raz (1990: 46) writes, “The scope of an exclusionary reason is the class of
reasons it excludes. Just as any reason has an intrinsic strength which can be affected by strengthaffecting reasons so every second-order reason has…an intrinsic scope which can be affected by
scope-affecting reasons.” Setting aside Raz’s view that exclusionary reasons have an intrinsic scope,
Conciliationists should accept that various considerations affect the scope of exclusionary reasons.
147
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bracketed and everything else goes into the Remainder.150 This is compatible with the
motivation behind Independence. You need to bracket considerations when your
assessment of those considerations is called into question. When you lack reason to
think the disagreeing party disagrees about the import of certain considerations, your
assessment of those considerations hasn’t been called into question. Hence, they
remain unexcluded. Since Priscilla doesn’t disagree with you about your reasoning –
in the most straightforward version of the case, she hasn’t even considered your
reasoning – her disagreement doesn’t exclude your reasoning. On the other hand,
when Priscilla has considered your reasons but still believes Adams lives in your
apartment, Conciliationists can comfortably claim that relying on those reasons is
inappropriate.
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Thus, by attending to the scope of exclusionary reasons

Conciliationists can answer this objection.
The second question points to another possible response. Like any reasons
exclusionary reasons can be defeated. I can’t offer a full theory of the defeat of
exclusionary reasons, but this case suggests one condition. Although Priscilla’s
disagreement may provide you with an exclusionary reason, that reason may be
defeated by your knowledge that she lacks important evidence you possess.
Conciliationists needn’t claim that agents must process disagreement evidence in two
stages: agents don’t first bracket their original reasoning and then assess the
credentials of their disputant. Conciliationists can view the process holistically.
Suppose the only potential defeater of the exclusionary reason in this case is that you
know Priscilla has less evidence than you do. If you know this, then perhaps once
Christensen (2011: 18), for instance, writes, “we understand the extent of the reasoning to be
bracketed to be just that which is in dispute (or perhaps better, that which I have good reason to
believe is in dispute).” See also Vavova (2015).
151 Again, Conciliationism may still capture the proper verdict in this case.
150
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you acquire the exclusionary reason it’s defeated. This defeater – that you know you
have more evidence – may inherit its defeating force from your original evidence.
But given the presence of both your original evidence and your knowledge that
Priscilla lacks this evidence, there’s no time at which you need to bracket your
original evidence because there’s no time at which your assessment of that evidence
has been called into question.
These responses to Lord’s and Kelly’s worries about the Mail Woman case
strike me as being both reasonable and in the Conciliationist spirit. If either of them
works, that’s good news for Conciliationism. Again, though, I’m uncertain that
Conciliationists should accept Lord’s judgment about this kind of case in the first
place. So, even if these responses don’t work, whether or not opponents of
Conciliationism agree, I don’t think Conciliationists should be terribly worried. All in
all, I think CE has plausible responses to each version of the asymmetry concern.

4.5.2 Explanation Dilemma
As

Independence

certainly

appears

to

permit

ignoring

evidence,

most

Conciliationists will want to explain why this appearance is misleading. This may lead
to another version of the Ignoring Evidence objection: The only plausible
explanation of why Conciliationism doesn’t permit agents to ignore evidence is N.
Either Conciliationism implies that ignoring evidence is permissible or it implies N.
Both implications are objectionable. Thus, Conciliationism is objectionable.
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Brian Weatherson (2013) advances this version of the objection.152 According
to Weatherson, Case 1 encodes the evidence Cory and Indy seem to have for and
against P:
Case 1
Evidence for P
Cory’s judgment that P
E

Evidence against P
Indy’s judgment that ~P

Weatherson (2013: 64-65) comments, Case 1 isn’t “a table where the evidence is
equally balanced for and against p. … If we want to conclude that [Cory] should
regard p and ~p as equally well supported for someone in her circumstance, we have
to show that the table is somehow wrong.”
Weatherson argues that to avoid permitting Cory to ignore E Conciliationists
must rely on the hypothesis that “judgments screen the evidence they are based on”
or JSE for short.153 If JSE is true, then E drops off the table once Cory bases her
judgment on it:
Case 2
Evidence for P
Cory’s judgment that P

Evidence against P
Indy’s judgment that ~P

According to Weatherson, this is Conciliationism’s most plausible explanation of
why the first table is wrong. But, he argues, JSE is false.
I won’t address Weatherson’s arguments against JSE because Conciliationists
can explain what’s wrong with Table 1 without relying on JSE.154

Weatherson concludes that the most plausible motivation for the Equal Weight View is false.
C screens off the evidential support that B provides to A relative to evidential background K iff:
1.
B is evidence that A relative to K.
2.
B & C is no better evidence relative to K that A than C is.
154 Weatherson also argues against other explanations. I’m focusing on this stage of his argument
because (i) Weatherson suggests that JSE is the best Conciliationists can do, (ii) I think that’s false,
and (iii) he doesn’t address CE. Note, also, that his argument against JSE doesn’t apply to CE.
152
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Consider the evidence in Case 1. On CE, the proper response to
disagreement depends on both more and less evidence. More, because the table says
nothing about the Remainder, R. Suppose R strongly indicates that Cory and Indy
are equally likely to form the correct belief on this occasion (call this Q):
Case 3
Evidence for Q
R

Evidence against Q

Conciliationists think that Cory’s response should depend on both Table 1 and Table
3,155 and when these tables look like this, she should abandon her belief. On CE, this
is because Cory has an exclusionary reason that excludes E. Hence, Cory’s response
should depend on less evidence than Case 1 contains. Case 2 captures what
determines what she should believe, given her exclusionary reason, namely, what her
evidence supports absent E. Cory still has E and it still supports P when she judges
on its basis. And although Weatherson notes that Cory’s evidence (Case 1) isn’t
equally balanced for and against P, it’s only on CW, not CE, that an equal balance of
total evidence is required for agnosticism. On CE, one’s beliefs must be sensitive not
only to evidence, but also to exclusionary reasons.
Thus, CE answers the dilemma, while avoiding commitment to JSE, by
explaining why ignoring evidence is permissible.156

As Weatherson acknowledges, support relations are relative to an evidential background. On
Conciliationism, Case 3 is a relevant part of that background.
156 Schoenfield (2015) argues against a view (basically equivalent to Guess Calibration) because it
implies that it’s the only constraint on rational belief. Schoenfield doesn’t say which other constraints
there are, so it’s hard to know whether she would find CE objectionable for this reason. But, since CE
is distinct from Guess Calibration and it tells agents to believe what their epistemic reasons support,
this objection doesn’t seem to apply.
155
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4.5.3 Not So Bad
A policy permitting agents to ignore evidence sounds crazy. But CE’s departure from
orthodoxy is relatively minimal. Evidence still plays a major role, as it constitutes the
epistemic reasons one must respond to both when one lacks and when one possesses
higher-order evidence. Committed Right Reasons theorists will insist that this isn’t
enough. But they have problems of their own. CE avoids these problems at the cost
of denying the Requirement of Total Evidence. Is this really a cost?
Sliwa and Horowitz argue that theories of higher-order evidence should
satisfy these desiderata:
Desideratum 1: One’s rational beliefs should reflect the bearing of one’s firstorder evidence.
Desideratum 2: One’s rational beliefs should reflect the bearing of one’s
higher-order evidence.
Desideratum 3: One’s rational first-order and higher-order beliefs should not
be in tension.
While the Right Reasons views and CE each apparently only satisfies two of these
desiderata, Sliwa and Horowitz’s view is designed to satisfy all three:
Evidential Calibration: When one’s evidence favors P over ~P, one’s
credence in P should equal the expected reliability of one’s educated guess
that P.
To apply Evidential Calibration you take three steps. First, determine which
proposition your first-order evidence favors, where evidence favors P over ~P just in
case the degree of support it provides to P is higher than the degree of support it
provides to ~P. Second, determine your expected reliability, r, about that
proposition. Finally, assign r to the favored proposition. If your evidence favors P
and your expected reliability is .99, then according to Evidential Calibration, if you
have a credence of .99 in P, your credence is rational and you haven’t ignored your
first-order evidence.
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I want to argue not that Evidential Calibration is false, 157 but that if it
represents the best balance of these three desiderata, and, in particular, if
Desideratum 1 is as weak as Evidential Calibration requires, then the fact that CE
doesn’t satisfy Desideratum 1 isn’t a serious cost.
Suppose your expected reliability about P at t1 and t2 is .99 while the degree
of support P receives from your evidence is .51 and .49, respectively. 158 Now,
consider how things unfold: at t0, your credences are 50/50 in P and ~P, at t1 you get
slightly confirming evidence, and then at t2 you get slightly disconfirming evidence. If
your credences in P go from .5 to .99 to .01 as you receive what appears to be nearly
negligible first-order evidence, your credences evolve as Evidential Calibration
implies they ought to. On the other hand, suppose your expected reliability, .89,
remains the same from t1 to t3, but you receive first-order evidence that shifts the
support for P from .51 up to .99 back down to .51. According to Evidential
Calibration, your credence in P is rational just in case it remains at .89 throughout
this interval. This view, therefore, requires huge swings in credences occasioned by
slight shifts in evidential support while forbidding changes in credences occasioned
by massive shifts in evidential support. This doesn’t look like a view that takes firstorder evidence seriously.
As Sliwa and Horowitz (2015: 2854) explain, Evidential Calibration “takes
the valence of our first-order evidence into account—whether the evidence favors P
or ~P—[but] it ignores the strength of that evidence.” Thus, they set out to
articulate a view that satisfies Desideratum 1 and that thereby avoids the Ignoring
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See Schoenfield (2015) for an argument that it’s unmotivated.
I’ll assume that credences should be probabilistically coherent.
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Evidence objection only to face a version of that very objection: Evidential
Calibration recommends ignoring evidence strength. Anticipating this objection, they
write, “Absent higher-order worries, it matters quite a lot whether one’s evidence for
P is weak or strong. So it’s natural to think that this difference should also matter in
cases where we do have higher-order evidence.” This thought should be resisted,
they argue, because it leads to the view that higher-order evidence should,
systematically, have a smaller effect in mathematical/logical cases and a larger effect
in inductive cases.
I argued that something like this should motivate Conciliationists to adopt
CE. Higher-order evidence, at least sometimes, leaves total evidential support
strength unchanged, or changed disproportionately to the extent of belief revision
the higher-order evidence requires. It’s common ground between CE and Sliwa and
Horowitz’s position, then, that capturing higher-order defeat requires abandoning
the goal of respecting total evidential strength. One response – Sliwa and Horowitz’s
– is to cling to total evidential support valence, ending up with what Sliwa and
Horowitz (2015: 2855) admit is a “fairly weak and attenuated understanding of
Desideratum 1,” something like:
Desideratum 1*: (i) When one lacks higher-order evidence, one’s rational
beliefs should reflect the strength and valence of one’s first-order evidence
and (ii) when one has higher-order evidence, one’s rational beliefs should
reflect only the valence of one’s first-order evidence.
Another response is to place less significance on total evidence and more on total
epistemic reasons, and to replace Desideratum 1* with:
Desideratum 1**: One’s rational beliefs should reflect the strength and
valence of one’s unexcluded first-order evidence.

96

On this understanding of Desideratum 1, CE satisfies all three desiderata. Moreover,
whereas Desideratum 1* treats evidential strength and valence asymmetrically
depending on whether agents have higher-order evidence, Desideratum 1** treats
them symmetrically. On Desideratum 1**, evidential valence and strength of one’s
unexcluded evidence always both matter. In contrast, on Desideratum 1*, valence
always matters, but sometimes strength doesn’t. Thus, Desideratum 1* and
Desideratum 1** both allow agents to ignore total evidence strength when they have
higher-order evidence. Desideratum 1** also allows agents to ignore total evidence
valence when they have higher-order evidence. If Desideratum 1** is the actual
desideratum, CE has no problem. On the other hand, if Sliwa and Horowitz are right
that Desideratum 1* is the actual desideratum, then the ignoring evidence objection
against CE is simply that it allows agents to ignore total evidence valence (while
requiring them to respect the valence and strength of their unexcluded evidence).
Given CE’s explanation of why ignoring valence is permissible, if Conciliationists
only face this version of the objection as a result of adopting CE, I submit that they
shouldn’t be too concerned.

4.6 Conclusion
Their commitment to Independence gives Conciliationists reason to adopt
Exclusionism. And Exclusionism allows Conciliationists to answer the most
prominent objection to their view. At bottom, the answer is simple: the objection
relies on a typically undefended, and by CE’s lights, false assumption, viz. the
Requirement of Total Evidence.
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The more general lesson: how theorists answer the (General) Undermining
Question makes a difference to theoretical debates surrounding higher-order
evidence. For this reason, I think more work needs to address these questions.
Regarding the case at hand, I’ve done little to defend Exclusionism. Given how well
Exclusionism complements Conciliationism, Exclusionism should inherit some of
Conciliationism’s support. But plenty of questions about exclusionary reasons
remain. 159 While I address these issues elsewhere, I hope to have shown that
metanormative questions like these deserve the attention of those investigating the
epistemology of fallibility. We have a decent sense of the options regarding whether
and when higher-order evidence undermines rational belief. The next question for
those who take higher-order evidence seriously is how does it undermine.

159

Edmundson (1993) is a good place to start. See Whiting (2015) for the state-of-the-art.
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CHAPTER 5
EPISTEMIC NORMATIVITY AND FALLIBILITY
5.1 Introduction
According to the Fallibility Norm, we ought to account for our fallibility when
managing our beliefs. As stated, I don’t know of anyone who disagrees with this
norm. Yet, there is significant controversy about what accounting for our fallibility
requires in particular cases. This controversy has implications concerning the nature
and structure of epistemic norms.
To illustrate, consider Probabilism, the view that our credences ought to
conform to the probability calculus. An implication of Probabilism is that we ought
to assign probability 0 to any logical falsehood toward which we have an opinion.
Yet, a plausible application of the Fallibility Norm implies otherwise. For example,
suppose I’m a logical neophyte, and I discover that all of the many logical experts in
my community independently and genuinely believe that some logical falsehood, P, is
a logical truth. Together with my recognition of these experts’ relative epistemic
superiority in the case at hand, this discovery seems to require that I give at least
some credence to P. If this is right, then a plausible application of the Fallibility
Norm requires me to violate Probabilism. And cases of this kind can be multiplied to
show that the Fallibility Norm would require me to violate, in certain situations, any
norm that makes substantive doxastic requirements.160
In response, proponents of norms of this kind argue that although it’s often
true that novices ought to defer to experts (or however this application of the
A norm makes substantive doxastic requirements if there is some doxastic attitude A and some
proposition P such that the norm implies that if an agent takes a doxastic attitude toward P at time t,
the agent ought to take A toward P at t.
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Fallibility Norm should be stated) and although the expert testimony provides some
evidence in favor of the relevant propositions, novices ought not defer when it
comes to truths of logic or rationality, etc., because there cannot be all-thingsconsidered misleading evidence about such truths.161 These writers attempt to respect
the Fallibility Norm by allowing that expert testimony provides some evidence in this
case, and perhaps very strong evidence in other cases, but they insist on limiting the
application of the Fallibility Norm to exclude their favored sets of truths. The
upshot: Probabilism and the Fallibility Norm are both true, and they don’t conflict.
This is a No Conflict Position.
Not everyone will endorse a No Conflict Position. Some will insist that there
is indeed a conflict – the application of the Fallibility Norm does indeed require
agents to violate Probabilism – and that this shows that one of the norms is false.
Again, I don’t know of anyone who rejects the Fallibility Norm itself, as opposed to
particular applications of it, so the version of this position that will be of interest is
the following: Probabilism and the Fallibility Norm do conflict, and therefore
Probabilism is false. Call this the Pessimistic Conflict Position.162
Finally, there is what I’ll call the Optimistic Conflict Position: Probabilism
and the Fallibility Norm do conflict, and yet they’re both true. On a standard way of
modeling this conflict, I have two conflicting prima facie obligations, or, in more
contemporary language, pro tanto reasons. I have a reason to have beliefs that
conform to the probability calculus, I have a reason to defer to the experts, and,

See, e.g., Elga (2010) and Titelbaum (2015).
Schechter (2013) uses fallibility considerations to argue against Single Premise Closure. Vis-à-vis
that principle, then, it’s plausible to claim that he endorses a Pessimistic Conflict Position. But, in
responding to what he calls the “fixed-point argument,” Schechter (reluctantly) endorses a version of
the Optimistic Conflict Position.
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since I cannot do both, these reasons conflict. But just as the fact that I sometimes
have a reason to keep a promise while also having a (perhaps stronger) reason against
keeping this promise doesn’t imply that there is no norm of promise keeping, the
fact that I sometimes have a reason to violate Probabilism doesn’t imply that
Probabilism isn’t a true epistemic norm. When fallibility based reasons don’t conflict
with other epistemic reasons, all of these reasons must be heeded; when these
reasons do conflict, they need to be balanced against each other.163
As a norm that makes substantive doxastic requirements, Probabilism is a
particularly good example of a norm that appears to conflict with the Fallibility
Norm. But the Fallibility Norm appears to conflict with other compelling epistemic
norms that lack this feature, including:
•

Conditionalization: You ought to conditionalize on your evidence and
never change your beliefs unless you acquire new experiential evidence.164

•

Single-Premise Closure: Deduction from justified beliefs results in
justified beliefs.165

•

The Evidentialist Dictum: You ought to proportion your beliefs to your
total relevant evidence.166

•

Level-Coherence: You ought to never believe a proposition while
believing you ought not or you’re rationally required not to believe that
proposition.167

These are the norms that have been discussed in the literature in relation to the
Fallibility Norm. But, in general, when a norm implies that you ought to adopt a
particular belief in your circumstances, C, if you have sufficiently strong evidence
Zynda (1996) and Christensen (2007a) endorse a position like this.
Jeffrey (1983) and Lewis (1999).
165 Schechter (2013).
166 Christensen (2010), van Wietmarschen (2013), and Sliwa & Horowitz (2015).
167 Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) and Weatherson (MS).
163
164
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that your circumstances are relevantly different from C or that the norm in fact
recommends some other belief in C, then the norm will say you ought to believe one
thing, while fallibility considerations will say otherwise. Or, alternatively, if the mere
recognition of your fallibility calls for certain sorts of doubts about what the norm
requires in your circumstances, again, the norm will say you ought to believe one
thing, while fallibility considerations will say otherwise. Or, finally, if you have strong
evidence that a true norm is not actually a true norm, when the norm applies to your
circumstances, it will say you ought to believe one thing while fallibility
considerations will say otherwise. Thus, the at least apparent conflict between the
Fallibility Norm and other epistemic norms is widespread.
For each of these apparent conflicts, there will be options available
corresponding to the ones just outlined with respect to Probabilism (No Conflict,
Pessimistic Conflict, and Optimistic Conflict). And while one may adopt the same
position with respect to each of these conflicts (e.g., No Conflict across the board),
there’s no reason to think one must do this as long as the norms are logically
independent.
I will focus on Probabilism, Conditionalization, and the Evidentialist Dictum.
On the position I will develop, these norms and the Fallibility Norm are all true; it
has this in common with both the No Conflict Position and the Optimistic Conflict
Position. But the Fallibility Norm differs in kind, or normative function, from these
other norms. For this reason it may be inaccurate to say that the norms conflict. But
they are not always jointly satisfiable: either they never apply to the same
circumstances, or if they do they often recommend different options.
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After distinguishing two kinds of norms (§5.2), and explaining which kind of
norm the Fallibility Norm is (§5.3), I show that this position has the potential to help
us make progress in debates concerning “higher-order evidence” (§5.4). Because the
position attempts to allow us to have our cake and eat it too, it inherits not only the
benefits of the positions it attempts to reconcile but also some of their problems.
One consequence in particular may be especially troubling: the position implies that
ideally rational agents needn’t be sensitive to the possibility of rational error. I
respond to this objection in §5.5. I conclude in §5.6.

5.2 Two Kinds of Norms
Norms are truth-evaluable propositions, saying how something ought to be, or how
someone ought to behave. Individual agential norms, for instance, have the
following form: In circumstances C, agent A ought to φ. Other kinds of norms, for
instance norms governing societal arrangements, will be more complicated.
Every normative domain should recognize two kinds of norms. Exactly how
we characterize these norms will, I fear, be a matter of controversy. So, I’ll begin
with the neutral terms primary norms and secondary norms, and I’ll use examples to
give a sense of what I have in mind for each. Then I’ll give more substantive
characterizations of these norms.
First, primary norms. Primary norms are what many have sought when
they’ve asked traditional normative questions: How is the perfectly just society
arranged? How does the virtuous agent behave? How does the perfectly rational
agent manage her beliefs? Answers: Societies ought to be arranged in such-and-such
ways to be perfectly just, agents ought to do so-and-so to be virtuous, and so on. In
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each case, true primary norms will say how things ought to be “ideally,” or how it
would be best for things to be, from a certain perspective (e.g., from the perspective
of justice, virtue, or epistemic rationality). A set of primary norms presupposes that,
as Rawls would say, conditions are favorable and compliance is full.168 Conditions are
favorable when they make full compliance possible, and compliance is full when
agents do/ have always done and/or will always do as the norms instruct them to do.
Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) is supposed to be the logic of ought-claims.
An assumption of SDL, when it was created, was that all ought-claims – or, at least,
all ought-claims within SDL’s scope – are primary norms. Different writers have
formulated this assumption in different ways. Aqvist (1967: 371) writes that the focus
of SDL is on “what takes place in certain perfectly nice possible worlds…where
everything is as it ought to be.” Chisholm (1963: 35) writes that “It’s not entirely
inaccurate,” to say that the principle that ‘If it ought to be that a occurs, then a
occurs’ is “presupposed by these logics.” Van Fraassen (1972: 417) writes that SDL
adopts “the thesis that what ought to be the case is exactly what is the case in any
ideal situation.” Or, finally, metalinguistically and in terms of ranked possible worlds,
Feldman (1990: 311) writes that in (a system relevantly similar to) SDL “‘Op’ is an
abbreviation for ‘p is true at all the best worlds.’” This narrow focus on primary
norms to the exclusion of secondary norms led to major problems for SDL. We
needn’t get bogged down in the formal aspects of these problems, but looking at
some of the central examples of secondary norms will help to illustrate the
distinction between primary norms and secondary norms, as well as demonstrate the
ubiquity of true secondary norms.
168

Rawls (1999a: 216).
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Suppose it’s true that Smith ought not murder Jones, yet Smith is determined
to murder Jones. Then it may also be true that Smith ought to murder Jones
gently.169 Or suppose that Doctor Brown must give her patient medicine. Her best
course of action would be to give her patient medicine M1 today and M1 tomorrow.
Her second best course of action would be to give her patient M2 today and M2
tomorrow. And it would be very bad to mix medicines. As a matter of fact, Doctor
Brown gives M2 today. It seems that while it’s true, in some sense, that she ought to
give M1 today and M1 tomorrow, given that she gives M2 today it’s also true that
she ought not give M1 tomorrow.170 In these examples, the primary norms (Smith
ought not murder Jones and Doctor Brown ought to give M1 today and M1
tomorrow) express how it would be best for things to be. The secondary norms
(Smith ought to murder Jones gently and Doctor Brown ought not give M1
tomorrow) express how it would be best for things to be, given that the agents fail to
comply with the primary norms. In their conditional form (e.g., If Smith murders
Jones, then Smith ought to murder Jones gently), these secondary norms are what
Chisholm calls, borrowing a phrase from Kant, contrary-to-duty imperatives.171 Just
as counterfactual conditionals state how things might or would be conditional on
something true being false, contrary-to-duty imperatives or norms state how things
ought to be conditional on an agent’s noncompliance.
Not all secondary norms are contrary-to-duty norms. To see this, let’s add
the following details to the Doctor Brown example. Doctor Brown accidentally
drops a pill of M1 into a cup with a pill of M3, a drug that will kill her patient. A pill

Forrester (1984).
Casteneda (1981).
171 Chisholm (1963).
169
170
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of M1 is indiscernible from a pill of M3, but a pill of M2 is discernible from M1 and
M3. Suppose that Doctor Brown needs to decide between giving her patient M2 or
giving her patient whichever she would randomly pick between M1 and M3. In this
scenario, it seems clear that a true secondary norm will say Doctor Brown ought to
give her patient M2. She hasn’t failed to comply with the primary norm that applies
to her situation, and there’s a decent chance that she will manage to comply with it.
Yet, since the risk of failing to comply in a particular way is high and the
consequences of this failure would be grave, Doctor Brown ought to fail to comply
in a different way. This example shows that some secondary norms are sensitive to
the risk of compliance failure rather than being sensitive merely to actual compliance
failure. In this way, then, some secondary norms are unlike contrary-to-duty
(secondary) norms.
All secondary norms, however, do seem to be based in imperfection, whether
situational or agential. Primary norms tell us what we ought to do or what it would
be best to do, taking certain sorts of perfections or ideals for granted. But we, and
the situations we find ourselves in, are imperfect in various respects, and, crucially,
normativity doesn’t end with perfection. There are better and worse ways of being
imperfect. Secondary norms are meant to express how we ought to compensate for
the imperfections with which we find ourselves. It may be best for Smith not to
murder Jones, but given that he’s going to murder Jones, it would be better for
Smith to murder Jones gently rather than painfully; it may be best for Doctor Brown
to give her patient M1 tomorrow, but given that she won’t give it today, it would be
better for her to give M2 tomorrow. And these judgments are not merely judgments
of betterness. They ground the oughts of secondary norms. It wouldn’t merely be
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better for Doctor Brown to give M2 tomorrow; that’s what she ought to do, given
the contingencies of her situation.
The Smith/Jones and Doctor Brown cases were meant to illustrate the
distinction between primary and secondary norms, as well as at least hint at the
ubiquity of secondary norms. Secondary norms are, indeed, ubiquitous. In ethics,
regarding contrary-to-duty norms, Chisholm (1963: 35-6) writes:
[When we have broken a rule of morality] we are required to consider the
familiar duties associated with blame, confession, restoration, reparation,
punishment, repentance, and remedial justice, in order to be able to answer
the question: ‘I have done something I should not have done—so what
should I do now?’ (Or even: ‘I am going to do something I shouldn’t do—so
what should I do after that?’) For most of us need a way of deciding, not
only what we ought to do, but also what we ought to do after we fail to do
some of the things we ought to do.
Rawls makes similar remarks when marking his famous distinction between ideal
political theory (what he sometimes calls “strict compliance theory”) and nonideal
political theory (what he sometimes calls “partial compliance theory”), saying of the
latter that it:
comprises such topics as the theory of punishment, the doctrine of just war,
and the justification of the various ways of opposing unjust regimes, ranging
from civil disobedience and conscientious objection to militant resistance
and revolution.172
For Rawls, another kind of nonideal political theory:
deals with unfavorable conditions, that is, with the conditions of societies
whose historical, social, and economic circumstances make their achieving a
well-ordered regime, whether liberal or decent, difficult if not impossible. In
regard to these burdened societies we must ask how far liberal or decent
peoples owe a duty of assistance to these societies so that the latter may
establish their own reasonably just or decent institutions.173

172
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Rawls (1999a: 8).
Rawls (1999b: 5).
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Thus, I take it that since these issues pervade our lives, and secondary norms are the
norms that govern these issues, secondary norms are, themselves, pervasive.
All of this provides us with multiple, hopefully consistent ways of marking
the distinction between primary norms and secondary norms. Primary norms
presuppose favorable conditions and strict compliance; secondary norms needn’t
presuppose either. Primary norms are the norms of ideal normative theories;
secondary norms are the norms of nonideal normative theories. Primary norms
express how it would be best for things to be from the perspectives of justice, virtue,
epistemic rationality, etc.; secondary norms express how it would be best for things
to be from those perspectives, taking for granted certain imperfections or nonideal
conditions. A somewhat more substantive, though no doubt controversial
characterization is: primary norms are norms of perfection, whereas secondary
norms are norms of compensation—norms that tell us how to compensate for
various imperfections.
Now that I’ve characterized and illustrated the distinction between primary
norms and secondary norms, and I’ve demonstrated the ubiquity and role of
secondary norms, I want to say a little bit about what we should expect from
secondary norms (i.e., norms of compensation). We know what to expect from
norms of perfection: they tell us how to be perfect, or how to organize a perfectly
just society, etc. But what should we expect from norms of compensation?
First, it’s worth noting that norms of compensation and norms of perfection
can converge on the same outcomes. To remain in one lane while driving a perfectly
aligned car (on a flat and straight road, on a windless day, etc.), a driver should not
pull the steering wheel in either direction. But when a car’s alignment is off, and the
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car pulls slightly to the left, the driver should pull the wheel slightly to the right to
compensate. If executed properly, this may have the exact same outcome –
remaining in one lane – that would be achieved by complying with the norm of
perfection in the perfect situation.
However, this is a special case, and we shouldn’t expect norms of
compensation and norms of perfection to converge in outcomes. Indeed, it should
be unsurprising if we find that complying with norms of compensation results in
imperfection: imperfection is often the normative residue of imperfection. As Rawls
(1999a: 247) writes concerning justice:
In practice we must usually choose between several unjust, or second best,
arrangements; and then we look to nonideal theory to find the least unjust
scheme. Sometimes this scheme will include measures and policies that a
perfectly just system would reject. Two wrongs can make a right in the sense
that the best available arrangement may contain a balance of imperfections,
an adjustment of compensating injustices.
This means we need to take care when making inferences concerning the
relationship between norms and the relative perfection of the outcomes they
recommend. Consider, for instance, an inference from a norm leads to imperfection
to the norm is false. If the norm is a norm of perfection, then this may be a good
inference; however, it’s not a good inference if the norm is a norm of compensation.
To refute a norm of compensation one must point out, not only that the norm leads
to imperfection, but also that, taking for granted the relevant background
imperfections, there is a better way to minimize or reduce imperfection. Rawls gives
the example of wartime slavery: a state that is committed to either executing
prisoners of war or enslaving them ought to enslave them, he claims, assuming the
conditions of slavery are not too terrible. Although it’s likely true that a perfectly just
society would not enslave people, prisoners of war or any others, this doesn’t imply
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that slavery will never be the most just (or, least unjust) option in the actual world.174
Care needs to be taken as well with inferences from an imperfect agent (society, etc.)
ought not behave as a norm implies agents ought to behave to the norm is false. If
the norm is a norm of compensation meant to apply to the imperfect agent’s
situation, then this may be a good inference; however, it’s not a good inference if the
norm is a norm of perfection.
Related to the point that we should be unsurprised to find that complying
with norms of compensation and complying with norms of perfection will often lead
to different outcomes, we should likewise expect these two types of norms to be
jointly unsatisfiable, in at least the following sense: if an agent complies with
(applications of) one of these types of norms, she will (at least often) not be
complying with corresponding applications of the other type of norm. For instance,
whereas a norm of perfection would never have you murder (say), certain norms of
compensation would. More generally, the lives of those complying with norms of
perfection will look quite a bit different from the lives of those complying with
norms of compensation.
Whether a more robust version of the “jointly unsatisfiable”-claim can be
defended depends on whether those agents (or societies) to which these two types of
norms apply ever find themselves in the same circumstances, and if they do, whether
the norms agree in those circumstances. Agential norms, recall, have the form: In
circumstances C, agent A ought to φ. If the perfections and imperfections on which
norms of perfection and norms of compensation are conditioned are included in the
circumstances, then these norms do not apply to the same circumstances, and not
174

Rawls (1999a: 247).
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only will it seem wrong to say that they are jointly unsatisfiable in some stronger
sense, it may also seem right to say that they are trivially jointly satisfiable. Whether
this is the case, though, depends on how we carve up circumstances. Reconsider the
Smith/Jones example. Suppose Smith’s options are (1) don’t murder Jones at t1, (2)
murder Jones gently at t1, (3) murder Jones painfully at t1. Perhaps the proper forms
of the norms of perfection and compensation are, respectively:
(Np) In Smith’s circumstances C, Smith ought not to murder Jones at t1.
(Nc) In Smith’s circumstances C, Smith ought to murder Jones gently at t1.
Here the circumstances are identical. The thought is that Smith’s imperfection – that
he will murder Jones – determines the content of the norm of compensation in some
way without figuring in (the antecedent of) that content. If something like this
proposal is correct, then these two types of norms are likely to be often jointly
unsatisfiable in a further sense, namely, in the very same circumstances the norms
will tell agents to do incompatible things.
Let’s take stock. I’ve claimed that every normative domain should recognize
two kinds of norms, norms of perfection and norms of compensation. Norms of
perfection tell us what ought to be done from a certain perspective (justice, virtue,
epistemic rationality, etc.), taking for granted certain perfections or ideals, including
favorable conditions and strict compliance. Norms of compensation tell us what
ought to be done from the same sorts of perspectives, taking for granted certain
imperfections, including perhaps unfavorable conditions or failures of compliance.
Some traditional normative questions that seek norms of compensation include
questions of blame, reparation, punishment, and remedial justice. We shouldn’t
expect compliance with norms of compensation to result in perfection; indeed, what
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seems more likely is that it will result in imperfection. Norms of compensation are
meant to minimize or reduce imperfection, instructing us on how to achieve the least
bad outcomes. Finally, it’s plausible, though perhaps not unavoidable, that norms of
perfection and norms of compensation will not apply to the same circumstances, and
so we will not ever be able to comply with instances of both types of norms in any
particular circumstance. If they ever do apply to the same circumstances, they are
likely to issue incompatible recommendations, and hence complying with one will
require violating the other.

5.3 The Fallibility Norm is a Norm of Compensation
As long as the distinction between norms of perfection and norms of compensation
is legitimate, I think the argument for the claim that the Fallibility Norm is a norm of
compensation is fairly straightforward, though some things about the argument must
be clarified. I’ll first state a preliminary version of the argument. Then, after making
clarifications, I’ll state the argument more accurately.
Norms of compensation tell us how to compensate for imperfections, and
norms of perfection do not do this. The Fallibility Norm says that we ought to
account for our fallibility when managing our beliefs. Fallibility is an imperfection.
Thus, the Fallibility Norm tells us how to compensate for an imperfection. Thus, the
Fallibility Norm is a norm of compensation, not a norm of perfection.
This argument immediately raises a question and an objection. First, what is
fallibility? Whether it’s an imperfection obviously depends on what it is. Second, the
Fallibility Norm, as stated, tells us to account for our fallibility; it doesn’t tell us how
to do this. So, even granting that fallibility is an imperfection, the Fallibility Norm
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isn’t a norm of compensation if those norms tell us how to account for our
imperfections. I’ll address these concerns in turn.
What is fallibility? Fallibility is a disposition to make mistakes; agents are
fallible insofar as they’re disposed to make certain kinds of errors. Corresponding to
two kinds of epistemic errors, we can distinguish two kinds of epistemic fallibility:
alethic and rational. An agent is alethically fallible insofar as she is disposed to form
inaccurate beliefs. An agent is rationally fallible insofar as she is disposed to form
epistemically irrational beliefs. Not all inaccurate beliefs are irrational beliefs, so
alethic fallibility doesn’t entail rational fallibility. As a contingent matter, any
inaccurate belief could be irrational, but in general the fact that a belief is inaccurate
doesn’t guarantee that it is irrational. There may be exceptions to this generalization,
though. For instance, some epistemic norms require certain beliefs to be true in
order to be rational.175 If such norms are true, then if an agent is alethically fallible
vis-à-vis those beliefs, then she is also rationally fallible. Furthermore, it may be
possible for inaccurate beliefs to contribute to irrational beliefs without being
irrational. Inaccurate, but rational beliefs about one’s epistemic situation or about
epistemic norms, if such beliefs are possible, may lead to irrational beliefs. Again, an
agent who is alethically fallible in this way may also thereby be rationally fallible.
My focus is on epistemic rationality. So, when I say fallibility is an
imperfection, I’m referring primarily to rational fallibility, and to any alethic fallibility
that contributes to rational fallibility. The epistemic condition is characterized by
ignorance, and doxastic inaccuracy is an unavoidable byproduct of that ignorance.
From the perspective of epistemic rationality, being disposed to have inaccurate
Titelbaum (2015) argues that, as a matter of necessity, false beliefs about the requirements of
rationality are irrational beliefs.
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beliefs, i.e., being alethically fallible, is not necessarily an epistemic imperfection.176
Rational fallibility, however, is an epistemic imperfection from this perspective. An
agent who is rationally fallible either manifests this disposition or doesn’t. If she
does, then she’s made a rational mistake, which is clearly a sign of rational
imperfection. But even if this disposition happens to never manifest itself—e.g.,
because the conditions in which it would manifest itself happen not to arise—it is
still an imperfection. A perfectly rational epistemic agent is not one who merely
happens to avoid rational mistakes; rather, a perfectly rational epistemic agent avoids
rational mistakes by necessity. So, being disposed to make rational errors, even if one
happens never to manifest this disposition, is enough to make one rationally
imperfect. And, as I’m understanding it, it is this imperfection for which the
Fallibility Norm tells us to account when managing our beliefs.
But even granting that rational fallibility is an imperfection, the Fallibility
Norm simply tells us to account for our fallibility rather than telling us how to
account for it. Wouldn’t the norm apply just as well to a perfectly rational agent, who
could easily account for her (non-existent) rational fallibility? In which case, is it right
to categorize it as a norm of compensation?
I don’t think this is a deep concern, but addressing it will help clarify the
argument. There are fallibility-based norms that do tell us how to compensate for
our fallibility, even if the Fallibility Norm itself isn’t one of them. Recall the example
from the introduction. I recognize that all the logical experts in my community take
P to be a logical truth. Since I also recognize that they are much more likely than I

As Christensen (2007a: 21) explains, “A central component of epistemic rationality is having beliefs
appropriate to incomplete information…A useful model of epistemic rationality cannot simply
collapse rational belief into truth.”
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am to correctly assess the evidence on this matter, I ought to defer to them, and give
at least some credence to P. 177 This norm tells me how to compensate for my
fallibility in this case: it tells me to defer to those whom I judge to be more likely to
correctly assess the relevant evidence. Other norms will tell me how to account for
my fallibility in other cases. All of these norms are applications of the Fallibility
Norm; they are case specific and they provide more guidance than the Fallibility
Norm does on its own.178 And, as controversy surrounds these norms rather than the
Fallibility Norm itself, it’s these norms that are of primary interest. Speaking of the
Fallibility Norm is just a simplified way of referring to all of these norms. Claiming
that applications of the Fallibility Norm, or fallibility norms, are norms of
compensation, rather than claiming that the Fallibility Norm itself is such a norm
wouldn’t affect the substance of my argument.
So, here is a slightly more accurate presentation of the argument. Norms of
compensation tell us how to compensate for our imperfections. Applications of the
Fallibility Norm tell us how to compensate for various aspects of our rational
fallibility when managing our beliefs. Rational fallibility is an epistemic imperfection.
Thus, applications of the Fallibility Norm tell us how to compensate for an epistemic
imperfection. Therefore, applications of the Fallibility Norm are epistemic norms of
compensation.
On the picture that emerges, there are epistemic norms of perfection and
there are epistemic norms of compensation, including but perhaps not limited to

Set aside the question of whether this is a fully accurate statement of the relevant norm; I’m just
using it for the sake of illustration.
178 Compare two familiar imperatives: “Don’t forget to pack everything you need” and “Remember to
pack your toothbrush.” The latter is an application of the former, it’s case specific and it provides
more guidance.
177
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applications of the Fallibility Norm. Epistemic norms of perfection are the norms
perfectly rational epistemic agents heed. Epistemic norms of compensation either
exhaust or are among the norms we imperfect epistemic agents must heed in order
to compensate for our epistemic imperfections. Following Rawls, we can take norms
of compensation to be sensitive to varieties of compliance failure (risk and actual)
and to unfavorable conditions. In the epistemic case, unfavorable conditions include
inter alia cognitive limitations, and susceptibility to introspectively undetectable bias,
wishful thinking, and the misapplication of epistemic rules. Norms of compensation
will be aimed at helping us achieve the least irrational mental state consistent with
living in these kinds of unfavorable epistemic conditions.179
Of course, norms of perfection are not wholly useless for agents like us.
They may set ideals for us to approximate. 180 For example, suppose that the
Evidentialist Dictum – that we ought to proportion our beliefs to our evidence – is a
norm of perfection, and suppose that sometimes, in order to compensate for our
imperfect evidence assessment abilities, fallible agents ought not to proportion their
beliefs to their total evidence.181 Still, no norm of compensation will tell agents who
do a reasonably good job at proportioning their beliefs to their evidence to be
counterinductivists or to regularly believe the opposite of what they think their
evidence supports. On the other hand, if an (imaginary) agent’s evidence assessments
are peculiar enough, a norm of compensation may tell the agent to do just that. In
both cases, this is because believing what your evidence supports is an epistemic

I want to avoid all-things-considered rationality assessments of fallible agents. If we do the best we
can from the perspective of epistemic rationality, is our belief state rational, even though it’s not
perfect? I’m not sure. But I’m also not sure that much hangs on the answer to this question.
180 Cf. Rawls (1999b: 90) on the role of ideal political theory.
181 I’ll discuss this case in more detail below.
179
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ideal. Or, for another example, consider Probabilism. Even if Probabilism is a norm
of perfection and norms of compensation will allow our beliefs to fail to conform to
the probability calculus, Probabilism may still set an ideal that guides our belief
revision. For example, suppose I have three logically independent sets of beliefs, A,
B, and C. Suppose further that A is probabilistically coherent, but B and C are both
incoherent. One option I have is to revise the beliefs in A to make A incoherent;
another option is to revise the beliefs in B to make B coherent. From the perspective
of Probabilism, pursuing the second option would be better than the first, even
though neither option would result in a fully coherent set of beliefs. If no other
epistemic considerations are in place, a norm of compensation may tell me to make
this very revision with the aim of approximating the ideal set by Probabilism.182
Although I think we should allow this talk of ideals, I think we need to do so
cautiously. Often the ideals that inform norms of compensation are the very ideals
perfect agents satisfy. Returning to the gentle murder example, gentle murder is
morally better than painful murder because, all else equal, actions producing less pain
are morally better than actions producing more. Crucially, this ideal is one that even
perfectly moral agents live by. But often the ideals we should approximate are not
ideals perfect agents would satisfy. David Lewis makes this point in terms of virtues,
when he (1986b: 586) writes, “many of our virtues consist of being good at coping
with our limitations. (Whatever the divine virtues may be, they can scarcely include
curiosity, fortitude, or gumption.)” The same can be said about ideals. We shouldn’t
assume that what is a virtue or an ideal for us imperfect agents is likewise a virtue or
ideal for perfect agents. To illustrate, consider the political example of the ideal of
182

Cf. Zynda (1996: 190-1).
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“color-blindness.” The color-blindness ideal “extols a world in which no one draws
racial distinctions.”183 Insofar as approximating this ideal involves opting for policies
that ignore racial distinctions, we shouldn’t attempt to approximate it, since ignoring
racial distinctions is tantamount to ignoring race-based injustices. Instead, we should
opt for policies that are more sensitive, in the right ways, to racial distinctions than
ones we have adopted in the past certainly, and even up to this point. Given our long
history of race-based injustice, in order to ameliorate the situation of those who have
been, and currently are, on the receiving end of this injustice, one of our social ideals
ought to be color-awareness. However, it strikes me as being fairly plausible that in
the ideal society – or, at least, a perfect utopia that never has been and never will be
structured by racial inequality – the color-blindness ideal would be realized.184 If this
is right, then it may be true, in some sense, that color-blindness is a political ideal,
while it’s also true, perhaps in a different sense, that color-awareness is a political
ideal. But, given the contingencies of our situation, our political norms of
compensation ought to be guided by the color-awareness ideal rather than the colorblindness ideal. Similar points apply in the epistemic domain. As I explain below, I
think failure to take care with this point has led to some confusion.
In the last paragraph, I quoted David Lewis to help make an important point.
It’s worth noting that it’s no coincidence that Lewis made a point so congenial to the
position I’m developing here. For although he never developed it in any detail, I
think he held a position very much like it. Lewis was among the arch-Bayesians of
the 20th century, and he was responsible for one of the most influential arguments

Anderson (2010: 155).
Anderson (2010: 177-9) carefully assesses this thought, concluding that she is “agnostic about the
value of the color-blind ideal for an ideal world.”
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for Conditionalization. Yet, he didn’t think you should always and only
conditionalize. When discussing Jeffrey Conditionalization – an alternative to
Conditionalization motivated by the fact that we are imperfect at identifying our
evidence – Lewis (1999: 404) writes:
Richard Jeffrey has suggested that we should respond to experiential
evidence not by conditionalizing, but rather by a less extreme redistribution
of degrees of belief. Despite appearances, I do not disagree. He and I are
considering different cases. My advice is addressed to a severely idealized,
superhuman subject who runs no risk of mistaking his evidence, and who
therefore can only lose if he hedges against that risk. Jeffrey’s advice is
addressed to a less idealized, fallible subject who has no business heeding
counsels of perfection that he is unable to follow.185
According to Lewis (1986a: 85), “Canons of reasonable belief need not be counsels
of perfection,” and conditionalization is a “counsel of perfection” addressed to ideal
subjects, whereas Jeffrey Conditionalization is addressed to fallible subjects like us.
Elsewhere when Lewis addresses the question of whether Conditionalization is the
only reasonable way of updating beliefs, he (1986a: 88) suggests that “the cases
where it seems wrong to Conditionalize may all be cases where one departure from
ideal rationality is needed to compensate for another.” He (1999: 404) describes such
a case in the Introduction to his short paper “Why Conditionalize?”
[I]t seems that we should sometimes respond to conceptual discoveries by
revising our beliefs. If first you divide your belief between hypotheses H1, H2,
H3, and ‘none of the above’, and then you discover that ‘none of the above’
includes a hitherto unnoticed H4 that is far nicer than the other three, you
would be wise to shift some of your belief to H4, even though you would not
be conditionalizing on experiential evidence. Our ideal subject, who never
changes his belief except by conditionalizing, will never do that. Is he pigheaded? No—being ideal, he has left no conceptual discoveries unmade. He
made them all in his cradle. So he has no occasion to respond to new
conceptual discoveries. But we, who are not so smart, would be unwise to
emulate him. Some of our departures from ideal rationality are just what we
need to compensate for other departures.
185

Lewis (1986a: 586) makes a similar argument.
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An interesting feature of this case is that it’s analogous to the Doctor Brown case
above. It would be best for the agent to do A at t1 and then do B at t2 (make all
conceptual discoveries/only conditionalize; give M1/give M1 again). But given that
the agent failed to do A by doing C at t1, she ought to do D rather than B at t2 (leave
conceptual discoveries unmade/shift belief without conditionalizing; give M2/give
M2 again). Moreover, Lewis’s cases taken together – the mistaking evidence case and
the conceptual discovery case – reinforce the need for the distinction I drew above
between secondary norms that are sensitive to the risk of compliance failure –
mistaking evidence case – and those that are sensitive merely to actual compliance
failure – the conceptual discovery case.
On Lewis’s view, we could have our cake and eat it too. There are, at least,
two kinds of norms: counsels of perfection – norms like Conditionalization – and
norms that require departures from ideal rationality to compensate for our other
departures – norms like Jeffrey Conditionalization. For Lewis, fallibility
considerations don’t tell against his counsels of perfection, just as for Rawls
considerations of compliance failure and unfavorable conditions don’t tell against
norms issued by ideal theory.
I’m dwelling on Lewis because he sets a precedent for the epistemological
view I’ve been developing.186 No one writing in the contemporary literature on the
relation between fallibility and epistemic normativity mentions Lewis’s (albeit brief)
work on this topic.187 And, as far as I can tell, the type of view I’ve been developing

Lewis, in turn, may be following the precedent, which I’m also following, that was set in political
philosophy by Rawls.
187 Several people have mentioned Lewis’s (1971) argument that inductive methods must be
immodest. But, as the quoted passages above reveal, this is only one strand of his work that has
implications regarding the relation between fallibility and epistemic normativity.
186
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has been mentioned only once in this literature.188 But, as I’d now like to argue, this
view has interesting implications for a number of disputes in that literature.

5.4 Disagreement, Fixed-Points, and Higher-Order Evidence
In this section, I’ll outline some debates concerning the epistemic significance of
fallibility, and I’ll show how the approach I’ve been developing can help us make
progress in those debates.

Disagreement. Cory and Indy disagree about whether P is true. They know each
other has the same evidence concerning P, and they take each other to be equally
likely to arrive at the belief best supported by their evidence if they disagree. Let’s
stipulate that Cory assessed her evidence correctly, and Indy assessed her evidence
incorrectly. On the Right Reasons view (RR, hereafter), since Cory arrived at the
belief supported by the original shared evidence before discovering the disagreement,
she ought to maintain that belief after discovering the disagreement. On
Conciliationism, Cory ought to bracket the original shared evidence, her belief
concerning P, and any other relevant information about which she and Indy disagree;
then she ought to revise her belief in P in proportion to the extent that her remaining
evidence gives her good reason to think that she and Indy are equally likely to be
correct in this instance.

Titelbaum (2015: 291) devotes a few sentences to this sort of view, explicitly citing Rawls’s
distinction between ideal and nonideal theory, in the second to last paragraph of his otherwise
incredibly thorough paper on the relation between epistemic norms and fallibility. Moreover, the view
he discusses is one on which the relevant fallible agents are in rational dilemmas. However, if norms
of perfection never apply to fallible agents, there’s no guarantee, on the view I’m developing, that
fallible agents are in rational dilemmas, and so it’s not even clear that Titelbaum has the view I’m
developing in mind.
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RR theorists and many Conciliationists agree that the evidence of
disagreement doesn’t change whether Cory’s evidence supports P.189 They disagree
about the implications of this fact. Conciliationists affirm, and RR theorists deny,
that in spite of this fact Cory ought to give up her belief in a wide range of cases.
This position, following from the requirement to bracket some of her evidence, flies
in the face of the Evidentialist Dictum. Conciliationists tell agents to believe on the
basis, not of their total relevant evidence, but of a proper subset of that evidence.
And, of course, many, including RR theorists, find the Conciliationist position
objectionable for approving a norm with this implication.
But let’s look at the motivations for these positions. In my opinion,
Titelbaum (2015) provides the strongest argument for RR. The argument begins with
the “Fixed-Point Thesis,” which says “Mistakes about the requirements of rationality
are mistakes of rationality.” This implies that if you have a false belief about the
requirements of rationality, then that belief is irrational; in other words, there’s never
a situation in which agents ought to have false beliefs about the requirements of
rationality. But if RR is false, there will be situations in which agents ought to have
false beliefs about the requirements of rationality. Suppose Cory believed P because
she believed her original evidence, E, rationally required belief in P. If she’s required
to give up her belief in P when she discovers the disagreement, she also needs to give
up her belief in what E rationally required. Indy’s disagreement isn’t just evidence
against Cory’s belief about P, it’s also evidence that Cory’s assessment of the
evidence – namely, that E required belief in P – is mistaken. But if Cory is forced to
RR theorists include Titelbaum (2015), Weatherson (2013, MS), Lasonen-Aarnio (2014).
Conciliationists who accept this conclusion include Christensen (2010, 2011) and van Wietmarschen
(2013). Sliwa and Horowitz (2015) accept a similar conclusion. See the other chapters of this
dissertation for more details.
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agree with Indy that E doesn’t require belief in P, or perhaps that E requires belief in
~P, then she will have a false belief about the requirements of rationality. According
to the Fixed-Point Thesis, though, this belief is irrational. So, this cannot be how
Cory is required to respond to disagreement. Since this line of reasoning started with
the assumption that RR is false, RR is true. Titelbaum (2015: 274) summarizes the
picture behind this argument:
Generally, an agent’s total evidence will never all-things-considered support
an a priori falsehood about the rational rules, because the rational rules are
structured such that no situation permits or requires a belief that contradicts
them. There may be pieces of evidence that provide some reason to believe a
falsehood about the rational rules, or evidence may provide prima facie
support for such false beliefs. But the properly restricted rules will never
make such false beliefs all-things-considered rational.
In this case, the evidence of disagreement may provide Cory with some reason to
think E doesn’t require belief in P, but she will always have (all-things-considered) a
priori justification to believe E requires belief in P, and therefore to stand by her
belief in P when she discovers the disagreement.
Before commenting on this argument, I want to review the motivation
behind Conciliationism. Christensen (2013: 77) nicely summarizes this motivation:
[A] common thread uniting [conciliatory] views is the recognition that we
may make mistakes in assessing evidence; that the disagreement of others
who have assessed the same evidence differently provides at least some
reason to suspect that we have in fact made such a mistake; and that reason
to suspect that we’ve made a mistake in assessing the evidence is often also
reason to be less confident in the conclusion we initially came to. The
rationale for revision, then, expresses a certain kind of epistemic modesty.
The contrast between these two motivations is stark. One is deeply theoretical, and
ultimately relies on the claim that we have empirically indefeasible a priori
justification for all the truths of rationality. The other begins with recognition of our
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fallibility. What I want to say is that we can capture both motivations if we take RR
to be a norm of perfection and Conciliationism to be a norm of compensation.190
It may be true that ideal agents will always heed the Evidentialist Dictum by
perfectly proportioning their beliefs to their evidence. But, for those of us who run
the risk of making mistakes about what our evidence supports while being incapable
of always discerning on our own whether we’ve made those mistakes, bracketing
some of our evidence when we have excellent and especially clear evidence that
we’ve in fact made such a mistake might be the best way of compensating for this
imperfection. Just as in the risky version of the Doctor Brown case, the risk of
noncompliance required a certain sort of noncompliance, likewise the risk that we all
face of failing to comply with the Evidentialist Dictum may require, as the
Conciliationist says it does, that we take precautions by committing to bracket our
evidence when we have good reason to think we have misassessed that evidence. In
other words, we know we’re going to fail to comply with the Evidentialist Dictum; a
precautionary commitment to bracketing our evidence when we have evidence of
this failure may be better than sometimes complying and sometimes failing to
comply with the Dictum without taking such precautions.
Commenting on the sort of motivation Titelbaum offers in favor of RR,
Worsnip (2015: 28-9) writes that the a priori truths about evidential support relations
are:
often radically unobvious to us. For example, what is the evidential support
relation between the proposition that it seems to you that you have hands
and the proposition that you have hands? What is the evidential support
relation between the proposition that a theory is simple and the proposition
that the theory is true? What is the evidential support relation between the
proposition that past scientific theories failed and the proposition that our
190

I should note that this is explicitly not how Titelbaum understands the position he develops.
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current theories are false?...I think we are in pretty bad epistemic positions
with respect to these questions—much worse epistemic positions than we
face with respect to common empirical questions. Many people would have
no idea how to answer them whatsoever. As such, the best evidence they
have to go on about them will often be testimonial and by upbringing—by
learning from others what to take as evidence for what. So I think it is highly
implausible to say that these questions are ones about which everyone
possesses indefeasible a priori evidence that renders (potentially misleading)
empirical evidence irrelevant.
I agree with most of what Worsnip says here. These truths are often unobvious to
us, and for this reason relying on what others take to be the facts of evidential
support is what we sometimes ought to do. But we need to distinguish two
questions. First, do we possess indefeasible a priori justification for evidential
support truths? And, second, ought we believe in accord with this justification? The
fact that we possess imperfect a priori justification identifying abilities, or as Worsnip
puts it, the fact that we’re in a bad epistemic position with respect to these a priori
issues, doesn’t bear on the first question, but it does bear on the second. Worsnip
appeals to people’s limitations to reach the conclusion that we lack the a priori
evidence Titelbaum claims we have. This is the sort of inference I warned about in
section 2. The fact that many of us, who are imperfect at identifying the a priori
justification we have, should rely on testimonial evidence about a priori matters does
nothing to show that we lack that a priori justification. We may have it, but, due to
our limited powers of a priori reasoning, we should rely on the non-a priori evidence
at our disposal. Those who can perfectly identify their a priori justification, or whose
powers of a priori reasoning far surpass our own, ought to rely on that evidence and
dismiss the misleading empirical evidence that our imperfections require us to rely
on.
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If we understand RR as a norm of perfection, and Conciliationism as a norm
of compensation, we can capture the motivations behind both views. A perfectly
rational agent who never fails to correctly assess her evidence, and who knows this
about herself, shouldn’t abandon her beliefs in the face of disagreement. But, to echo
Lewis, we imperfect folk who run the risk of incorrectly assessing our evidence will
need to bracket our assessments, even the correct ones, to avoid the unwarranted
dogmatism to which our fallibility makes us susceptible. In general, when the
justification for a norm relies on the claim that we’re fallible and the norm is aimed at
helping us cope with our fallibility, that norm should be understood as a norm of
compensation. (Or, at least, insofar as the justification supports taking the norm to
be a true norm of any kind, it will only support taking it to be a norm of
compensation.) If the justification for a norm doesn’t rely on our fallibility, or any
other imperfections, the norm should be understood as a norm of perfection.

Higher-Order Evidence. Evidence of disagreement is a type of higher-order
evidence. Higher-order evidence is evidence about the relation between one’s
evidence and one’s beliefs. It’s often evidence that one has made a rational mistake in
arriving at one’s current beliefs. When it is, we can say it’s fallibility-based higherorder evidence. Following Lewis, on my view only fallible agents’ beliefs – not
perfectly rational agents’ beliefs – ought to be influenced by fallibility-based higherorder evidence. I’ll defend this thought in a little more detail below. For now, let’s
suppose it’s right. On this assumption, some otherwise puzzling claims start to make
more sense.
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To illustrate, consider Josh Schechter’s discussion of what he calls the “fixedpoint argument.” He considers several versions of this argument, which are all
arguments in favor of theses roughly equivalent to Titelbaum’s Fixed-Point Thesis.
Here’s the simplest version of the fixed-point argument:
The fixed-point argument can also be put in terms of incoherence among
beliefs. Suppose that my epistemic system includes a rule that tells me to
believe that p (given my current epistemic state). Suppose that it also tells me
that I shouldn’t fully trust that very rule. In this case, it tells me that I should
believe that p and that I shouldn’t fully trust the recommendation to believe
that p. This is incoherent.191
The conclusion of the fixed-point argument is that a thinker’s epistemic system – the
collection of basic rules that a thinker employs – never tells her that she shouldn’t
fully trust one of the system’s rules.192 When might my epistemic system tell me I
shouldn’t fully trust one its rules? When I have higher-order evidence that this rule is
mistaken. (For instance, I form a belief on the basis of this rule, then I receive
higher-order evidence that my belief is irrational because it’s formed on that basis.)
Schechter resists the fixed-point argument. What, according to Schechter, is the
problem with the argument?
I suspect that the right diagnosis is that (a) in some cases, we can be justified
in believing the pronouncements of an incoherent epistemic system; and (b)
we are rationally required to be incoherent. In general, there is a rational ideal
to avoid epistemic incoherence—we should avoid commitments that can be
seen by us to be incompatible. But in some cases, we are rationally required
to violate this ideal. Being an epistemically modest thinker is also a rational
ideal, as is apportioning one’s beliefs to the evidence. Epistemic modesty and
respecting the evidence each require that we believe that our basic rules are
imperfect. This leads to incoherence.193

Schechter (2013: 445).
Some characterize this feature of epistemic systems by saying they’re immodest; they always
recommend full trust in themselves. See Lewis (1971).
193 Schechter (2013: 447).
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But Schechter isn’t fully satisfied with this diagnosis because “The claim that we are
rationally required to be incoherent is a radical view.”
I want to make two points about Schechter’s remarks. First, as I argued in
section 3, we need to be careful not to “mix” ideals. I distinguished between two
types of ideals: ones that guide both norms of compensations and norms of
perfection, and ones that guide only norms of compensation. Like the moral ideal to
minimize pain, the epistemic ideal to avoid incoherence plausibly guides both sorts
of norms. However, on my view, the epistemic ideals of epistemic modesty and
epistemic immodesty respectively correspond to the political ideals of colorawareness and color-blindness. Epistemic modesty is an ideal – like Lewis’s virtues
of curiosity, fortitude, and gumption – that helps us to cope with our limitations. A
perfectly rational agent would not be epistemically modest, just as the ideal society
would not be color-aware. Aiming at the ideal of epistemic modesty would only mar
a perfectly rational agent.
On the other hand, and this is the second point, although we fallible agents
should approximate both ideals – epistemic modesty and avoiding incoherence – the
view that we’re rationally required to be incoherent isn’t radical on the position I’m
developing. This view, or at least this kind of view, is to be expected. Being
epistemically modest, responding to higher-order evidence, and whatever else we do
to compensate for our fallibility is likely to lead us into imperfection because we’re
starting out from a position of imperfection. Just as in Rawls’s prisoners of war
example the least unjust arrangement includes slavery, and just as Rawls explains that
sometimes the least unjust arrangement will include measures and policies that a
perfectly just system would reject, so it is in the epistemic realm when our fallibility is
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taken for granted. The perfectly rational agent will not be incoherent. But that we are
required to be incoherent is unsurprising, if the reason we are so required is to
compensate for our imperfections. We’re not left with a view on which every
possible epistemic agent is rationally required to be incoherent; that view would be
radical. Rather, we’re only left with a view on which imperfect epistemic agents are
required to be incoherent.
Similar remarks apply to some claims Christensen (2010a) makes. In taking
higher-order evidence into account in certain cases, Christensen (2010a: 193) writes,
“an agent is forced to embody a kind of epistemic imperfection.” And, according to
Christensen (2010a: 212), higher-order evidence is “prone to being rationally toxic:
that is, being such that once the agent has it, she is doomed to fall short of some
rational ideal.” Now, if the reason we need to heed higher-order evidence in the first
place is that we’re rationally imperfect, then it doesn’t seem wholly accurate to say
that higher-order evidence “forces” us to embody epistemic imperfection; rather the
imperfect conditions that require respecting the higher-order evidence are
responsible for the resulting imperfection. And if I’m right that only rationally
imperfect agents are required to heed higher-order evidence, the consequences of
heeding this evidence pointed out by Christensen are to be expected. Rationally
imperfect agents were bound to fall short of rational ideals. That there is no perfect
way to respond to higher-order evidence is unsurprising if the reason we must
respond to it is that we’re imperfect. (Compare: that there is no morally perfect way
for Smith to behave is unsurprising if Smith is committed to murdering Jones.)
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Epistemic Akrasia. Before moving on, let’s consider one final debate concerning
higher-order evidence. According to the Non-Akrasia Constraint, it can never be
rational to have high confidence in claims of the form “P, but my evidence doesn’t
support P” or “P, but I ought not believe P.”194 By way of explanation, Horowitz
(2013: 1) writes “Just as an akratic agent acts in a way she believes she ought not act,
an epistemically akratic agent believes something that she believes is unsupported by
her evidence.” The Non-Akrasia Constraint might seem obviously true. But we need
to be careful in how we understand it. Lasonen-Aarnio (2014: 342) argues for a view
on which the Non-Akrasia Constraint is false by arguing that “there is no nonparadoxical notion of justification or epistemic rationality that can accommodate”
the two ideas (1) that for any epistemic rule or principle, there are possible situations
in which one acquires evidence that a doxastic state that is in fact an output of that
rule is flawed and (2) that in such circumstances epistemic rationality calls for
revising the doxastic states in question. In other words, there is no non-paradoxical
notion of epistemic rationality that can accommodate defeat by higher-order
evidence. For Lasonen-Aarnio, receiving higher-order evidence doesn’t change what
agents should believe about first-order matters; rather, it changes what they should
believe about what they ought to believe. When agents have sufficiently strong
higher-order evidence that one of their rational beliefs is irrational, agents should
maintain that belief while adopting the belief that it is irrational for her to believe it,
or that she ought not to believe it.
Now, I’m more inclined to side with Conciliationists about how to
understand the rational impact of higher-order evidence. But it also strikes me as
Horowitz (2013: 1). Titelbaum (2015) appeals to a version of this constraint to defend the FixedPoint Thesis.
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being plausible that there will not always be a uniquely rational way to compensate
for our rational imperfections. So, I think Lasonen-Aarnio’s proposal needs to be
taken seriously. Since she’s advancing a norm that expresses how agents ought to
respond to higher-order evidence and, on my view, only fallible agents ought to
respond to such evidence, this norm needs to be taken seriously only as a norm of
compensation. However, Horowitz defends the Non-Akrasia Constraint against
higher-order evidence based considerations while almost explicitly taking it to be a
norm of perfection. She (2013: 1) writes, “The Non-Akrasia Constraint says that
ideally rational agents will never be epistemically akratic.”195 Understood in this way,
the Constraint strikes me as being very plausible, and I think she’s right to think that
higher-order evidence-based arguments don’t tell against it. But a defense of this
Constraint isn’t a defense of the claim that fallible agents ought never to be
epistemically akratic. And that’s the claim that is at issue when epistemic akrasia is
supported by higher-order evidence based arguments.
To anyone familiar with Horowitz’s arguments, this might seem too quick.
She argues that believing and acting on the basis of the two beliefs that constitute the
epistemically akratic state – P and I ought not believe P, say – lead to highly
counterintuitive consequences. What difference does it make if the agents are ideal
or fallible? There are at least two reasons why it makes a difference. First, as I’ve
been arguing, imperfection is likely to be unavoidable for fallible agents. So, pointing
out that being epistemically akratic leads to additional strange/imperfect beliefs and
actions doesn’t imply that fallible agents ought not be epistemically akratic; there may
be no better option.
Cf. Greco (2014: 214) who writes: “Plausibly, if epistemic akrasia were ever rationally required,
then ideally rational agents would sometimes be epistemically akratic.”
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Second, when it comes to fallible agents, we have additional normative
resources. To illustrate, consider one of Horowitz’s examples. At t1, Sam believes P
on the basis of E. At t2, Sam receives higher-order evidence that E doesn’t support
P. Following Lasonen-Aarnio’s advice, suppose Sam believes P and Sam believes that
E doesn’t support P. Also, suppose Sam knows that E either supports P or supports
~P. Now Sam reasons as follows: “E doesn’t support P, so, E supports ~P. But P is
true, and when a body of evidence supports the negation of a truth, it’s misleading.
Therefore, E is misleading.” Horowitz thinks this is an illegitimate way of concluding
that one’s evidence is misleading. All of her examples work like this: if the agent
combines the beliefs that constitute her akratic state to make an inference or a
decision, she reaches a conclusion/decision she’s unwarranted in reaching. Suppose
we grant Horowitz that these conclusions and decisions are unwarranted. If we’re
dealing with ideal agents, this seems like a good reason to relinquish support for
epistemic akrasia. But if we’re dealing with fallible agents, we need only adopt an
additional norm of compensation, one that calls for compartmentalization;
something like: if you believe P and you believe that I ought not believe P, then you
ought not to infer or to act on the conjunction of these beliefs. (Richard Foley
recommends an analogous strategy in Lottery and Preface cases.
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Compartmentalizing like this may be rationally imperfect, but, again, while that may
While defending the legitimacy of sometimes having inconsistent sets of beliefs, Foley (2001: 53)
writes “inconsistency is not to be tolerated in the premises of arguments. An argument is credible only
to the degree that the conjunction of its premises is credible, but if one knows that a set of
propositions is inconsistent, one knows that their conjunction is false. So, one should never
knowingly allow inconsistency in the premises of arguments. … However, inconsistency can
sometimes be permitted in large and theoretically loose sets of propositions, as long as one does not
utilize the propositions together to argue or deliberate about the truth of other propositions”
[emphasis added]. An interesting side note might be worth mentioning: while arguing against the
rationality of epistemic akrasia, Greco (2014) argues that epistemic akrasia is a “species of
inconsistent” belief. If that’s right, and if Foley is right about the possible legitimacy of adopting
inconsistent sets of beliefs, then the application of Foley’s point is even smoother.
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imply that ideally rational agents will not do it, it doesn’t imply that we shouldn’t.197
So, if the view I’m defending is correct, those who endorse epistemic akrasia as the
best way of responding to fallibility-based higher-order evidence have a response to
an argument against their view that is unavailable to those who endorse epistemic
akrasia as potentially perfectly rational.
This is the power of the position I’ve developed here. On the one had, there
are many compelling epistemic positions that are motivated independently of
fallibility considerations. On the other, there are compelling positions whose
motivations depend on our fallibility. By most everyone else’s lights, we need to
choose between these positions. By the lights of the position I’ve developed, we can
do justice to the respective motivations of these views without choosing. This
attempt at reconciliation is not without its apparent costs, however. In the next
section, I answer an important objection to my view.

5.5 Are Ideally Rational Agents Epistemically Modest?
Ideally rational agents (IRAs) are agents who reason perfectly.198 I’ve claimed that
they are also agents who heed norms of perfection, and that they should be
unmoved by fallibility-based higher-order evidence. The reasoning for this position is
fairly straightforward. To reason perfectly you must perfectly apply epistemic rules,
or rules of reasoning, to your situation. To do this, you must be certain of your
situation and certain of the epistemic rules. And such certainty has its benefits: it will
allow one to correctly dismiss as misleading any evidence that suggests that one has
reasoned imperfectly.
The bracketing Conciliationists call for is a sort of compartmentalizing, as well. Coping with our
fallibility may require, in one way or another, compartmentalization.
198 I take this definition from Christensen (2007b).
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This way of putting the argument suggests that, for IRAs, epistemic
situations and epistemic rules are luminous, and this may lead some to object to my
view. A condition is luminous for an agent just in case whenever it obtains the agent
is in a position to know that it obtains. Hasn’t Williamson (2000) shown that only the
most trivial and uninteresting conditions are luminous? This objection can be easily
met. For even granting the soundness of Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments, as
Williamson (2000: 13) himself notes, “The main idea behind the argument against
luminosity is that our powers of discrimination are limited.” When he discusses
luminosity failure, Williamson is not discussing the merely possible superbeings that
IRAs would have to be. Rather, he’s talking about beings like us.199 Nothing I’ve said
requires me to disagree with Williamson.
Christensen (2007b) advances a more serious concern. According to
Christensen, IRAs cannot rule out the possibility that for any particular belief they
have, they hold that belief as a result of a cognitive mistake. So, they cannot be
absolutely confident in the truth of any of their beliefs. According to Christensen
(2007b: 24), this shows that there turns out to be a strange way in which the mere
possibility of epistemic misadventure implies an actual epistemic imperfection.” For
either an IRA is certain of some logical truth, in which case her beliefs fail to
appropriately reflect the possibility of error, or she is uncertain of that truth, in which
case her beliefs fail to be probabilistically coherent. If she could somehow rule out
the possibility of error, she could be certain of the logical truth and there would be
nothing wrong with her beliefs failing to reflect the possibility of error. But,
Cf. Srinivasan (2015: 317): “If the anti-luminosity argument were meant to apply to all possible
creatures, we need nothing very much to show it to be impotent. For the anti-luminosity argument is
trivially compatible with various possible creatures for whom feeling cold and a whole range of other
conditions are luminous.”
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Christensen argues, we must all live with and account for the possibility of error in
our beliefs, and that includes IRAs.
I’m inclined to respond: if the possibility of error implies epistemic
imperfection, then for IRAs, as perfectly rational epistemic agents, there is no
possibility of error. One person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens, and all
that. What would be wrong with this response? After all, we’ve already admitted that
what’s normatively true for perfect agents isn’t necessarily true for imperfect agents.
So, for instance, the fact that IRAs would dismiss evidence of rational error doesn’t
imply that we should.
This wouldn’t satisfy Christensen, for he thinks candidate explanations of
how IRAs can rationally rule out the possibility of error fail. One way to defend the
claim that IRAs can rule out the possibility of error, for instance, is to show that
IRAs know that they are ideally rational. But, Christensen points out, whereas IRAs
are often assumed to be logically omniscient, they aren’t assumed to be factually
omniscient, and so this conception of an IRA carries with it no obvious presumption
that an IRA would know this about herself.
Of course, requiring that IRAs know themselves to be ideally rational doesn’t
require them to be factually omniscient, and if reasoning perfectly does require IRAs
to know themselves to be ideal, or at least to know of any particular belief they have
that it is rational, then the conception of an IRA as an agent that reasons perfectly
may limit an IRA’s ignorance without requiring full blown factual omniscience. Such
knowledge may be a byproduct of the requirement that IRAs reason perfectly.
Titelbaum (2015: 256) thinks of logical omniscience requirements in the same way:
“Formal theorists don’t require logical omniscience because formal theorists like the
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requirement; logical omniscience is a side-effect of systems capturing the rational
requirements theorists are after.” Likewise, if lacking some factual knowledge
prevents IRAs from reasoning perfectly, then imputing this knowledge to IRAs may
be a necessary side-effect of taking IRAs to be perfect reasoners. And if lacking
knowledge of their own rational perfection prevents them from being coherent, then
lacking this knowledge does prevent IRAs from reasoning perfectly.
But knowledge requires warrant, and IRAs cannot be warranted in being
absolutely certain in their own rational perfection, Christensen argues. Neither
memory, nor induction, nor introspection, nor any sort of first-person presumption
of rationality can guarantee absolute confidence in one’s own ideality. Neither can an
IRA bootstrap her way to this knowledge, through thousands of accurate proofs and
awareness of their accuracy. And neither can the self-evidence of logical truths justify
an IRA in ruling out the possibility of error. Or so Christensen argues.
Although I don’t have a theory to offer of how IRAs get this knowledge, I
don’t find Christensen’s arguments to be persuasive. Each relies on too tight of an
analogy between fallible agents and IRAs. Consider the self-evidence method
example. For us, suppose, the claim that everything is self-identical – call it T’ – is
self-evident. And so it might be thought that such self-evidence would allow us to
rule out the possibility of error about this proposition. Moreover, one might think
that IRAs would experience all logical truths in the way we experience T’.
Accordingly, IRAs could rule out the possibility of error about all logical truths. But
Christensen thinks that no matter how self-evident a logical truth is for us, we
cannot completely rule out the possibility of error. He (2007b: 19) writes:
Even if there were some special way of seeing clearly and distinctly that
occurs when I contemplate claims like T’, I don’t think I can rationally be
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absolutely certain that no drug or demon could make it seem to me that I’m
seeing clearly and distinctly when in fact I’m contemplating a falsity.
By analogy, he concludes that even if all logical truths strikes an IRA in this way,
“she cannot absolutely preclude the possibility that her cognitive process has
misfired or been interfered with in a way that allows some falsehoods to seem selfevidently true.” However, the analogy between how we experience T’ and how an
IRA would experience all logical truths is only an analogy; the cases needn’t be
perfectly analogous, and not all conclusions concerning one case will carry over to
the other. We are logically fallible. The IRA isn’t. Perhaps logical infallibility has a
phenomenological trace. In effect, Christensen must deny that the conditions of
logical error and accuracy are luminous for IRAs. I’m not exactly sure how to show
that Christensen would be wrong to deny this, but arguing by analogy with ordinary
humans seems to be a weak strategy.
For one more example, consider the bootstrapping method. Consider Ira, an
IRA. Each time Ira considers a logical truth, he adopts two beliefs: this proposition
is a logical truth, and I believe it’s a logical truth. And each time Ira considers
propositions that aren’t logical truths, he adopts two beliefs: this proposition is not a
logical truth, and I believe it’s not a logical truth. He does this a million times.
Eventually he concludes that he has an extraordinary logical truth detection ability.
Can this be rational? Christensen argues (2007b: 17) that it can’t be, as it:
would be like an agent consulting the gas gauge in her car to determine both
the level of fuel and what the gas gauge read, and using the resulting beliefs
to rationalize confidence that the gauge was accurate; or looking at a series of
colored squares to determine both what color the squares were and how they
looked, and using that to make rational her confidence that her color vision
was accurate. If the agent begins with a rational moderate degree of
confidence in her theorem-recognition abilities, it seems clear that she cannot
make higher confidence rational in the manner envisaged.
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But there’s an important respect in which Ira’s process would be unlike either of
these other processes: Ira would never be mistaken when he reasons as he does,
whereas these other processes might lead to error. And while none of us should
reason as Ira does, it doesn’t follow that there’s something wrong when Ira reasons
in this way.
This is how I think things stand. Christensen is right that the possibility of
rational error implies epistemic imperfection. But this only shows that for IRAs –
agents who reason perfectly – there is no possibility of rational error. To reason
perfectly in accord with logical truths, one must be certain of those truths. So, IRAs
must be certain of logical truths. Any argument to the contrary must do more than
rely on an analogy with humans. It must show that there is some special reason to
think that agents who would otherwise reason perfectly – i.e., agents with cognitive
abilities incredibly more sophisticated than ours – could not rule out the possibility
of error.

5.6 Conclusion
I began this paper with a puzzle. Applications of the Fallibility Norm appeared to
conflict with other compelling epistemic norms. Rather than giving up on these
applications of the Fallibility Norm or on these other norms, I’ve developed a
normative approach – one that has a precedent in ethics and political theory but is
rarely discussed in epistemology – that allows us to capture both sets of norms. With
respect to these norms, then, I don’t think the Pessimistic Conflict Option is true.
Whether the No Conflict Position or the Optimistic Conflict Position is true
depends on how we carve up the circumstances on which the oughts of norms are
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conditional. But, in any case, the position I’ve developed is importantly different
from other versions of these views. No Conflict Positions typically deflate the
significance of fallibility, while Optimistic Conflict Positions often inflate its
significance. Titelbaum’s version of RR is a prime example of the former: on his
view, ordinary epistemic agents have and should believe in accord with indefeasible a
priori justification, and they should ultimately dismiss higher-order evidence against
this justification. This view doesn’t take our limitations seriously. And Christensen
endorses a version of the Optimistic Conflict Position that implies that even ideally
rational agents should be epistemically modest. I’ve developed a middle way that
requires fallible agents to treat their fallibility as epistemically significant, but that
allows rationally infallible agents to dismiss evidence of rational error. I’ve also
shown how this kind of view can clarify other debates surrounding the epistemic
significance of fallibility. All of these considerations taken together hopefully show
that the view I’ve been developing can be illuminating and needs to be taken
seriously.
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